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Abstract 
 
 
This dissertation consists of two essays: one looks at the time-varying relationship 
between earnings and price momentum, and the other looks at how liquidity and transparency 
affect the pricing differential between Chinese A-and Hong Kong H-share. 
The first essay presented in Chapter I investigates the time varying relationship between 
earnings momentum and price momentum. Using a Markov-switching framework, allowing for 
variation between high volatility and low volatility states, I find that price momentum is 
significantly more influenced by earnings momentum in the high volatility state. Further for 
price momentum I find that loser firms display a higher degree of differential response to 
earnings momentum across the low and high volatility states than winner firms. Limited 
financing and investor’s sensitivity to future investment opportunities might explain these two 
results. A further analysis indeed indicates that loser firms tend to be more financially 
constrained.  Additionally, I investigate the relationship between investor sentiment and the two 
momentums and find that sentiment only has predictive power for price momentum profits in the 
low volatility state. Finally, the results are robust regardless of instrument variables.  
The second essay presented in Chapter 2 examines the impact of liquidity and 
transparency on the discount attached to H-shares from 2003 to 2011. The higher the relative 
illiquidity of an H-share, the more the H-share is discounted relative to the underlying A-share 
price. In addition, more actively traded A-shares and infrequently traded H-shares are associated 
with a higher H-share discount. Further, increases in the number of analysts following a firm, 
both in the A-and H- market, are accompanied by a lower H-share discount. Also, a firm with a 
higher percentage of A-share holdings by mutual funds is associated with a smaller H-share 
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discount. Overall, the results provide support for the notion that liquidity and transparency affect 
the relative pricing of A- and H-shares.  
 
Keywords:  earnings momentum, price momentum, regime-switching, discount, illiquidity, 
transparency 
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Chapter 1 
The Relation between Earnings and Price Momentum: Does It Vary across Regimes? 
1. Introduction 
Earnings momentum and price momentum are well-known market anomalies. Each has 
been intensely studied in the empirical finance literature; however, there are relatively few 
studies investigating the relation between the two. Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) show a linear 
relationship between the two anomalies and conclude that price momentum can be captured by 
systematic earnings momentum. On the other hand Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) 
argue that although there is a correlation between earnings momentum and price momentum one 
effect cannot be subsumed by the other. This mixed evidence may be partly the result of the time 
varying relation between the two momentums. Consequently, this paper attempts to model a 
nonlinear relationship between the two using a Markov regime-switching framework 
incorporating macroeconomic information into the state transition probabilities. This framework 
is helpful in that it allows for variation in the relation between high volatility and low volatility 
states. 
In order to examine the relationship between these two anomalies, I first sort firms into 
decile portfolios based on the most recent standardized earnings surprise (or standardized 
unexpected earnings, SUE) to create an investment portfolio (PMN) that is long in the highest 
earnings surprise decile and is short in the lowest earnings surprise decile. Similarly, sorting 
firms into decile portfolios using past returns, I create a second investment portfolio (WML) that 
is long in past winners and short in past losers. I use each of these portfolios as the fourth factor 
in a regime-switching Fama-French model. The results from these models indicate that price 
momentum is significantly more influenced by earnings momentum in the high volatility state. 
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There are two possible explanations for this finding. First, from a financing perspective, the 
discount rate in the low volatility state has a large impact on stock prices but not necessarily on 
companies’ earnings. However in the high volatility state, when financing is more constrained, 
the discount rate makes a bigger difference on earnings. Therefore, the co-movement of price 
momentum and earnings momentum becomes stronger when volatility is higher. Second, from 
an investing perspective, PMN captures future aggregate investment opportunities and its 
predictive content becomes more important for investors in the high volatility state. Therefore, 
investors pay more attention to earnings information in the high volatility state, which could also 
result in a stronger relation between earnings and price momentum. 
No less important, I extend the analysis to allow firms with different degrees of SUE to 
respond differently to factors across volatility states. Likewise, I examine whether winner and 
loser firms display similar responses to earnings momentum across volatility states. This analysis 
is motivated by two observations. First, as argued above, financing and investment 
considerations might be important in explaining momentum. It is further argued that the 
importance of these considerations likely differs across firms. More specifically, firms with 
constraints on financing and investments likely are more vulnerable in more volatile conditions. 
Second, by comparing the firm characteristics of firms in the two extreme SUE portfolios, P10 
and P1, I find that that firms in the lowest SUE portfolio generally have high book-to-market 
ratios and small market value, (Chordia and Shivakumar (2006)) 1, as well as higher debt ratio 
and more constraints on financing. Similarly, by comparing the firm characteristics of firms in 
the two extreme price momentum portfolios, loser and winner, I find that firms in the loser 
portfolio generally have small market value, low book-to-market ratio, higher debt ratio and are 
                                                          
1
 Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) find the highest earnings surprise decile is generally composed of firms with large 
size, high book-to-market ratio and thus behaves more like a growth portfolio, whereas the lowest earnings surprise 
decile is composed of firms with small size, low book-to-market ratio and thus behaves like a value portfolio.  
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significantly more financially constrained than firms in the winner portfolio (Baytas and Cakici 
(1999), Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004))2.  Previous literature also suggests that  firms in the 
lowest SUE or loser portfolios also tend to be more sensitive to changes in the state of the 
economy (Perez-Quiros & Timmermann (2000), Gulen, Xing and Zhang (2011))3. I find that 
loser firms display a stronger differential response to both the market risk premium and earnings 
momentum (PMN) across low and high volatility states. In contrast, lowest SUE firms display a 
higher degree of asymmetry only to the market risk premium, but not to price momentum 
(WML). One explanation for this is that PMN captures future macroeconomic activities such as 
aggregate investment opportunities. Loser firms are generally small firms with high book-to-
market ratios that have limited financing access, higher financing costs and are potentially 
associated with higher credit risk. These properties make loser firms more sensitive to PMN than 
winner firms across states. In contrast, WML does not contain information about future 
economic or investment opportunities;4 therefore, lowest SUE and highest SUE firms do not 
react to WML asymmetrically. 
Finally, since momentum generally implies some degree of market inefficiency and thus 
might be caused by investor sentiment or return chasing behavior, whose strength may vary with 
economic conditions, I adopt two sentiment measures constructed by Baker and Wurgler (2006) 
to investigate the relationship between sentiment and the two momentums. I find that profits 
from earnings momentum are positive and do not vary with investor sentiment. In contrast, 
profits for price momentum exist only when investor sentiment is optimistic. When pessimistic, 
                                                          
2
 Baytas and Cakici (1999) provide evidence that in the U.S. the market value for loser firms is almost ten times 
smaller than that of winner firms, which is also confirmed by Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004). 
3
 Perez-Quiros & Timmermann (2000) find strong evidence that small firms display a higher asymmetry in their 
factor loadings than large firms across recession and expansion states. Gulen, Xing and Zhang (2011) find that when 
conditional volatilities are high, the expected excess returns of value stocks are more sensitive to aggregate 
economic conditions than the expected excess returns of growth stocks. 
4
 Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) and Liew and Vassalou (2000)  
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price momentum results in losses. This suggests a high correlation between price momentum and 
investor sentiment. Overall, the results indicate that sentiment has predictive power for price 
momentum profits, but not for earnings momentum profits. Moreover, this predictive power for 
price momentum profits is only pronounced in the low volatility state.  
 The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 examines the literature for price and 
earnings momentum, Section 3 describes data and how the portfolios and the sentiment measures 
are constructed, Section 4 presents the general econometric framework for incorporating 
asymmetries in the conditional distribution of stock returns, Section 5 applies this framework to 
a univariate regime-switching model for single decile regressions, Section 6 applies this 
framework to a bivariate model for the 1st and 10th deciles , Section 7 examines the relationship 
between investor sentiment and the two momentums, Section 8 is the robustness check and 
Section 9 concludes.  
2. Literature Review 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) are the first to document price momentum profits. The 
momentum strategy involves a portfolio that takes a long position in winner stocks and a short 
position in loser stocks. The stocks are first ranked monthly according to their performance, over 
the past six months, and then assigned to decile portfolios. These in turn are then held for a six 
month period. The authors report that a price momentum strategy earns more than 1% above the 
risk-free rate per month and that this return cannot be fully explained by size or market exposure. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) further confirm that the profits of price momentum strategies, of 
about 1% per month, continue through the 1990s suggesting that their initial results were not due 
to data mining. In addition, the robustness of this strategy has been confirmed using data from 
stock markets other than the U.S., where the profitability of this strategy was initially identified. 
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In particular, Rouwenhorst (1998) examines international markets and finds momentum payoffs 
to be significantly positive in twelve countries. More recently Cooper, Gutierrez and Hameed 
(2004) test overreaction theories of short-run momentum and long-run reversal in the cross 
section of stock returns. They find that momentum profits depend on the state (regime) of the 
market and that up-market momentum reverses in the long run. They also suggest that models of 
asset pricing, both rational and behavioral, need to incorporate such regime switches. 
Besides momentum strategies that utilize past returns, there is also a large body of 
literature on momentum strategies that utilize past earnings. Ball and Brown (1968) are the first 
to document earnings momentum or the post-earnings announcement drift, which encompasses 
the tendency of stock prices to move in the direction suggested by recent earnings surprises. 
Further Foster, Olsen and Shevlin (1984) are able to calculate a 25% annual profit from earnings 
momentum strategies. Bernard and Thomas (1989) link post-earnings announcement drift to 
behavioral finance on the assumption that investors fail to fully appreciate the earnings 
information, resulting in delayed price responses. In addition Hew, Skerratt, Strong and Walker 
(1996) investigate earnings momentum in the U.K. The authors find that earnings momentum is 
not statistically significant for larger companies and conclude that earnings momentum might be 
explained by trading costs, trading volumes and the amount of information available to investors 
before the announcement date.   
Additionally, there is a growing body of literature investigating the interaction between 
earnings and price momentum. Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) find that the profitability 
of earnings momentum strategies is still evident among large capitalization stocks, even after 
controlling for Fama-French factors. They further argue that although there is a correlation 
between the earnings momentum and price momentum, however, one effect cannot absorb the 
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other. Conversely Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) examine whether earnings momentum and 
price momentum are related and find that price momentum is captured by the systematic 
component of earnings momentum. They argue that the predictive power of past returns is 
subsumed by a zero investment portfolio that is long on stocks with high earnings surprises and 
short on stocks with low earnings surprises. More recently Leippold and Lohre (2009) find that 
price and earnings momentum are pervasive features of international equity markets, even when 
controlling for data snooping biases. For European markets, they find that price momentum is 
subsumed by earnings momentum on an aggregate level. However, this conclusion does not 
apply to each and every country. While the above explanation is confined to certain time periods 
in the U.S., earnings momentum nevertheless appears to be a crucial driver of the price 
momentum anomaly in many markets.  
The mixed results from these various studies may be due to the time varying relation 
between the two momentums. Therefore, I attempt to model a nonlinear relationship between 
price momentum and earnings momentum using a Markov regime-switching framework, 
incorporating macroeconomic information in the state transition probabilities. The Markov 
regime-switching framework has been widely applied in the area of nonlinear modeling. For 
example, Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000) adopt a flexible two-state regime-switching 
model to analyze the presence of asymmetries in the variation of small and large firm risk over 
the economic cycle. Their model shows that small firms display higher sensitivity to variables 
that measure credit market conditions. Another example is Gulen, Xing and Zhang (2011) which 
study time variations of the expected value premium using a two-state Markov-switching model. 
They find that when conditional volatilities are high the expected excess returns of value stocks 
are more sensitive to aggregate economic conditions than the expected excess returns of growth 
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stocks. As a result, the expected value premium is time varying. In fact, the value premium tends 
to go up in the high volatility state only to decline more gradually in subsequent periods. Further, 
momentum portfolios, as mentioned in Chordia and Shivakumar (2002), are highly influenced by 
the state of macroeconomic conditions. Because of these studies, it makes sense to examine 
earnings momentum and price momentum in a regime-based framework. 
In recent years, more empirical studies emerge focusing on the impact of investor sentiment 
on the profitability of momentum strategies.  Hou, Peng and Xiong (2009) find that price 
momentum profits are higher in up-market, but that earnings momentum profits are higher 
among low volume stock and down-market. In the long run, price momentum profits reverse but 
earnings momentum profits do not. Antoniou, Doukas and Subrahmanyam (2011) show that 
momentum profits arise only under optimism and are driven principally by strong momentum in 
losing stocks. They also show that momentum-based hedge portfolios formed during optimistic 
periods experience long run reversals. In conclusion, this literature provides a theoretical and 
economic foundation to study earning and price momentum in a non-linear framework. 
3. Data 
The paper focuses on excess returns of earning and price momentum portfolios. Excess 
returns are calculated as portfolio returns in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate. The data 
for one-month Treasury bill rates was obtained from Kenneth French’s website. Following 
Chordia and Shivakumar (2006), I create earnings portfolios that capture the post-earnings-
announcement-drift phenomenon. Each month, all NYSE-AMEX firms on the monthly CRSP 
files, along with data from COMPUSTAT, are sorted into deciles based on their standardized 
unexpected earnings (SUE) from the most recent earnings announcement. The firms are sorted 
each month into deciles based on the earnings in this quarter less earnings from four quarters ago. 
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In order to make a cross-sectional comparison, earnings are standardized5 using the standard 
deviation of the earnings changes in the prior eight quarters. Decile portfolios, which are also 
referred to as SUE portfolios, are formed by weighting equally all firms in the decile rankings. 
The positions are held for six months, t through t+5, which is designated as the holding period. I 
form price momentum decile portfolios on the basis of past returns. Portfolio returns are average 
monthly returns that are rebalanced monthly. The ten price momentum portfolios are formed on 
the basis of the prior six-month returns, where decile 1 comprises past "losers" and decile 10 
comprises past "winners." Thus, for each month t, all NYSE and AMEX stocks are ranked into 
deciles based on their formation period returns, t – 6 through t – 1. The momentum portfolios are 
formed by equally weighting all firms in the decile rankings. The positions are then held for a 
six-month period, t through t+5.  
 The sample period is from January 1972 to December 2010, for a total of 468 monthly 
observations. Table I Panel A presents the returns on the earnings momentum portfolios. Over 
the entire sample period, the mean monthly returns range from -0.79%, for the lowest SUE 
portfolio, to 1.92% for the highest SUE portfolio. The return from shorting the lowest SUE 
portfolio and holding the highest SUE portfolio (PMN) is a statistically and economically 
significant 2.71% per month with over 87% of the months being positive. Similarly, Table I 
Panel B presents the returns on the price momentum portfolios. The mean monthly returns range 
is from 0.80% for the loser portfolio to 1.23% for the winner portfolio. The return from shorting 
                                                          
5
 Using stock price, market capitalization, total assets, or sales variables might unintentionally proxy for size or 
expected returns; therefore, standardizing earnings is preferred. In other words by sorting firms on earnings changes, 
scaled by the above variables, this might bias towards capturing cross-sectional differences in expected returns 
associated with those variables. 
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Table I. Summary Statistics of Monthly Excess Returns to Earnings and Price Momentum Portfolios  
(January 1972 to December 2010) 
 
Each month, firms are sorted into deciles based on their standardized change in earnings from the most recent earnings announcement (SUE portfolios) or on 
their returns over the past 6-months (Momentum portfolios). In each month, SUE portfolios are computed using all earnings announcements made in the prior 4-
month period. The standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) for month t = (Eit -Eit-4)/σit , where Eit  is the most recently announced earnings and σit is the standard 
deviation of (Eit -Eit-4) over the prior 8 quarters. Momentum portfolios are sorted based on the returns of the prior 6-month period. The portfolios are then held for 
the following 6-month period. The table reports the returns to these portfolios as well as the payoffs from a strategy of being long on the highest portfolio (P10) 
and short on the lowest portfolio (P1). PMN is the profit from earnings momentum portfolios and WML is the profit from price momentum portfolios. P-values 
are reported in the parenthesis. Panel A reports results for SUE portfolios, while Panel B reports the results for momentum portfolios. 
 
Panel A. Earnings Momentum Portfolios 
 Lowest SUE Decile 2 Decile 3 Decile 4 Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile 8 Decile 9 Highest SUE PMN=P10-P1 
Mean -0.0079 -0.0023 0.0671 0.0022 0.0052 0.0099 0.0107 0.0146 0.0160 0.0192 0.0271 
t-Statistic 
(Mean=0) 
-2.46 
(0.01) 
-0.79 
(0.43) 
0.04 
(0.97) 
0.74 
(0.46) 
1.79 
(0.07) 
3.41 
(0.00) 
3.84 
(0.00) 
5.14 
(0.00) 
5.76 
(0.00) 
7.14 
(0.00) 
15.52 
(0.00) 
% > 0 41.88 50.64 50.43 52.14 55.34 57.48 57.48 61.32 62.61 62.82 86.97 
 
  
Panel B. Price Momentum Portfolios 
 Loser Decile 2 Decile 3 Decile 4 Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile 8 Decile 9 Winner WML=P10-P1 
Mean 0.0080 0.0080 0.0094 0.0094 0.0097 0.0098 0.0099 0.0100 0.0106 0.01225 0.0043 
t-Statistic 
(Mean=0) 
1.74 
(0.08) 
2.47 
(0.00) 
3.27 
(0.00) 
3.60 
(0.00) 
3.97 
(0.00) 
4.13 
(0.00) 
4.24 
(0.00) 
4.19 
(0.00) 
4.22 
(0.00) 
4.17 
(0.00) 
1.31 
(0.19) 
% > 0 51.82 52.99 57.05 60.04 60.90 60.26 61.75  60.90 61.11 60.26 64.53 
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the loser portfolio and holding the winner portfolio (WML) is 0.43% per month with over 64.53% 
of the months being positive. This is largely due to the disappearance of momentum profits since 
the late 1990s.6 This suggests that the profit from earnings momentum (PMN) seems to be more 
persistent than that of price momentum (WML). Figure I(a) plots the profits of PMN and WML 
portfolios over time and Figure I(b) plots the excess returns of the lowest SUE portfolio, the 
highest SUE portfolio, loser’s portfolio, and winner’s portfolio. It appears from both figures that 
PMN and WML is correlated over time, but that this correlation is certainly less than perfect. 
Therefore the relation between the two factors calls for a thorough investigation. 
 
Figure I(a) Plots of Profits from Earnings Momentum and Price Momentum 
Figure I(a) plots the expected returns on a strategy that is long on stocks with high earnings surprises and short on 
stocks with low earnings surprises (PMN) and a strategy of buying winners and selling losers (WML). Figure I(b) 
plots the expected excess returns for the lowest SUE portfolio (Panel A), the highest portfolio (Panel B), the loser’s 
portfolio (Panel C), and the winner’s portfolio (Panel D). 
 
                                                          
6There are numerous studies documenting how price momentum profits have been disappearing since the late 1990s, 
such as Bhattacharya, Kumar and Sonaer (2011). In my unreported sub-sample study from January 1972 to 
December 1999, the return on the WML portfolio is statistically and economically significant (t-stat= 2.62) with a 
return of 0.82% per month. 
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Figure I(b) Plots of Excess Returns from Four Portfolios 
 
The excess returns are first explained for each of the earnings and price momentum 
portfolios using a Fama-French three-factor model. Following Gray (1996) and Gulen, Xing and 
Zhang (2011) framework, the one-month Treasury bill rate (TB) is used as a state variable proxy 
to model the unobserved expectations of investors on future economic conditions. Using the one-
month Treasury bill rate as a state variable allows me to incorporate the time varying discount 
rate into the regime-switching model. The one-month Treasury bill rate is used frequently in past 
literature (Fama, 1981; Campbell, 1987) to predict stock market returns. Figure II Panels A and 
B plot monthly returns of the one-month Treasury bill rate and the one-month Treasury bill rate 
changes.  
          To examine the relationship of investor sentiment and the two momentums, I need a 
measure of sentiment that best captures the different facets of investor sentiments. Therefore, I 
decide to use the sentiment measure developed by Baker and Wurgler (2006). This measure is 
available through Jeffrey Wurgler’s website. 
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Figure II Plot of Monthly Return of One-Month Treasury Bill Rates 
The figure contains a time series plot of monthly one-month Treasury bill rates, reported in annualized percentage 
terms. The sample period is January 1972 to December 2010, a total of 468 observations. 
Panel A. One Month T-Bill Rate Change 
 
 
Panel B. One Month T-Bill Rate Change 
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4. General Econometric Frame work: 
This section discusses the general methodology I employ in this paper. First, I state the 
nature of the empirical topic and the choices of the model. Second, I describe the framework 
details and how I empirically estimate the model. Additionally, I outline various applications of 
the model in order to test several hypotheses the paper examines.  
A potentially useful approach to modeling nonlinearities in time series is to assume different 
behavior (structural breaks) in different subsamples (or regimes). If the dates in which the regime 
switches have taken place are known, then modeling can be worked out simply with dummy 
variables. In practice, however, the prevailing regime is not always directly observable. 
Therefore, the Markov-switching frame work is a preferable choice since it does not require 
exact dates to be known when estimating the underlying regimes. It is a latent state approach that 
does not require conditioning on predefined state indicators. The state transition probability 
obtained through estimation reveals important information about the directions in which 
variations in the conditional distribution of stock return occurs.  
 Let rt denote the excess return of an earnings or price momentum portfolio over period t 
and  be a vector of conditioning variables used to explain the excess return rt. The Markov-
switching specification follows a general framework and allows the intercept, regression 
coefficients, and variance/volatility of excess returns to depend on a single, latent state 
variable,  : 
( )' 2~ (0, ), 1
t t tt S S t t t S
r X with Nα β ε ε σ= + +
 
in which 2(0, )
tS
N σ
 is a normal distribution with zero mean and a variance of 2
tS
σ . I allow the 
parameters to differ across two states. This methodology allows for the interpretation of the 
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nature of the state from the data without presumption or restrictions. Later in the paper, the 
estimation shows that state 1 represents the low volatility state, and is denoted as 1tS = , whereas 
state 2 ( 2tS = ) represents the high volatility state. The regression coefficients and variance are 
either ( )' 21 1 1, ,α β σ or ( )' 22 2 2, ,α β σ , depending on the state. 
  To specify how the underlying state evolves over time, I make the general assumption 
that the state transition probabilities follow a first-order Markov chain: 
( )
( )
( )
( )
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
( 1| 1, ) ( ) 2
1 ( 2 | 1, ) 1 ( ) 3
( 2 | 2, ) ( ) 4
1 ( 1| 2, ) 1 ( ) 5
t t t t t
t t t t t
t t t t t
t t t t t
p P S S Y p Y
p P S S Y p Y
q P S S Y q Y
q P S S Y q Y
− − −
− − −
− − −
− − −
= = = =
− = = = = −
= = = =
− = = = = −
 
in which 1tY −  is a vector of information variables that are publicly known  at time 1t − and 
affects the state transition probabilities between time 1t −  and t . Traditional formulations of 
Markov-switching models generally assume that state transition probabilities are constant over 
time. However, recent literature suggests that the state transition probabilities are time varying 
and depend on prior information such as interest rates (Gray, 1996) or economic leading 
indicators (Filardo, 1994). Time-varying transition probabilities allow me to capture important 
economic behavior that may be missed using constant (or fixed) transition probabilities. 
The parameters of the model are estimated using a maximum likelihood estimation, with 
some assumptions made regarding the conditional density function of the innovations, tε ,
 
~	0,  .  Let θ  denote the vector of parameters entering the likelihood function for the data. 
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Suppose the density of the of the innovations, tε , conditional on being in state j ,
( | , ; )t t tf r S j X θ= , is Gaussian:
( )
( )
2
'
1
1( | , , ; ) exp 6
22
t j j t
t t t t
jj
r Xf r S j X α βθ
σπσ−
 − − −
 Ω = =
 
 
 
for 11, 2, tj −= Ω denotes the information set 1 1 1, ,t t tX r Y− − − , and also the lagged values of these 
variables.  We assume that the relationship between the conditioning factors, ,tX  and excess 
returns, ,tr  is constant within each state, but allow these coefficients to vary across states.  The 
log-likelihood function is given by: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1
1
| ; log | ; , 7
T
t t t t
t
L r rθ φ θ− −
=
Ω = Ω∑  
where the density, ( )1| ;t trφ θ−Ω , is obtained by summing the probability-weighted state 
densities, ( )f •  across two possible states: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
1 1 1
1
| ; | , ; | ; , 8t t t t t t t
j
r f r S j P S jφ θ θ θ− − −
=
Ω = Ω = = Ω∑   
and ( )1| ;t tP S j θ−= Ω  is the conditional probability of state j at time t  given  information at 
time 1t − . The conditional transition probabilities depend on lagged conditioning information 
and reflect the perception of investors on the conditional likelihood of being in the low volatility 
state for the next period. 
I then obtain the conditional state probabilities recursively based on the total probability theorem: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
1 1 1 1 1
1
| ; | , ; | ; , 9t t t t t t t
j
P S i P S i S j P S jθ θ θ− − − − −
=
= Ω = = = Ω = Ω∑  
Then, using Bayes’ rule, the conditional state probabilities can be obtained as  
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
1 1 1 1 1 1 2
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2
2
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2
1
| ; ( | , , , ; )
| , , , ; | , , ;
. 10
| , , , ; | , , ;
t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t t
j
P S j P S j r X Y
f r S j X Y P S j X Y
f r S j X Y P S j X Y
θ θ
θ θ
θ θ
− − − − − − −
− − − − − − − − −
− − − − − − − − −
=
= Ω = = Ω
= Ω = Ω
=
= Ω = Ω∑
 
Following Gray (1996), Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000) and Gulen, Xing and 
Zhang (2011) I iterate on Equations (9) and (10) recursively to derive the state probabilities 
( )1| ;t tP S j θ−= Ω
 and obtain the parameter estimates of the likelihood function. Thus, the 
inferred state probabilities are driven by variation in the distribution of excess returns conditional 
on the included regressors. 
This general framework will be applied in later sections. I first apply the framework to a 
single portfolio Fama-French three-factor and then again to an extended four-factor regression, 
with WML or PMN as the additional factor. Next, I apply the framework to jointly estimate the 
1st and 10th portfolios to test whether (1) loser firms display symmetric response in their risk 
across volatility states as winner firms and (2) lowest SUE firms display symmetric response in 
their risk across volatility states as highest SUE firms.   
5. Univariate Markov-switching Model –An Application of General Econometric Frame 
Work 
5.1. Single Portfolio Regression Specifications 
For each earnings and price momentum decile, indexed by i , I first estimate the following model: 
 ( )1, 2, 3, 11t t t t
i i i i i i
t S S t S t S t tr MKT SMB HMLα β β β ε= + + + +
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in which itr  is the monthly excess return for the thi earnings and price momentum decile, MKT, 
SMB and HML are Fama-French Factors obtained from Kenneth French Website. 
( )2,~ 0, tit i SNε σ
, 
{ }1,2tS =
.  
 
The conditional variance of excess returns, 2
, ti S
σ , is allowed to depend on the state. To model 
investors’ conditional beliefs, I follow Gray (1996) and Gulen, Xing and Zheng (2011) and 
model the state transition probabilities to be a linear function of the one-month Treasury bill rate. 
This choice allows the model to capture the currently available information regarding future 
economic conditions. The state transition probabilities are thus defined as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 0 1 1
1
1 1 0 2 1
1
1| 1, ; 12
1 2 | 1 ; 13
2 | 2, ; 14
1 2 | 2 ; 15
i i i i i
t t t t t
i i i
t t t
i i i i i
t t t t t
i i i
t t t
p P S S Y TB
p P S S
q P S S Y TB
q P S S
µ µ
µ µ
− − −
−
− − −
−
= = = = Φ +
− = = =
= = = = Φ +
− = = =
 
in which itS  indicate the state for thi portfolio and Φ  is the cumulative density function of a 
standard normal variable. This specification is similar to Gray (1996). The information of 
investors on state transition probabilities is captured parsimoniously through the use of the one-
month Treasury bill rate. The above model is estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. 
5.2. Estimation Results and Interpretation of States 
Table II reports the parameter estimates for the single-regime Fama-French three-factor 
model of excess returns for earnings and momentum portfolios. These parameter estimates are 
similar to those reported in Chordia and Shivakumar (2006). For earnings momentum portfolios, 
I find that the intercepts increase monotonically from a significant -1.74% per month for the 
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lowest SUE portfolio to a significant 1.15% per month for the highest SUE portfolio. For the 
price momentum portfolio, the intercepts increase monotonically from a significant -0.49% per 
month for the loser’s portfolio to a significant 0.42% per month for the winner’s portfolio. Thus, 
even after for controlling for the Fama-French factors, a strategy that is long on stocks with high 
earnings surprises and short on stocks with low earnings surprises generates a payoff of 2.89% 
per month; a strategy of buying winners and selling losers generates a payoff of 0.91% per 
month. Therefore, empirical results confirm the existence of momentum profits. 
 
Table II.  Parameter Estimates for Single-Regime Fama-French Three-Factor Model of 
Excess Returns to Momentum Portfolios (January 1972 to December 2010) 
This table reports the estimates for the time-series regression of excess portfolio returns on the Fama-French three-
factor model. In Panel A the portfolios are sorted based on the most recent standardized unexpected earnings; in 
Panel B the portfolios are sorted into deciles based on past six-month return (***, ** and * denote significance level 
of 1%, 5%, and 10%).        
 
Panel A. Parameters for Earnings Momentum Portfolios 
  Low Sue  Decile  2 Decile 3 Decile 4  Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile  7 Decile 8 Decile 9  High SUE 
Intercept -0.0174*** -0.0111*** -0.0096*** -0.0069*** -0.0037** 0.0011 0.0021* 0.0061*** 0.0076*** 0.0115*** 
MKT 1.0797*** 1.0464*** 1.1497*** 1.0416*** 1.0284*** 1.038*** 1.0421*** 1.044*** 1.0318*** 1.0057*** 
SMB 0.8445*** 0.7358*** 0.7817*** 0.8311*** 0.7758*** 0.7531*** 0.6997*** 0.7106*** 0.6916*** 0.6193*** 
HML 0.5421*** 0.4754*** 0.553*** 0.4809*** 0.495*** 0.4742*** 0.4598*** 0.4194*** 0.4252*** 0.3265*** 
Log likelihood  894.38 1013.08 1026.75 1044.48 1005.97 1012.11 1097.86 1060.15 1087.29 1095.50 
 
T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat 
Intercept -10.63 -7.85 -7.48 -5.60 -2.53 0.86 1.68 4.49 6.26 9.90 
MKT 17.91 26.76 24.54 28.25 25.69 26.04 22.40 23.99 26.08 26.30 
SMB 9.28 8.49 10.16 10.38 9.48 9.04 9.79 9.98 10.51 8.98 
HML 5.48 6.41 7.04 6.48 6.71 6.18 5.46 4.90 5.39 4.69 
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Panel B. Parameters for Price Momentum Portfolios 
  Loser's Decile  2 Decile 3 Decile 4  Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile  8 Decile 9 Winner's 
Intercept -0.0049* -0.0023 -0.0001 0.0007 0.0016** 0.002*** 0.0023*** 0.0024*** 0.0029*** 0.0042*** 
MKT 1.3665*** 1.1562*** 1.0935*** 1.0368*** 0.9934*** 0.9832*** 0.9666*** 0.9763*** 0.9996*** 1.0594*** 
SMB 1.2953*** 0.8583*** 0.6974*** 0.5962*** 0.5449*** 0.5001*** 0.4939*** 0.5082*** 0.5598*** 0.7893*** 
HML 0.7305*** 0.6275*** 0.6095*** 0.5717*** 0.5129*** 0.4854*** 0.4615*** 0.4255*** 0.3748*** 0.2514*** 
Log likelihood 669.14 976.60 1096.58 1197.03 1276.06 1313.17 1323.42 1309.40 1253.44 1099.83 
 
T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat 
Intercept -1.94 -1.61 -0.06 0.74 2.05 2.74 3.10 3.24 3.65 4.06 
MKT 15.27 20.78 25.04 30.46 36.94 40.85 39.29 41.13 36.67 30.53 
SMB 7.28 8.49 8.42 8.60 8.75 9.08 9.50 10.41 12.68 14.96 
HML 4.44 6.30 7.57 8.49 9.03 9.66 9.46 9.52 8.37 4.33 
 
Table III extends Table II by incorporating the two regimes. First it is important to 
interpret the state estimate from the model. Estimates of the state transition probabilities are 
reported in Table III, along with all the parameters obtained from estimating the Markov-
switching Fama-French model. For the earnings momentum portfolios 8 out of 10 state transition 
probability estimates of the coefficients on the one-month Treasury bill rate are negative for state 
2, whereas 10 out of 10 estimates are positive for state 1. For the price momentum portfolios 6 
out of 10 estimates of the coefficients on the one-month Treasury bill rate are negative in state 2, 
whereas 7 out of 10 are positive in state 1, with the remaining estimates for state 1 being 
significantly larger than those for state 2. The time variation in the transition probabilities 
therefore indicates that the effect of an increase in the one-month Treasury bill is to decrease the 
probability of staying in state 2 and to increase the probability of staying in state 1. This suggests 
that state 1 is likely an expansion state while state 2 is likely a recession state.  
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Table III.  Parameter Estimates for the Univariate Markov-Switching Fama-French Three-
Factor Model of Excess Returns (January 1972 to December 2010) 
For each earnings and price momentum portfolio i, I estimate the following two-state Markov-switching model:
( ) ( )
2
0 , 1, 2, 3, ,
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 1
~ (0, ) , (1, 2)
( 1 | 1) ; 1 ( 2 | 1) ( 2 | 2) ; 1 ( 1 | 2)
t t t t t
i i i i i i i i
t S S S S t t i S t
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
r MKT SMB HML N S
p P S S TB p P S S q P S S TB q P S S
β β β β ε ε σ
µ µ µ µ− − − − − −
= + + + + =
= = = = Φ + − = = = = = = = Φ + − = = =
in 
which  is the monthly excess return for a given decile portfolio and is the regime indicator. MKT, SMB and 
HML are obtained from the Kenneth French Website (***, ** and * denote significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%).        
Panel A. Parameters for Earnings Momentum Portfolios 
  Low Sue  Decile  2 Decile 3 Decile 4  Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile  8 Decile 9 High SUE 
Intercept, State 1 -0.0172*** -0.0100*** -0.0096*** -0.0067*** -0.0032*** 0.0008 0.0026*** 0.0053*** 0.0078*** 0.0111*** 
Intercept, State 2 -0.0159** -0.0119** -0.0025 -0.0035 -0.0005 0.0051 0.0027 0.0106*** 0.0106*** 0.0157*** 
MKT, State 1 1.0570*** 1.0010*** 1.0149*** 1.0343*** 1.0327*** 1.0550*** 1.0714*** 1.0485*** 1.0466*** 1.0441*** 
MKT, State 2 1.0431*** 1.0718*** 1.3441*** 0.9881*** 0.9689*** 0.9538*** 0.9546*** 0.9977*** 0.9377*** 0.8743*** 
SMB, State 1 0.8509*** 0.8396*** 0.8806*** 0.9492*** 0.9513*** 0.9193*** 0.9503*** 0.8702*** 0.8482*** 0.7797*** 
SMB, State 2 0.8174*** 0.6096*** 0.5605*** 0.6608*** 0.5786*** 0.5588*** 0.4453*** 0.5324*** 0.5264*** 0.4343*** 
HML, State 1 0.3763*** 0.3427*** 0.3358*** 0.3594*** 0.3714*** 0.3663*** 0.3882*** 0.2950*** 0.2618*** 0.1682*** 
HML, State 2 0.6879*** 0.6013*** 0.7061*** 0.6101*** 0.6106*** 0.5686*** 0.4854*** 0.5191*** 0.5692*** 0.4627*** 
Standard Deviation 
σ, State 1 0.0160*** 0.0137*** 0.0138*** 0.0137*** 0.0130*** 0.0129*** 0.0116*** 0.0110*** 0.0118*** 0.0117*** 
σ, State 2 0.0667*** 0.0561*** 0.0499*** 0.0498*** 0.0504*** 0.0477*** 0.0332*** 0.0416*** 0.0381*** 0.0358*** 
Transition Probability Parameters 
Constant 1.6344*** 1.8344*** 1.2504*** 0.9397*** 1.5160*** 1.9902*** 2.6838*** 0.6110 1.5710*** 1.9125*** 
TB, State 1 0.3086 0.4219 0.9637* 1.7743*** 0.8620*** 0.5487* 0.2596 2.5480*** 0.9129 0.7070 
TB, State 2 -1.1958*** -1.1819 -0.8814 0.2725 -0.3789*** -0.3340 -0.3284 2.2000** -0.0437 -0.1644*** 
Log likelihood value  1061.52 1186.68 1172.09 1182.25 1176.53 1190.21 1255.32 1226.77 1234.21 1252.30 
  T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat 
Intercept, State 1 -19.53 -14.48 -12.61 -10.30 -4.49 1.11 4.16 8.69 11.53 14.44 
Intercept, State 2 -2.48 -1.99 -0.42 -0.67 -0.10 1.17 0.99 2.86 3.06 4.92 
MKT, State 1 60.96 59.94 51.87 72.30 82.51 66.12 87.98 72.88 73.26 64.39 
MKT, State 2 10.88 9.82 15.12 10.01 12.05 12.25 25.83 17.71 15.25 14.97 
SMB, State 1 28.38 32.31 35.66 39.32 34.43 40.88 54.65 46.40 35.00 31.38 
SMB, State 2 7.35 6.30 4.90 7.42 6.39 7.05 6.34 6.78 7.19 6.66 
HML, State 1 12.63 12.23 11.16 15.28 14.46 14.31 20.95 13.36 10.54 6.12 
HML, State 2 5.16 4.82 6.97 5.80 5.57 5.68 9.01 7.39 9.10 7.18 
σ, State 1 27.34 23.63 26.58 28.51 26.46 28.84 31.16 24.34 22.99 19.84 
σ, State 2 21.49 18.19 19.05 17.42 31.39 26.56 34.90 29.66 17.95 22.68 
Constant 10.74 5.90 3.76 6.26 9.23 12.18 13.79 1.40 4.12 4.58 
TB, State 1 1.20 0.69 1.67 6.36 2.94 1.71 0.40 2.91 1.25 0.79 
TB, State 2 -2.75 -1.50 -1.03 0.53 -0.84 -0.45 -0.51 1.99 -0.04 -0.12 
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Panel B. Parameters for Price Momentum Portfolios 
 
  Loser's Decile  2 Decile 3 Decile 4  Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile  8 Decile 9 Winner's 
Intercept, State 1 -0.0107*** -0.0029*** 0.0006 0.0018** 0.0023*** 0.0033*** 0.0035*** 0.0036*** 0.0041*** 0.0043*** 
Intercept, State 2 0.0402** 0.0068 0.0027 -0.0015** 0.0007 0.0009 0.0019*** 0.0001 0.0008 0.001 
MKT, State 1 1.1727*** 1.0269*** 0.9646*** 1.0565*** 0.9686*** 1.0353*** 1.0054*** 0.9964*** 1.0884*** 1.1466*** 
MKT, State 2 1.7968*** 1.2787*** 1.2384*** 0.794*** 1.0784*** 0.8681*** 0.8346*** 0.7575*** 0.8513*** 0.8997*** 
SMB, State 1 1.0975*** 0.8412*** 0.6679*** 0.8248*** 0.5657*** 0.7571*** 0.7304*** 0.6525*** 0.795*** 1.071*** 
SMB, State 2 1.1564*** 0.7844*** 0.6786*** 0.2723*** 0.5131*** 0.3433*** 0.3351*** 0.3667*** 0.4524*** 0.5683*** 
HML, State 1 0.3787*** 0.351*** 0.2996*** 0.4801*** 0.2104*** 0.3316*** 0.2987*** 0.2493*** 0.1886*** 0.2031*** 
HML, State 2 1.1682*** 0.8858*** 0.8577*** 0.639*** 0.8409*** 0.5674*** 0.5513*** 0.5952*** 0.4591*** 0.2444*** 
Standard Deviation           
σ, State 1 0.0267*** 0.0138*** 0.0112*** 0.0152*** 0.0084*** 0.0088*** 0.0088*** 0.0103*** 0.0113*** 0.0164*** 
σ, State 2 0.1236*** 0.0557*** 0.0414*** 0.0115*** 0.0221*** 0.0126*** 0.0124*** 0.0125*** 0.015*** 0.0286*** 
Transition Probability Parameters 
Constant 1.2786*** 1.7598*** 1.93*** 1.4951*** 1.9095*** 3.9885*** 1.8186*** 1.1929*** 1.1401*** 1.5384*** 
TB, State 1 0.4623** -0.269 -0.2425 0.6202 0.0554 -1.9301*** 1.2935*** 3.5086*** 1.5957*** 1.4548 
TB, State 2 -1.9585*** -1.5963*** -1.3945*** -0.9088 -0.7225** -3.0802*** 0.8983*** 2.7195*** 1.1634** 0.805 
Log Likelihood value  861.81 1140.85 1260.53 1288.77 1427.81 1467.14 1479.23 1450.80 1358.07 1175.23 
  T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat 
Intercept, State 1 -7.51 -4.01 1.02 2.32 4.94 6.94 7.27 6.99 5.92 4.89 
Intercept, State 2 1.92 1.09 0.61 -1.17 0.28 1.00 1.63 0.09 0.60 0.38 
MKT, State 1 43.08 57.53 77.61 99.40 114.63 115.19 132.61 128.30 66.74 54.60 
MKT, State 2 6.07 16.60 21.80 27.09 34.14 52.15 55.14 27.15 52.91 19.63 
SMB, State 1 23.61 29.55 33.51 51.85 35.96 63.02 64.51 57.55 47.78 34.91 
SMB, State 2 3.83 10.55 9.81 14.41 20.51 27.75 24.31 14.40 18.90 9.46 
HML, State 1 7.51 12.74 12.41 28.48 16.31 23.82 20.19 17.57 8.02 6.16 
HML, State 2 4.03 9.74 12.83 28.27 23.02 26.39 38.88 19.93 19.28 4.20 
σ, State 1 19.92 22.88 27.58 61.00 27.35 28.66 32.00 38.78 29.84 27.37 
σ, State 2 11.86 18.66 15.74 12.54 18.58 32.37 30.07 10.86 28.78 19.08 
Constant 10.02 12.93 12.92 5.12 11.87 19.26 7.74 5.62 5.94 3.89 
TB, State 1 2.34 -1.45 -1.11 1.30 0.23 -7.39 2.50 6.56 4.31 1.46 
TB, State 2 -4.18 -5.02 -4.05 -1.50 -1.96 -5.47 1.17 2.46 2.35 0.79 
 
 
Table III also indicates that state 1 is associated with low volatilities, whereas state 2 is 
associated with high volatilities. Therefore, we can interpret state 1 as a low volatility state and 
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state 2 as a high volatility state. For example, the standard deviation7 estimation for the lowest 
SUE decile is 0.016 in state1 and 0.067 in state 2, and for the highest SUE decile is 0.012 in state 
1 and 0.036 in state 2. For the price momentum portfolios, the standard deviation estimation for 
the loser decile is 0.027 in state1 and 0.124 in state 2, and for the winner decile is 0.016 in state 1 
and 0.029 in state 2. These results in general support that state1 is a low volatility state and state 
2 is a high volatility state. 
 Table III reports the parameter estimates for the univariate Markov-switching Fama-
French three-factor models of excess returns for the earnings and price momentum portfolios. In 
state 1, the low volatility state for the earnings momentum portfolios, the intercepts increase 
from -1.72% per month for the lowest SUE portfolio to 1.11% per month for the highest SUE 
portfolio. For the price momentum portfolio, the intercepts increase from -1.07% per month for 
the loser’s portfolio to 0.43% per month for the winner’s portfolio. Thus, even after controlling 
for the Fama-French factors, a strategy that is long on stocks with high earnings surprises and 
short on stocks with low earnings surprises generates a payoff of 2.83% per month in state 1; a 
strategy of buying winners and selling losers generates a payoff of 1.50% per month in state 1. 
These results are similar to those of the single-regime Fama-French model.  
In state 2, the high volatility state for the earnings momentum portfolios, the intercepts 
are also found to increase. They range from -1.59% per month, for the lowest SUE portfolio, to 
1.57% per month for the highest SUE portfolio. For the price momentum portfolio the intercepts 
range from 4.02% per month for the loser’s portfolio to 0.10% per month for the winner’s 
portfolio. Thus, a strategy that is long on stocks with high earnings surprises and short on stocks 
with low earnings surprises generates a payoff of 3.16% per month in state 2, 0.33% more than 
in state 1; a strategy of buying winners and selling losers generates a payoff of -3.92% per month 
                                                          
7
 The standard deviation here is the square root of the volatility. 
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in state 2. The results for price momentum are quite different from those estimated from the 
single regime Fama-French model where price momentum strategy generates positive profit. In 
particular, the profit for price momentum strategy is only positive in state 1 but negative in state 
2. However, these results are similar to the literature regarding the profitability of price 
momentum, which only generates a positive profit in good economic conditions (Chordia and 
Shivakumar, 2002). To sum up, Table III shows the profitability of the price momentum 
disappears during the high volatility state. However, the profitability of earnings momentum is 
quite persistent regardless of the underlying state.  
In addition to Table III, I also plot several figures to further demonstrate the transition of 
the states. Figure III Panels A and B plot the conditional transition probabilities of being in the 
low volatility state at time t, conditional on the information set at time 11, ( 1| ; )t tt P S θ−− = Ω  for 
the lowest and highest SUE portfolios, respectively. Similarly, Figure III Panels C and D plot the 
conditional transition probabilities of being in the low volatility state at time t conditional on the 
information set at time 11, ( 1| ; )t tt P S θ−− = Ω  for the loser’s and winner’s portfolios, 
respectively. The transition probabilities are overlaid with historical NBER recession dates.  
From looking at Figure III one can see that the transitional probabilities of being in the high 
volatility state are all moderately high during the eight postwar recessions. In addition, the 
evidence indicates that the high volatility state is more likely during recessions while the low 
volatility state is more likely during expansions. The relationship between stock volatilities and 
business cycles is consistent with the findings of Schwert (1989) and Campbell ,Lettau, Malkiel 
and Xu (2001). 
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Figure III Plot of Regime-Switching Probabilities 
(January 1972 to December 2010) 
For each portfolio, I plot a time-series scheme of the ex-ante and smoothed probabilities for regime 1 (the low-volatility / variance) at time t. The ex-ante 
probability is based on the information available at time t 	Pr   1|, while the smoothed probability is based on the entire sample 	Pr   1|. 
The solid lines are for the ex-ante probabilities and the dotted lines are for the smoothed probabilities. Panel A examines the Low SUE portfolio, Panel B the 
High SUE portfolio, Panel C the Loser’s portfolio, while Panel D examines the Winner’s portfolio. Shaded areas indicate NBER recession periods. 
 
                       Panel A.  Low SUE Portfolio                                                     Panel B.  High SUE Portfolio 
 
                     Panel C.  Loser’s Portfolio                                                           Panel D.  Winner’s Portfolio 
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Furthermore, Figure III indicates that the frequency of the probability of being in state 2 
is higher than the frequency of the aggregate economy entering a recession. In particular, state 2 
also captures incidents of high stock return volatilities yet is not officially in a recession, such as 
October 1987. In Panels A and B, the univariate Markov-switching model classifies 1992 as a 
recession for the earnings momentum portfolio, but not for the price momentum portfolios. 
Similarly, in Panels B and D, the univariate Markov-switching model classifies the period 1999 
to the first half of 2003 as a recession for the highest SUE portfolio and winner’s portfolio, but 
not for lowest SUE portfolio and loser’s portfolio. In view of these differences, I interpret state 1 
as the low volatility state (as opposed to the expansion state) and state 2 as the high volatility 
state (as opposed to the recession state). 
Time variations in expected returns can be driven by variations in conditional volatilities, 
variations in conditional Sharpe ratios, or both. Figure IV Panels A and B plot the conditional 
volatilities for the lowest SUE and highest SUE portfolios, while Figure IV Panels C and D plot 
the conditional volatilities for the loser’s and winner’s portfolios. Because these volatilities are 
conditional volatilities, they therefore incorporate the switching probabilities, not just the 
volatilities of returns in a given state. Figure IV reports that the upward spikes appear during 
most recessions for both (1) loser and winner firms and (2) lowest SUE and highest SUE firms. 
The conditional volatilities spike upward much more frequently for loser firms and lowest SUE 
firms than for winner firms and highest SUE firms. Additionally, the conditional volatilities 
spike upward much more frequently than the NBER recession dates.
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Figure IV Plot of Conditional Standard Deviation 
(January 1972 to December 2010) 
These plots contain time-series plot of conditional standard deviation for the lowest SUE (Panel A), highest SUE (Panel B), loser’s (Panel C), and winner’s 
portfolios (Panel D). Shaded areas indicate NBER recession periods. 
Panel A.  Low SUE Portfolio                                                   Panel B.  High SUE Portfolio 
  
                             Panel C.  Loser’s Portfolio                                                           Panel D.  Winner’s Portfolio 
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Figure V Panels A and B plot the conditional Sharpe ratios for lowest SUE and highest 
SUE portfolios from the univariate model while Figure V Panels C and D plot the conditional 
Sharpe ratios for loser’s and winner’s portfolios . The Sharpe ratio dynamics are similar for the 
lowest SUE and highest SUE portfolios, as well as for the loser’s and winner’s portfolios. Both 
display substantial time variations. The Sharpe ratios for the highest SUE and winner’s portfolios 
are almost double what the lowest SUE and loser’s portfolio are in the 1987 stock market crash. 
The Sharpe ratios tend to increase rapidly during recessions and to decline more gradually in 
expansions. The time variations in expected excess returns for earnings and momentum 
portfolios in Figure V Panel B appear to be correlated with variations in both conditional 
volatilities and conditional Sharpe ratios.  
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Figure V Plot of Conditional Sharpe Ratio 
(January 1972 to December 2010) 
These plots are of conditional Sharpe ratios, defined as expected excess returns divided by conditional volatilities. Panel A, B, C, and D plot the conditional 
Sharpe ratio for the lowest SUE, highest SUE, loser’s, and winner’s portfolios, respectively. Shaded areas indicate NBER recession periods. 
 
Panel A.  Low SUE Portfolio                                                        Panel B.  High SUE Portfolio 
  
Panel C.  Loser’s Portfolio                                                           Panel D.  Winner’s Portfolio 
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5.3.Extended Four Factor Model 
In this part, I follow Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) adding PMN and WML as an additional 
factor. Specifically, they extend the Fama-French model by including the earnings-based zero-
investment portfolio, PMN (positive minus negative), and price-based zero-investment portfolio, 
WML (winners minus losers) as additional factors. They run the following regression for each of 
earnings momentum portfolios: 
 
*( ) * * *i f i i M F i i i iR R b R R s SMB h HML w WML eα− = + − + + + +
 
and the following regression for each of price momentum portfolios: 
 
*( ) * * *i f i i M F i i i iR R b R R s SMB h HML p PMN eα− = + − + + + +
 
I then extend the earlier model for each of the earnings and price momentum deciles: 
1, 2, 3, 4,
1, 2, 3, 4,
Earnings Momentum:
(16)
Price Momentum:
(17)
t t t t t
t t t t t
i i i i i i i
t S S S S S t
i i i i i i i
t S S S S S t
r MKT SMB HML WML
r MKT SMB HML PMN
α β β β β ε
α β β β β ε
= + + + + +
= + + + + +
 
in which tr  is the monthly excess return for the earnings and price momentum deciles. The 
conditional variance of excess returns, 2
, ti S
σ , is allowed to depend on the state of economy. The 
state transition probabilities are specified in Equations (12) to (15). 
 Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) suggest that earnings momentum subsumes price 
momentum and Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) argue that although earnings and price 
momentum are correlated, one effect does not subsume the other. To examine the interaction 
between earnings and price momentums, I first run regressions for Equations (16) and (17) in a 
linear fashion without incorporating regime switching. The results are reported in Table IV 
Panels A and B for earning and price momentum deciles, respectively. The results for earnings  
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Table IV.  Parameter Estimates for Single-Regime Extended Four-Factor Models of Excess 
Returns to Earnings and Price Momentum Portfolios (January 1972 to December 2010) 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the time-series regression of excess portfolio returns on a four-
factor model that extends the Fama-French model. The fourth factor is either PMN or WML. In Panel A the 
portfolios are sorted based on the most recent standardized unexpected earnings; in Panel B the portfolios are sorted 
into deciles based on past six-month return. (***, ** and * denote significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%).        
 
Panel A. Parameters for Earnings Momentum Portfolios 
  Low Sue  Decile  2 Decile 3 Decile 4  Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile  8 Decile 9 High SUE 
Intercept -0.0146*** -0.0092*** -0.0075*** -0.0053*** -0.0025* 0.0025** 0.0029** 0.0074*** 0.0084*** 0.0120*** 
MKT 0.9853*** 0.9823*** 1.0815*** 0.9902*** 0.988*** 0.9919*** 1.0163*** 1.0003*** 1.0062*** 0.9898*** 
SMB 0.689*** 0.6301*** 0.6692*** 0.7463*** 0.7091*** 0.6771*** 0.6572*** 0.6386*** 0.6495*** 0.5931*** 
HML 0.3949*** 0.3753*** 0.4465*** 0.4007*** 0.4318*** 0.4023*** 0.4196*** 0.3512*** 0.3852*** 0.3017*** 
WML -0.3074*** -0.2089*** -0.2223*** -0.1674*** -0.1318*** -0.1501*** -0.084** -0.1424*** -0.0833** -0.0518* 
Log 
likelihood 987.12 1080.72 1110.61 1092.16 1029.83 1044.41 1111.91 1096.12 1100.49 1100.69 
 
T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat 
Intercept -10.40 -6.82 -6.32 -4.49 -1.67 1.95 2.16 5.38 6.54 9.90 
MKT 20.34 28.72 27.78 31.45 27.02 26.22 21.92 22.97 25.38 26.71 
SMB 12.44 9.46 11.78 11.37 9.64 9.57 9.61 10.66 10.27 8.59 
HML 5.60 6.51 7.48 6.79 6.85 6.16 5.23 4.34 5.15 4.51 
WML -6.73 -5.69 -6.36 -4.41 -3.46 -4.21 -2.27 -4.41 -2.37 -1.69 
 
 
Panel B. Parameters for Price Momentum Portfolios 
  Loser's Decile  2 Decile 3 Decile 4  Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile  8 Decile 9 Winner's 
Intercept 0.0131*** 0.0065*** 0.0055*** 0.0036*** 0.0029*** 0.0020** 0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0013 -0.0024 
MKT 1.3204*** 1.1338*** 1.0792*** 1.0293*** 0.9900*** 0.9831*** 0.9695*** 0.9830*** 1.0104*** 1.0763*** 
SMB 1.1551*** 0.7902*** 0.6540*** 0.5734*** 0.5346*** 0.4998*** 0.5030*** 0.5286*** 0.5928*** 0.8406*** 
HML 0.5962*** 0.5623*** 0.5679*** 0.5499*** 0.5030*** 0.4851*** 0.4702*** 0.4450*** 0.4063*** 0.3006*** 
PMN -0.6227*** -0.3023*** -0.1929*** -0.1009*** -0.0458 -0.0011 0.0401* 0.0906*** 0.1464*** 0.2279*** 
Log 
likelihood 708.30 1010.56 1119.14 1206.24 1278.69 1313.17 1325.88 1321.48 1278.98 1132.42 
 
T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat 
Intercept 2.66 2.51 2.94 2.51 2.45 1.91 1.12 -0.23 -1.26 -1.60 
MKT 15.12 20.98 25.85 31.11 37.79 41.42 39.52 41.75 38.81 34.68 
SMB 7.41 8.62 8.50 8.70 8.89 9.31 9.88 11.03 13.83 15.91 
HML 3.75 5.97 7.50 8.51 9.07 9.78 9.65 9.96 9.31 5.74 
PMN -4.81 -4.78 -4.05 -2.84 -1.57 -0.04 1.71 4.43 6.50 6.08 
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momentum, reported in Table IV Panel A, show that the estimated intercepts increase 
monotonically from a low of –1.46% to a 1.20% per month, which suggests that even after 
controlling for price momentum, a strategy of buying the highest SUE portfolio and selling the 
lowest SUE portfolio would earn a significant payoff of 2.66 % per month. The coefficient on 
WML is highly significant for most of the portfolios and increases monotonically from –0.3074 
for the lowest SUE portfolio to -0.0518 for the highest SUE portfolio. This suggests that 
although price momentum is related with earnings momentum, it cannot subsume the profits of 
earnings momentum. 
In Table IV Panel B, I estimate the single-regime four-factor model with PMN as an 
additional factor. The coefficient on PMN is highly significant for most of the portfolios and 
increases monotonically from –0.6227 for the loser portfolio to 0.2279 for the winner portfolio. 
This indicates that exposure of firms to PMN systematically varies across the momentum 
portfolios. The estimated intercepts decrease from 1.31% for the loser portfolio to –0.24% for the 
winner portfolio, suggesting that price momentum strategy has a negative payoff, after 
controlling for the portfolios' exposures to PMN. The results seem to suggest that price 
momentum can be dominated by earnings momentum. 
 Next, I incorporate regime switching in estimation of Equations (16) and (17). The state 
transition probabilities are specified in Equations (12) to (15). The corresponding results are 
reported in Table V Panels A and B, for earning and price momentum deciles, respectively. For 
the Markov-switching, four-factor model with WML as an additional factor, the coefficient on 
WML is highly significant for most of the portfolios and increases from -0.3201 for the lowest 
SUE portfolio to 0.0070 for the winner portfolio in state 1 and from -0.3344 for the lowest SUE 
portfolio to -0.1013 for the highest SUE portfolio in state 2, as reported in Table V Panel A. The  
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Table V.  Parameter Estimates for the Univariate Markov-Switching Extended Four -
Factor Model of Excess Returns to Momentum Portfolios (January 1972 to December 2010)             
For each earnings and price momentum portfolio i, I estimate the following two-state Markov-switching model:
( ) ( )
2
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, ,
1 0 1 1 1 0 2 1 1
~ (0, ) , (1, 2)
( 1| 1) ; 1 ( 2 | 1) ( 2 | 2) ; 1 ( 1| 2)
t t t t t t
i i i i i i i i i
t S S S S S t t i S t
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
t t t i t t t t t t t t t t t
r MKT SMB HML WML or PMN N S
p P S S TB p P S S q P S S TB q P S S
β β β β β ε ε σ
µ µ µ µ− − − − − −
= + + + + + =
= = = = Φ + − = = = = = = = Φ + − = = =
    
(***, ** and * denote significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%).        
Panel A. Parameters for Earnings Momentum Portfolios 
  Low Sue  Decile  2 Decile 3 Decile 4  Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile  8 Decile 9 High SUE 
Intercept, State 1 -0.0131*** -0.0078*** -0.0054*** -0.0044*** -0.0012* 0.0031*** 0.0038*** 0.0065*** 0.0086*** 0.0111*** 
Intercept, State 2 -0.0262*** -0.0128*** -0.0137*** -0.0065 -0.0032 0.0021 0.0018 0.0087*** 0.0093*** 0.0152*** 
MKT, State 1 1.0867*** 1.0035*** 1.1358*** 1.0148*** 1.042*** 1.0245*** 1.0562*** 1.0532*** 1.0674*** 1.0453*** 
MKT, State 2 0.6421*** 0.8767*** 0.7441*** 0.8906*** 0.847*** 0.8406*** 0.9037*** 0.875*** 0.898*** 0.8014*** 
SMB, State 1 0.82*** 0.7895*** 0.8343*** 0.8624*** 0.9169*** 0.8513*** 0.8673*** 0.8457*** 0.8645*** 0.7834*** 
SMB, State 2 0.4915*** 0.5069*** 0.3481*** 0.6077*** 0.4692*** 0.4686*** 0.4233*** 0.4806*** 0.4278*** 0.408*** 
HML, State 1 0.4539*** 0.261*** 0.4905*** 0.3238*** 0.3557*** 0.3042*** 0.3299*** 0.2887*** 0.302*** 0.1701*** 
HML, State 2 0.285*** 0.4559*** 0.2311*** 0.4562*** 0.4625*** 0.4792*** 0.4602*** 0.4005*** 0.4486*** 0.4203*** 
WML, State 1 -0.3201*** -0.1614*** -0.2546*** -0.1818*** -0.16*** -0.1516*** -0.1019*** -0.0815*** -0.0891*** 0.007 
WML, State 2 -0.3344*** -0.2581*** -0.2039*** -0.1501*** -0.1172*** -0.1539*** -0.068*** -0.1801*** -0.0965*** -0.1013*** 
σ, State 1 0.015*** 0.0111*** 0.0188*** 0.0114*** 0.012*** 0.0124*** 0.0105*** 0.0107*** 0.012*** 0.0117*** 
σ, State 2 0.0574*** 0.0403*** 0.0185*** 0.0441*** 0.044*** 0.0476*** 0.0337*** 0.0338*** 0.0344*** 0.0343*** 
Transition Probability Parameters 
Constant 1.3788*** 2.2786*** -0.149 0.7218*** 1.679*** 2.0291*** 1.786*** 2.247*** 2.2014*** 1.8451*** 
TB, State 1 2.0572** 0.1118 3.8786*** 2.473*** 1.3584*** 0.9721** 1.464** 0.412 0.257 0.8388 
TB, State 2 0.8785 -0.8207 2.3404*** 1.0751** 0.6188 0.3931 0.999* -0.1717 -0.5407 -0.0239 
Log Likelihood value  1178.68 1261.64 1156.28 1254.94 1225.72 1243.73 1292.32 1255.38 1244.11 1257.46 
  T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat 
Intercept, State 1 -17.54 -12.52 -5.14 -6.86 -1.81 4.40 6.63 11.52 10.86 17.17 
Intercept, State 2  -3.87 -3.40 -5.12 -1.42 -0.77 0.45 0.65 3.27 3.20 5.01 
MKT, State 1 71.88 80.21 59.59 76.51 98.85 64.65 88.45 90.75 83.90 81.13 
MKT, State 2 5.58 14.78 13.16 11.33 12.44 11.53 25.66 23.61 20.62 17.27 
SMB, State 1 41.81 42.44 23.21 46.68 48.03 35.90 48.53 41.13 37.79 32.05 
SMB, State 2 3.23 6.29 6.53 7.13 4.48 4.11 6.03 7.17 5.79 5.61 
HML, State 1 19.24 12.33 15.11 13.26 16.10 11.64 18.60 14.63 13.14 8.04 
HML, State 2 1.92 4.70 4.41 4.03 3.74 4.00 8.74 8.12 8.03 6.56 
WML, State 1 -37.55 -15.40 -32.10 -22.48 -15.87 -13.93 -11.97 -7.90 -7.11 0.64 
WML, State 2 -6.56 -12.80 -8.18 -5.43 -3.91 -5.15 -3.81 -9.02 -5.17 -4.27 
σ, State 1 29.41 26.62 45.16 27.74 29.42 29.26 26.65 27.39 27.67 25.89 
σ, State 2 21.61 37.51 12.62 23.04 25.23 18.03 31.01 38.68 27.10 15.64 
Constant 4.13 13.12 -0.50 3.68 8.91 9.56 8.88 13.96 11.67 4.22 
TB, State 1 2.33 0.32 5.09 5.72 2.98 2.12 1.98 1.05 0.70 0.99 
TB, State 2 0.71 -1.02 2.92 2.03 0.93 0.42 1.65 -0.30 -0.86 -0.02 
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Panel B. Parameters for Price Momentum Portfolios 
 
  Loser's Decile  2 Decile 3 Decile 4  Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile  8 Decile 9 Winner's 
Intercept, State 1 0.0031*** 0.0166*** 0.0115*** 0.0062*** 0.0045*** 0.004*** 0.0034*** 0.0027*** 0.0018* 0.0009 
Intercept, State 2 0.0641*** 0.0014 0.0021** 0.0014 0.0052*** 0.0038*** 0.0018 -0.001 -0.0034** -0.0074*** 
MKT, State 1 1.1463*** 1.2826*** 1.1568*** 1.0472*** 0.9727*** 0.9824*** 0.9651*** 0.998*** 1.0773*** 1.1453*** 
MKT, State 2 1.6401*** 1.0162*** 0.9766*** 0.8982*** 0.9412*** 0.8992*** 0.9804*** 0.7677*** 0.8858*** 0.9462*** 
SMB, State 1 1.0569*** 1.4834*** 1.0733*** 0.7879*** 0.6759*** 0.6326*** 0.6018*** 0.6603*** 0.8293*** 1.081*** 
SMB, State 2 0.8143*** 0.5798*** 0.4538*** 0.3601*** 0.3736*** 0.373*** 0.3889*** 0.3731*** 0.4739*** 0.6564*** 
HML, State 1 0.2619*** 0.2727*** 0.3387*** 0.3312*** 0.2209*** 0.2125*** 0.1803*** 0.264*** 0.1974*** 0.2365*** 
HML, State 2 1.0386*** 0.4886*** 0.6369*** 0.7395*** 0.8326*** 0.7772*** 0.795*** 0.5916*** 0.4691*** 0.2963*** 
PMN, State 1 -0.4383*** -0.3645*** -0.2905*** -0.1493*** -0.0609*** -0.0312*** -0.0018*** 0.0329** 0.1035*** 0.1287*** 
PMN, State 2 -0.9358*** -0.1686*** -0.0997*** -0.1204*** -0.2182*** -0.1646*** -0.022*** 0.0389 0.1318*** 0.2526*** 
σ, State 1 0.0235*** 0.0385*** 0.0197*** 0.0138*** 0.0088*** 0.0088*** 0.0089*** 0.0102*** 0.011*** 0.016*** 
σ, State 2 0.1143*** 0.0174*** 0.0148*** 0.0149*** 0.0155*** 0.0124*** 0.0125*** 0.0124*** 0.0136*** 0.0256*** 
Transition Probability Parameters 
Constant 1.0848*** 1.4559*** 1.7504*** 3.0927*** 2.1424*** 3.0049*** 2.112*** 1.1129*** 0.7261 1.4606*** 
TB, State 1 0.8175*** -0.6132 0.3195 -1.1132* -0.3187 -1.4075*** 0.247 3.6996*** 2.0222** 1.7159*** 
TB, State 2 -1.6196*** 0.6055*** 0.2155 -2.6872*** -1.7234*** -2.9991*** -0.7299 2.911*** 1.6594 1.0936 
Log Likelihood value  917.51 1126.25 1218.66 1310.97 1441.94 1477.67 1487.83 1453.53 1373.54 1196.46 
  T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat 
Intercept, State 1 4.26 3.47 8.16 8.19 9.99 8.04 7.84 4.14 1.78 0.96 
Intercept, State 2 2.48 1.57 2.36 0.82 3.27 3.48 1.29 -0.67 -2.09 -3.02 
MKT, State 1 6.99 22.89 63.83 101.23 104.66 107.61 140.58 128.55 82.01 58.64 
MKT, State 2 45.81 47.52 52.57 32.09 42.43 44.92 52.25 28.72 48.72 25.12 
SMB, State 1 3.71 12.87 28.12 30.41 42.93 41.61 47.90 59.40 25.09 33.38 
SMB, State 2 25.41 38.77 38.70 18.38 17.09 19.17 17.27 15.94 19.31 13.56 
HML, State 1 4.06 2.95 9.38 21.61 11.80 15.72 12.52 17.25 6.66 7.76 
HML, State 2 6.01 13.14 37.84 24.07 30.63 37.48 35.38 19.99 18.16 6.20 
PMN, State 1 -5.04 -4.85 -10.89 -11.72 -7.54 -3.25 -0.17 2.14 3.93 5.89 
PMN, State 2 -19.36 -9.63 -6.79 -2.90 -7.13 -7.42 -1.19 1.35 4.22 6.61 
σ, State 1 12.76 22.57 56.71 68.87 27.61 29.62 31.04 39.94 29.38 26.76 
σ, State 2 24.83 47.78 35.20 14.83 18.31 15.26 15.52 10.39 22.31 14.48 
Constant 8.31 9.82 10.68 6.08 7.44 18.16 8.80 5.18 1.26 6.74 
TB, State 1 -3.47 -1.61 0.98 -1.67 -0.68 -6.12 0.64 6.37 2.31 3.38 
TB, State 2 3.98 2.44 0.63 -2.52 -2.56 -5.91 -1.40 2.58 1.61 1.57 
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estimated intercepts decrease from -1.31% for the lowest portfolio to 1.11% for the highest SUE 
portfolio in state, 1 and from -2.62% for the loser portfolio to 1.52 % for the highest SUE 
portfolio in state 2. Again, the results suggest that earnings momentum cannot be subsumed by 
price momentum. For the highest SUE portfolio, the coefficient of WML is positive and 
extremely small, 0.007 for the low volatility state (state 1), and is not statistically significant. 
Thus, the ability of WML as an additional factor to explain earnings momentum is limited. 
Table V Panel B reports the estimation results for the Markov-switching four-factor 
model with PMN as an additional factor. The coefficient on PMN is highly significant for most 
of the portfolios and increases monotonically from -0.4383 for the loser portfolio to 0.1287 for 
the winner portfolio in state 1 and from -0.9358 for the loser portfolio to 0.2526 for the winner 
portfolio in state 2. This indicates that exposure of firms to PMN varies across the momentum 
portfolios and is much more pronounced in state 2, the high volatility state. In other words, 
earnings momentum influences price momentum more in the high volatility than in the low 
volatility state. From a financing perspective, the discount rate in the low volatility state has a 
large impact on stock prices but not on companies’ earnings. However, in the high volatility state, 
when financing is more constrained, the discount rate makes a bigger difference on earnings. 
Therefore, the co-movement of price momentum and earnings momentum becomes stronger. 
From an investing perspective, PMN captures future aggregate investment opportunities and its 
predictive content becomes more important for investors in the high volatility state. Therefore, 
investors pay more attention and place higher weights on earnings. The results also show that 
exposure of firms to PMN varies across the price momentum portfolios, and is more pronounced 
than the exposure of firms to WML which vary across earnings momentum portfolios. The 
estimated intercepts decrease from 0.31% for the loser portfolio to 0.09% for the winner 
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portfolio in state 1 and from 6.41% for the loser portfolio to -0.74% for the winner portfolio in 
state 2. However, the statistical significance of the intercept for most price momentum deciles 
indicates that although earnings momentum seems to dominate price momentum, it does not 
appear to fully subsume price momentum. 
These results show that there is strong evidence of asymmetries in stock returns. 
However, they do not prove that the asymmetries are statistically significant. Therefore, a set of 
likelihood ratio tests are performed regarding the existence of the two states in the conditional 
mean and variance for each of the earnings and price momentum deciles.8 It is important to 
understand that the likelihood ratio test is testing whether there is asymmetry in the coefficients 
across two different states rather than testing the existence of the two states. The test I perform 
here, after already establishing there are two regimes, is to examine whether the coefficients are 
symmetric in the two mean equations. When testing for asymmetry of the coefficients across the 
two states, I cannot use the standard likelihood ratio test for multiple states since the state 
transition probability parameters are not identified under the null hypothesis of a single-regime, 
as Hansen (1992) discusses.  Therefore, the regression coefficients from the Markov regime-
switching model are restricted by setting the coefficients equal to one another across the two 
states. The resulting likelihood ratio statistic follows a standard chi-squared distribution. 
Specifically, I test the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients on the MKT, SMB, HML, 
and WML or PMN are equal across the two states for each of the testing deciles.   
Table VI Panel A shows that the state dependence in the conditional mean equations is 
indeed statistically significant. The p-values for the likelihood ratio tests are equal or smaller  
                                                          
8
 The likelihood ratio test here is not testing whether single or two regime models are appropriate. It is testing that, 
given two regimes and allowing the intercept to vary, whether coefficients are statistically different across regimes. 
The existence of two states (the choice of two regime models) is confirmed in the unreported tests which are based 
on the standard likelihood ratio test. 
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than 1% for 8 out of 10, and smaller than 5% for 1 out of 10 of earnings momentum deciles, 
meaning that the null hypothesis is strongly rejected. In particular, the null hypothesis is rejected 
at the 1% significance level for the lowest SUE and highest SUE deciles. Similarly, Table VI 
Panel B shows that the state dependence on the conditional mean equations is statistically 
significant as well. The p-values for the likelihood ratio tests are equal or smaller than 1% for 6 
out of 10 and smaller than 5% for 1 out of 10 of price momentum deciles, meaning that the null 
hypothesis is strongly rejected. In particular, the null hypothesis is rejected for the loser’s and 
winner’s deciles.  
Table VI. Tests for Identical Slope Coefficients across States in the Markov-Switching 
Model (January 1972 to December 2010) 
For each earnings and price momentum portfolio i, I estimate the following two-state Markov-switching model: 
( )
0, 1, 2, 3, 4,
0, 1, 2, 3, 4,
2
,
1 0 1
Earnings Momentum:
Price Momentum:
~ (0, ) , (1, 2)
( 1 | 1) ; 1
t t t t t
t t t t t
t
i i i i i i i
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i i i i i i i
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in which  is the monthly excess return for a given decile portfolio and is the regime indicator.. I conduct 
likelihood ratio tests on the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal across states, that is
{ }
, 1 , 2 , 1, 2, 3, 4t t
i i
k S k S kβ β= == = , for earnings and price momentum decile i. The p-value is the probability that the 
null hypothesis is not rejected. When testing the null hypothesis, the model conditions on the existence of two states 
for the conditional volatility.  
 
 
 
Panel A. Earnings Momentum Portfolios   
 Low SUE Decile 2 Decile 3 Decile 4 Decile 5 
Unrestricted log-likelihood value   1178.68 
 
1261.64 
 
1156.28 
 
1254.94 
 
1225.72 
 
Restricted log-likelihood with
{ }
, 1 , 2 , 1, 2, 3, 4t t
i i
k S k S kβ β= == =   
1173.35 
 
1251.29 
 
1229.33 
 
1247.66 
 
1211.10 
 
Chi-square 
10.67 20.70 20.29 -146.10 29.23 
p-value 
0.03 0.00  NA 0.01 0.00 
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Decile 6 
   
Decile 7 
             
Decile 8 
                  
Decile 9 
                        
High SUE 
Unrestricted log-likelihood value   1243.73 
 
1292.32 
 
1255.38 
 
1244.11 
 
1257.46 
 
Restricted log-likelihood with
{ }
, 1 , 2 , 1, 2, 3, 4t t
i i
k S k S kβ β= == =   
1231.90 
 
1267.96 
 
1237.14 
 
1223.37 
 
1229.76 
 
Chi-square 
23.66 48.72 36.46 41.48 55.41 
p-value 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
 
Panel B. Price Momentum Portfolios 
 Loser’s Decile 2 Decile 3 Decile 4 Decile 5 
Unrestricted log-likelihood value   917.51 
 
1126.25 
 
1218.66 
 
 
1310.97 
 
1441.94 
 
Restricted log-likelihood with
{ }
, 1 , 2 , 1, 2, 3, 4t t
i i
k S k S kβ β= == =   
911.86 
 
1168.73 
 
1269.81 
 
1348.94 
 
1400.90 
 
Chi-square 
11.30 -84.95 -102.30 -75.95 82.07 
p-value 
0.02 NA NA NA 0.00 
      
 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile 8 Decile 9 Winner’s 
Unrestricted log-likelihood value   1477.67 
 
1487.83 
 
1453.53 
 
1373.54 1196.46 
 
Restricted log-likelihood with
{ }
, 1 , 2 , 1, 2, 3, 4t t
i i
k S k S kβ β= == =   
1414.45 
 
1429.79 
 
1424.30 
 
1348.30 
 
1173.43 
 
Chi-square 
126.44 116.07 58.46 50.48 46.06 
p-value 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
6. Bivariate Markov-switching Models for 1st and 10th Decile–A Further Application of 
General Econometric Frame Work 
 
I now study the characteristics of firms in the two extreme SUE portfolios P10 andP1. 
Table VII Panel A presents the average firm characteristics across the SUE portfolios. Stocks in 
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the lowest SUE portfolio, P1, have negative earnings on average whereas stocks in the highest 
SUE portfolio, P10, have positive average earnings as evidenced by the earnings price ratio. The 
book to market ratio of the P1 portfolio is 1.3040 while that of P10 is 0.6801. In other words, the 
P10 portfolio is more like a growth portfolio whereas the P1 portfolio behaves more like a value 
portfolio. Also, the P10 portfolio stocks are larger as measured by market capitalization and have 
higher prices than the P1 portfolio stocks, confirming the negative correlation between SMB and 
PMN. The average monthly returns are significantly different across the two portfolios. The P1 
portfolio has an average monthly return of -0.7296% whereas the P10 portfolio has an average 
monthly return of 2.6779%. Furthermore, I also look at debt ratio across SUE portfolios. The 
average debt ratio for the lowest SUE firms is 0.6031 and the average debt ratio for the highest 
SUE firms is 0.5937.  I perform a non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test and find that these 
differences are statistically significant between the lowest and highest SUE portfolios. In 
addition, following Lamont et al. (2001), I also construct an index of the likelihood that a firm 
faces financial constraints (Kaplan and Zingales (1997) “KZ Index”) by applying the following 
linearization to the data:  
 
KZ Index = -1.001909 x Cash Flows / K + 0.2826389 x Q + 3.139193 x Debt / Total Capital + -
39.3678 x Dividends / K + -1.314759 x Cash / K 
 
Where: 
 
Cash Flows = (Income Before Extraordinary Itemst + Total Depreciation and Amortizationt) 
 
K = Property，Plant, and Equipmentt-1 
 
Q = (Market Capitalizationt + Total Shareholder's Equityt - Book Value of Common Equityt - 
Deferred Tax Assetst) / Total Shareholder's Equityt 
 
Debt = Total Long Term Debtt + Notes Payablet + Current Portion of Long Term Debtt 
 
Dividends = Total Cash Dividends Paidt (common and preferred) 
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Cash = Cash and Short-Term Investmentst 
 
The KZ-Index (Kaplan-Zingales Index) is a relative measurement of reliance on external 
financing. Companies with higher KZ-Index scores are more likely to experience difficulties 
when financial conditions tighten since they may have problems financing their ongoing 
operations. The KZ Index value for P10 portfolio is, on average, lower than that of the P1 
portfolio. However, the differences between the two are not statistically significant. 
Similarly, I also study the characteristics of firms in the two extreme price momentum portfolios 
P10 and P1. Table VII Panel B presents the average firm characteristics across the price 
momentum portfolios. The book-to-market ratio of the P1 portfolio is 0.5575 while that of P10 is 
1.7053. Also, the winner portfolio stocks are much larger as measured by the market 
capitalization and have higher prices than the loser portfolio stocks. Furthermore, I also look at  
 
Table VII. Average Characteristics Across 1st and 10th Portfolios 
The decile portfolios are formed as in Table I. The characteristics are obtained for each month for each portfolio by 
averaging the relevant variable across all stocks in that portfolio in that month. These means are then averaged 
across months and the table reports the time-series averages P1 as the 1st portfolio and P10 is the 10th portfolio.  All 
accounting values (namely, book value of equity, earnings and total assets) are taken from the most recent quarter 
that ends at least four months prior to formation month. All market variables (namely, market value of equity, 
turnover, volume and price) are collected at the end of the quarter prior to the formation month. The variable 
definitions are as follow: BM is the book-to-market ratio; Size represents market capitalization; EP represents the 
earnings to price ratio; price is the share price; and the KZ-Index (Kaplan-Zingales Index) is constructed based on 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) following Lamont et al. (2001). The table also presents the results of the non-parametric 
Man-Whitney Rank test. 
.  
Panel A. Earnings Momentum 1st and 10th Portfolio Comparison 
P1 P10 H0: P1=P10 
BM (Book-to-market ratio) 1.3040 0.6801  44.8273 
Size ($million) 302438300 423936340 74.9397 
Log(size) 20.1324 20.6239 74.4281 
EP(%) -0.0193 0.0862 -39.7666 
EPS(%) -0.0160 0.0334 -39.8392 
Debt  Ratio 0.6031 0.5937 4.8624 
Interest and related Expense 64.1691 54.5549 7.2550 
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Price($) 35.8920 71.4503 159.7036 
Turnover Ratio 0.0403 0.0403 7.3720 
Return -0.7296 2.6779 113.5345 
Total Asset 3207.9700 3756.6100 -13.4009 
Net Income 959.1368 1194.2000 78.7870 
KZ Index -4.9696 -17.5224 1.1550 
 
Panel B. Price Momentum 1st and 10th Portfolio Comparison 
P1 P10 H0: P1=P10 
Book-to-market ratio 0.5575 1.7053 35.8582 
Size ($million) 111651490 328734110 148.1064 
Log(size) 19.5040 20.2101 149.4318 
EP(%) -0.3114 -0.0307 96.7466 
EPS(%) -0.2568 -0.0316 97.1035 
Debt Ratio 0.6840 0.6266 -29.3510 
Interest and related Expense 42.6334 36.4951 -15.4906 
Price($) 8.0847 51.1550 384.6425 
Turnover Ratio 0.0424 0.2089 150.3226 
Return -7.2373 10.8771 427.8234 
Total Asset 1217.1300 1491.7600 -3.0688 
Net income 470.3570 852.9308 103.1851 
KZ Index 6.0240 -10.0377 -15.6006 
 
debt ratio across price momentum portfolios. The average debt ratio for the loser firms is 0.6840, 
which is much higher than the average debt ratio for the winner firms are 0.6266. The non-
parametric Mann-Whitney U tests also suggest that these differences are statistically significant 
between the loser and winner portfolios. Different from the SUE portfolios, the KZ Index value 
for the winner portfolio is, on average, lower than that of loser portfolio with the differences 
between the two are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
So far the extended four-factor models have been estimated separately for each portfolio 
and therefore do not impose the condition that high volatility occurs simultaneously for all 
portfolios. More generalized estimates of the underlying state may be obtained from a jointly 
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estimated bivariate model imposing a common process driving all excess return deciles.9 As 
discussed earlier, lowest SUE and loser firms generally have high book-to-market ratios and 
small market value, while highest SUE and winner firms have low book-to-market ratios and 
high market value. Lowest SUE and loser firms therefore generally have higher information 
asymmetry and limited access to the external capital markets, and thus a higher cost of capital. 
Given these reasons, lowest SUE or loser firms may be affected more by changes in the risk 
factors than highest SUE or winner firms across different states. Moreover, it is important to 
extract the variation in the risk premium of highest SUE over lowest SUE portfolios and winner 
over loser portfolios. It is also critical to find the source that contributes to these variations. In 
other words, I want to find which risk factors cause a higher differential response in regards to 
the risk premium of the 10th portfolio over the 1st portfolio. Specifically, for the SUE portfolios, I 
investigate whether lowest SUE firms and highest firms display an identical differential response 
to risk factors across the two states. In the same fashion, I examine whether loser firms and 
winner firms display an identical differential response to the risk factors across the two states. 
   I extend the previous general econometric framework by applying it to estimate a bivariate 
Markov-switching model for the excess returns on the first and tenth decile. The bivariate model 
imposes the assumption that the high volatility state occurs simultaneously for both deciles, and 
therefore allows me to extract the variation in the risk premium of the highest SUE portfolio 
over the lowest SUE portfolio. This also results in a more generalized estimation of the 
underlying state. Furthermore, the joint estimation permits me to seek an answer to the first 
question, whether the lowest SUE firms display the same asymmetry across states as the highest 
SUE firms. Similarly and separately, for the price momentum, I jointly estimate loser and 
                                                          
9
 Two (1st and 10th ) rather than ten portfolios are considered in order to (1) keep the estimation feasible and (2) 
extract the variation in the risk premium of  10th  portfolio over 1st portfolio. 
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winners portfolios and impose the assumption that the state transition probabilities are the same 
for both the loser and winner firms. The process allows me to extract the variation in the risk 
premium of winners over losers and examine the second question of whether losers and winners 
display the same asymmetry across states.                                                                                                                             
6.1. Specification of Joint Estimation of 1st and 10th Decile  
To examine the first question (lowest SUE firms display identical asymmetry in their risk 
across volatility states as highest SUE firms), I make the following specification, 
Let ( ), 'Earnings Low Hight t tr r r≡ be a ( )2 1×  vector consisting of the excess returns of the lowest 
SUE portfolio, Lowtr , and the excess returns of the highest SUE portfolio, 
High
tr . The joint 
Markov-switching model is specified as follows:  
( )1, 2, 3, 4, . 18t t t t t
Earnings
t S S t S t S t S t tr MKT SMB HML WMLα β β β β ε= + + + + +
 
in which, ( ),
t t t
Low High
S S Sα α α≡ , ( ), , ,,t t tLow Highk S k S k Sβ β β≡ for 1, 2, 3, 4k =  , { }1,2tS = , and 
( )~ 0,
tt S
Nε Σ  is a vector of residuals. 
tS
Σ is a positive semi-definite ( )2 2× matrix that 
contains the variance and covariances of the residuals of the lowest SUE and highest SUE 
portfolio excess returns in state tS . The diagonal elements of this variance-covariance matrix,
, tii S
Σ , take a similar form as the univariate model. The off-diagonal elements,
, tij SΣ , assume a 
state-dependent correlation between two residuals , denoted 
tS
ρ , where 
( ) ( )1/2 1/2, , ,t t t tij S S ii S jj SρΣ = Σ Σ  for i j≠ . In addition, I maintain the state transition probabilities 
from the univariate model, which are estimated through Equations (12) to (15), but with the 
same state driving both the lowest SUE and the highest SUE portfolios. The estimations are 
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again carried out through maximum likelihood estimation and the results are reported in Table 
VIII Panel A. 
 I also conduct likelihood ratio tests to see whether the difference across the two states in 
the coefficients of the lowest SUE decile is the same as the difference in the coefficients of the 
highest SUE decile. For each set of regression coefficients indexed by k , I test the following null 
hypotheses:  
1 2 1 2
Low Low High Highα α α α− = −
 
,1 ,2 ,1 ,2 1,2,3,4
Low Low High High
k k k k kβ β β β− = − =
 
Alternatively, I expect that the coefficient differential is larger for the lowest SUE firms. 10  
      I examine the second question, regarding loser and winner firms, in a similar fashion as that 
for lowest and highest SUE firms. For each set of regression coefficients indexed by k ,   I test 
the following hypothesis:  
 
 
,1 ,2 ,1 ,2 1,2,3,4
Loser Loser Winner Winner
k k k k kβ β β β− = − =
 
Alternatively, I expect that the coefficient differential is larger for the loser firms. Again, the 
above estimations are carried out through maximum likelihood estimation and the results are 
reported in Table VIII Panel B. 
6.2. Estimation Results 
                                                          
10If one thinks of the sampling distribution of , one can argue that  is a one-tailed test because the null 
hypothesis can only be rejected when the value of lies in the far right tail. The p-value here indicates the area 
under the chi-square distribution to the right of the test statistic. Also, the hypotheses are tested based on critical 
values of chi-square for a one-tail (right-tail) test. Therefore, it is reasonable to use   to test the null against 
alternative in this case. (Right-tailed test: Equal hypothesis verses greater than hypothesis). 
1 2 1 2
Loser Loser Winner Winnerα α α α− = −
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Figure VI Panel A plots the conditional transition probabilities of being in the low volatility 
state at time t, for the lowest and highest SUE portfolios in the bivariate case. Similarly, Figure 
VI Panel B plots the conditional transition probabilities of being in the low volatility state at time 
t, for the loser’s and winner’s portfolios in the bivariate case. For the bivariate case, probabilities 
of being in the high volatility state are also more frequent than the NBER recessions, but less 
frequent than in univariate case. The probabilities obtained from the joint estimation of the 1st 
and 10th portfolios are used to extract the variation of profits from the earnings and price 
momentum portfolios.  
 
Figure VI Bivariate Regime-Switching Probabilities 
 
I plot the time series of the probability of being in state 1 (low volatility) at time t conditional on information in 
period t−1 in the bivariate Markov-switching model that estimates the expected lowest SUE and highest SUE 
portfolios returns jointly (Panel A), and the expected loser’s and winner’s portfolio returns jointly (Panel B). Shaded 
areas indicate NBER recession periods. 
 
Panel A. Lowest SUE and Highest SUE Portfolios
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Panel B. Loser’s and Winner’s Portfolios 
 
 
 
 
Table VIII Panel A presents the estimation results for earnings from the bivariate model. 
Panel A confirms that the null is strongly rejected at the 5% significance level for the intercept 
and at the 1% significance level for the loadings on the market premium. The evidence suggests 
that the lowest SUE decile is more sensitive than the highest SUE decile to changes in the market 
risk premium in the high volatility state. However, the asymmetry tests cannot reject the null for 
loadings on the SMB, HML and WML factors. These results suggest that the market risk 
premium is the most important factor contributing to the variation in the risk premium of highest 
SUE portfolio over lowest SUE portfolio. 
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Table VIII. The Bivariate Markov-Switching Model for the Earnings (PMN) and the Price 
Momentum Strategy (WML) (January 1972 to December 2010) 
 
For Panel A, the following are estimated: 
( )
1, 2 , 3, 4 ,
1/ 2 1/ 2
, , ,
1 0 1 1
1 0
~ (0, ) , {1, 2}, ( ) ( )
( 1 | 1) ; 1 ( 2 | 1)
( 2 | 2)
t t t t t
t t t t t
Earnings
t S S t S t S t S t t
i i
t S t ij S S ii S jj S
i i i i i i i i
t t t i t t t t
i i i i
t t t
r MKT SMB HML WML
N S for i j
p P S S TB p P S S
q P S S
α β β β β ε
ε ρ
µ µ
µ
− − −
−
= + + + + +
Σ = Σ = Σ Σ ≠
= = = = Φ + − = = =
= = = = Φ ( )2 1 1; 1 ( 1 | 2)i i i it t t tTB q P S Sµ − −+ − = = =
 
 in which Earningstr  is the ( )2 1× vector that contains the monthly returns of the Low SUE and  High SUE portfolio, 
 ! "#and $%& "#  respectively,  where ( ),
t t t
Low High
S S Sα α α≡ , ( ), , ,,t t tLow Highk S k S k Sβ β β≡ for 1, 2, 3, 4,k =  , { }1,2tS = .
 
~ (0, ) ,
tt S
ε Ν Σ is a vector of residuals. 
tS
Σ is a positive semi-definite ( )2 2× matrix containing the variances and 
covariances of the residuals of the PMN strategy and WML Strategy  profits in state ' . The diagonal elements of 
this variance-covariance matrix, 
,
( )
tii S
Σ
 , take the similar form as in the univariate  model. The off-diagonal 
elements, 
, tij SΣ , assume a state-dependent correlation between the residuals, denoted tSρ , that is, 
1/2 1/2
, , ,
( ) ( )
t t t tij S S ii S jj S for i jρΣ = Σ Σ ≠  . is the cumulative density function of a standard normal variable. Standard 
errors are in parentheses to the right of the estimates. The p-value from the likelihood ratio test is the probability of 
the restriction that the asymmetry between the excess returns of two portfolios is identical against the alternative, 
that the asymmetry is larger for the Lowest SUE Portfolio.   
 
Similarly and separately, for Panel B, the following are estimated: 
( )
Price
1, 2 , 3, 4 ,
1/ 2 1/ 2
, , ,
1 0 1 1
1 0 2
~ (0, ) , {1, 2}, ( ) ( )
( 1 | 1) ; 1 ( 2 | 1)
( 2 | 2)
t t t t t
t t t t t
t S S t S t S t S t t
i i
t S t ij S S ii S jj S
i i i i i i i i
t t t i t t t t
i i i i
t t t
r MKT SMB HML PMN
N S for i j
p P S S TB p P S S
q P S S
α β β β β ε
ε ρ
µ µ
µ µ
− − −
−
= + + + + +
Σ = Σ = Σ Σ ≠
= = = = Φ + − = = =
= = = = Φ +( )1 1; 1 ( 1 | 2)i i i it t t tTB q P S S− −− = = =
 
 in which Pricetr  is the ( )2 1× vector that contains the monthly returns of the Low SUE and High SUE portfolio, 
 ()*and +,,)*   respectively, where ( ),
t t t
Loser Winner
S S Sα α α≡ , ( ), , ,,t t tLoser Winnerk S k S k Sβ β β≡ for 1, 2, 3, 4k =  , { }1,2tS = .
 
~ (0, ) ,
tt S
ε Ν Σ is a vector of residuals. 
tS
Σ is a positive semi-definite ( )2 2× matrix containing the variances and 
covariances of the residuals of the PMN strategy and WML Strategy  profits in state ' . The diagonal elements of 
this variance-covariance matrix, 
,
( )
tii S
Σ
 , take the similar form as in the univariate  model. The off-diagonal 
elements, 
, tij SΣ , assume a state-dependent correlation between the residuals, denoted tSρ , that is, 
1/2 1/2
, , ,
( ) ( )
t t t tij S S ii S jj S for i jρΣ = Σ Σ ≠  . is the cumulative density function of a standard normal variable. Standard 
errors are in parentheses to the right of the estimates. The p-value from the likelihood ratio test is the probability of 
the restriction that the asymmetry between the excess returns of two portfolios is identical against the alternative that 
the asymmetry is larger for the loser Portfolio.  
 
Panel A reports the results of the Low SUE and High SUE Portfolio. Panel B reports the results of the Loser’s and 
Winner’s Portfolio. (***, ** and * denote significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%)        
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Panel A. Earnings Momentum 
 
 Low SUE T-stat High SUE T-stat Tests for Identical Asymmetries 
     Intercept:- !- - ! =-$%&- -$%& 
Intercept, State 1 -0.0128*** -17.63 0.0107*** 18.35 Log-likelihood value 2431.76 
Intercept, State 2 -0.0198*** -4.80 0.0161*** 5.38 p-value   0.02 
     MKT : ., !- ., ! =.,$%&- .,$%& 
MKT, State 1 1.0590*** 74.25 1.0361*** 85.10 Log-likelihood value  2407.25 
MKT, State 2 0.8332*** 14.74 0.8740*** 21.80 p-value   0.00 
     SMB: ., !- ., ! =.,$%&- .,$%& 
SMB, State 1 0.7898*** 38.14 0.7740*** 32.72 Log-likelihood value 2433.27 
SMB, State 2 0.6177*** 5.92 0.3981*** 5.83 p-value   0.14 
     HML: ./, !- ./, ! =./,$%&- ./,$%& 
HML, State 1 0.3185*** 11.78 0.1547*** 7.40 Log-likelihood value 2433.98 
HML, State 2 0.4638*** 4.74 0.4189*** 7.16 p-value   0.38 
     WML: .0, !- .0, ! =.0,$%&- .0,$%& 
WML, State 1 -0.2784*** -23.74 0.0045 0.42 Log-likelihood value 2434.30 
WML, State 2 -0.3489*** -16.50 -0.0889*** -4.67 p-value   0.75 
      
      
, State 1 0.0130*** 28.16 0.0110*** 29.42  
, State 2 0.0481*** 36.03 0.0344*** 23.61  
 
Parameters Common to Both Deciles 
Correlation parameters 
 
T-stat 
  
1, State 1 0. 5259*** 3.90   
1, State 2 0.6257*** 3.37   
Transition probability  
Parameters 
   TB: 1 2µ µ=  
Constant 2.0829*** 15.41 
  
TB, State 1 0.4677* 1.68 
 
Log-likelihood value 2432.90 
TB, State 2 -0.3943 -0.75 
 
p-value   0.09 
Unconstrained 
log-likelihood 
 
2434.36 
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Panel B. Price Momentum 
 
 Loser's T-stat Winners T-stat Tests for Identical Asymmetries 
     Intercept:- ()*- - ()*=-+,,)* 2  -+,,)*  
Intercept, State 1 0.0029** 2.16 0.0006 0.65 Log-likelihood value 2100.11 
Intercept, State 2 0.0774*** 4.17 -0.0143*** -2.62 p-value   0.00 
     MKT : ., ()*- ., ()*  =.,+,,)*- .,+,,)*  
MKT, State 1 1.1658*** 46.14 1.0970*** 60.82 Log-likelihood value  2095.58 
MKT, State 2 1.7641*** 6.28 0.9711*** 12.51 p-value   0.00 
      
     SMB: ., ()*- ., ()*  =.,+,,)*- .,+,,)*  
SMB, State 1 1.0978*** 24.49 0.9290*** 34.26 Log-likelihood value 2106.82 
SMB, State 2 0.6104** 2.43 0.8286*** 10.35 p-value   0.30 
      
     HML: ./, ()*- ./, ()*  =./,+,,)*- ./,+,,)*  
HML, State 1 0.3375*** 7.28 0.2661*** 9.67 Log-likelihood value 2106.94 
HML, State 2 0.7822*** 2.68 0.3748*** 3.55 p-value   0.37 
      
      
     PMN: .0, ()*- .0, ()*  =.,+,,)*- .,+,,)*  
PMN, State 1 
-0.4278*** -17.78 0.1774*** 9.86 Log-likelihood value 2105.32 
PMN, State 2 
-1.0298*** -4.51 0.2696*** 2.72 p-value   0.04 
      
      
, State 1 0.0251*** 26.67 0.0164*** 25.90  
, State 2 0.1217*** 11.16 0.0402*** 10.58  
 
Parameters Common to Both Deciles 
Correlation parameters 
 
T-stat 
  
1, State 1 0.5177***         5.68   
1, State 2 0.5356*** 3.63   
Transition probability  
Parameters 
   TB: 1 2µ µ=  
Constant 1.7407***  6.43 
  
TB, State 1 0.4150  0.92 
 
Log-likelihood value 2091.37 
TB, State 2 -1.4844*** -2.77 
 
p-value   2E-08 
Unconstrained 
log-likelihood 
 
2107.35 
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Similarly, Table VIII Panel B presents the estimation results for earnings from the bivariate 
model. Panel B confirms that the null is strongly rejected at the 1% significance level for the 
intercept and the market risk premium factor and at the 5% significance level for the loadings on 
the PMN factor. The evidence suggests that the loser’s decile is more sensitive than the winner’s 
decile to changes in the market risk premium and PMN factor in the high volatility state. In 
addition, the asymmetry tests cannot reject the null for loadings on the SMB and HML factor. 
The market risk premium and earnings momentum here are the main sources for the variation in 
the risk premium of winner over loser portfolio. This again supports the earlier finding that 
earnings momentum dominates price momentum, yet it cannot fully subsume price momentum. 
For the loser decile, the coefficient for PMN is -0.428 in state 1 and -1.030 in state 2. For the 
winner decile, the coefficient for PMN is 0.178 in state 1 and 0.267 in state 2. Loser firms 
display a higher degree of differential response to earnings momentum between the two states 
than winner firms, with the stronger sensitivity occurring in the high volatility state. One 
explanation for this is that PMN captures future macroeconomic activities such as aggregate 
investment opportunities.11 Loser firms are generally small firms with high book-to-market ratios 
that have limited financing access, higher financing costs and are potentially associated with 
higher credit risk. These properties make loser firms more sensitive to PMN than winner firms. 
7. Investor Sentiment and Momentums 
This section first examines the relationship between investor sentiment and the two 
momentums by analyzing the momentum profits during optimistic and pessimistic sentiments. 
Next I further investigate the predictive power of investor sentiment using both linear and 
nonlinear analysis. 
                                                          
11
 Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) 
50 
 
        The sentiment measures of choice are comprehensive ones developed by Baker and Wurgler 
(2006). This composite index is based on components of six (standardized) sentiment proxies: (1) 
Value-weighted dividend premium, (2) IPO volume, (3) First-day returns on IPOs, (4) Closed-
end fund discount, (5) NYSE turnover, and (6) Natural log NYSE turnover, detrended using past 
five-year average. They define this index as SENTIMENT. They then form another index 
SENTIMENT
3
 from the orthogonalized proxies following the same procedure as before.12  
As mentioned in Baker and Wurgler (2006), optimistic sentiment is correlated with positive 
value of sentiment and pessimistic sentiment is correlated with negative 4567458. 13 
Overall, SENTIMENT3 is positive for the years 1972, 1979–1987, 1994, 1996–1997, 1999–2002, 
and 2006 to first half of 2008. Table IX panel A shows that when SENTIMENT3is negative, 
returns average -0.32% per month for the lowest SUE portfolio and 2.27% per month for the 
highest SUE portfolio; when SENTIMENT3 is positive, returns average -1.30% per month for the 
lowest SUE portfolio and 1.53% per month for the highest SUE portfolio. Table IX Panel B 
shows that when SENTIMENT3 is negative, returns average 1.68% per month for the loser’s 
portfolio and 1.35% per month for the winner’s portfolio; when SENTIMENT3 is positive, 
                                                          
12
 The authors regress each of the above six raw proxies on growth in the industrial production index, growth in 
consumer durables, nondurables, and services, and a dummy variable for NBER recessions. They argue that 
residuals from these regressions may be cleaner proxies for investor sentiment. They form an index of the 
orthogonalized proxies following the same procedure as before. 
13
 As indicated in unreported results, the two measures of sentiment, 456745 9:; 4567458, roughly 
follow the same pattern.   
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Table XI. Future Returns by Sentiment Index (January 1972–December 2010) 
 
For each month, I report average portfolio returns over months in which SENTIMENT⊥ from the previous year-end is positive, months in which it is negative, 
and the difference between these two averages. Panel A reports the earnings momentum portfolios and Panel B reports the price momentum portfolio. 
 
 
Panel A. Earning Momentum Portfolios 
                              
  <=>?@A=>?BC8  Low SUE Decile 2 Decile 3 Decile 4 Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile 8 Decile 9 High SUE 10 −1  10−5  5− 1 
Earnings  Negative -0.32% 0.10% 0.49% 0.64% 1.01% 1.52% 1.52% 1.95% 2.02% 2.27% 2.59% 1.26% 1.33% 
Momentum  Positive -1.30% -0.58% -0.50% -0.23% 0.00% 0.43% 0.59% 0.94% 1.16% 1.53% 2.83% 1.53% 1.30% 
  Difference -0.98% -0.69% -0.99% -0.88% -1.01% -1.09% -0.92% -1.01% -0.86% -0.74% 0.24% 0.27% -0.03% 
 
Panel B. Price Momentum Portfolios 
                              
  
<=>?@A=>?BC8  Loser's Decile 2 Decile 3 Decile 4 Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile 8 Decile 9 Winner's 10 −1  10−5  5− 1 
Price  Negative 1.68% 1.26% 1.21% 1.16% 1.13% 1.08% 1.11% 1.08% 1.16% 1.35% -0.32% 0.23% -0.13% 
Momentum  Positive -0.14% 0.31% 0.64% 0.71% 0.81% 0.88% 0.87% 0.91% 0.95% 1.09% 1.22% 0.28% 0.50% 
  
Difference -1.81% -0.95% -0.57% -0.45% -0.32% -0.20% -0.23% -0.17% -0.21% -0.27% 1.54% 0.05% 0.63% 
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returns average -0.14 per month for the lowest SUE portfolio and 1.09% per month for the 
winner’s portfolio. In general, when sentiment is pessimistic, the highest SUE decile returns 2.59% 
per month more than the lowest SUE decile; it returns 2.83% more when sentiment is optimistic, 
meaning there is a only 0.24% differential between the optimistic sentiment and pessimistic 
sentiment. On the other hand, when sentiment is pessimistic, the winner’s decile returns -0.32% 
per month less than the loser’s decile; it returns 1.22% more when sentiment is optimistic, 
meaning there is a 1.54% differential between the optimistic sentiment and pessimistic sentiment. 
These results seem to indicate that sentiment has a much larger impact on price 
momentum than on earnings momentum. To further investigate the relationship between the two 
momentums and sentiment, I run the following regression based on Baker and Wurgler (2006) to 
see whether sentiment can predict the various long–short portfolio profits.  
, , 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 1
' , ' , 1, 2, 3, 4,
Earnings Momentum:
(20)
Price Momentum:
t t t t t
it High SUE t it Low SUE t S t S t S t S t S t t
it Winner s t it Loser s t S S t S t S t S
t t t t t tS
r MKT SMB HML WML Sentiment
r MKT SMB HML W
r Index
r
α β β β β β ε
α β β β β
= = −
= =
− = + + + + + +
− = + + + + 5, 1 (21)
t
t S t tML Sentiment Indexβ ε−+ +
where 2~ (0, ) ,
t
t SNε σ  and (1, 2)tS = and the conditional variance of excess returns,
2
tS
σ , is allowed 
to depend on the state of economy. The sentiment index is measured in two ways: SENTIMENT 
and SENTIMENT3.
 
The dependent variable is the monthly return on a long–short portfolio, and the monthly 
returns are regressed on the lagged value of the sentiment index. The regressions are controlled 
for MKT, SMB, HML, WML or PMN, respectively. I run the regressions for a single-regime 
(linear regression) and two-regime model both with the lagged value of the sentiment index. For 
the two-regime estimation, the state transition probabilities are estimated using Equations (12) to 
(15). The two-regime estimations are again carried out using the maximum likelihood estimation. 
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Table X Time Series Regressions of Portfolio Returns with Sentiment Index                       
(January 1972 to December 2010) 
 
Regressions of long--short portfolio returns on lagged sentiment measure, Fama-French factors and 
WML or PMN 
, , 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 1
' , ' , 1, 2, 3, 4,
Earnings Momentum:
Price Momentum:
t t t t t
it High SUE t it Low SUE t S t S t S t S t S t t
it Winner s t it Loser s t S S t S t S t S t
t t t t t tS
r MKT SMB HML WML Sentiment
r MKT SMB HML WML
r Index
r
α β β β β β ε
α β β β β
= = −
= =
− = + + + + + +
− = + + + + +
( ) ( )
2
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 1
5, 1
~ (0, ) , (1, 2)
( 1 | 1) ; 1 ( 2 | 1) ( 2 | 2) ; 1 ( 1 | 2)
t
t S t
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
t
S t t
N S
p P S S TB p P S S q P S S TB q P S S
Sentiment Index
ε σ
µ µ µ µ
β ε
− − − − − −
−
=
= = = = Φ + − = = = = = = = Φ + − = = =
+
 
The sentiment index is measured in two ways:  456745 and 4567458 .  456745is based on first 
principal component of six (standardized) sentiment proxies: (1) Value-weighted dividend premium, (2) IPO volume, 
(3) First-day returns on IPOs, (4) Closed-end fund discount, (5) NYSE turnover, and (6) Natural log NYSE turnover, 
detrended using past five-year average. 4567458 is orthogonalized to a set of marcoeconomic conditions. 
Panel A reports the results for PMN and Panel B reports the results for WML. (***, ** and * denote 
significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%).        
 
Panel A. PMN 
OLS   State 1   State 2   OLS   State 1   State 2   
  PMN T-Stat PMN T-Stat PMN T-Stat PMN T-Stat PMN T-Stat PMN T-Stat 
Constant 0.0267*** 16.79 0.0245*** 26.51 0.0534*** 5.60 0.0267*** 16.77 0.0246*** 26.13 0.0513*** 5.11 
RPM 0.0045 0.09 -0.0668*** -3.26 0.365*** 2.56 0.0045 0.09 -0.0673*** -3.04 0.3516** 2.27 
SMB -0.0939 -1.38 -0.0203 -0.76 -0.4015** -2.08 -0.0941 -1.39 -0.0199 -0.67 -0.3933** -1.98 
HML -0.0926 -1.33 -0.101** -3.37 -0.0576 -0.27 -0.0936 -1.35 -0.1028*** -3.25 -0.0552 -0.26 
WML 0.2547*** 5.89 0.2618*** 22.02 0.3484*** 5.99 0.2541*** 5.86 0.261*** 22.08 0.3542*** 5.90 
456745 0.0116 0.09 0.071 0.63 1.192 0.74 
4567458 0.0557 0.50 0.1186 1.04 0.9596 0.66 
TB, Constant 2.549*** 13.16 2.549*** 13.16 2.547*** 12.98 2.547*** 12.98 
TB, Slope  -0.2403 -0.78 -2.397*** -2.96 -0.2379 -0.78 -2.3867*** -2.97 
σ     0.019*** 32.36 0.0726*** 14.71     0.019*** 30.88 0.0728*** 14.75 
 
 
Panel B. WML 
 
OLS   State 1   State 2   OLS   State 1   State 2   
  WML T-Stat WML T-Stat WML T-Stat WML T-Stat WML T-Stat WML T-Stat 
Constant -0.015*** -2.62 -0.0028* -1.86 -0.0859*** -4.28 -0.0149*** -2.60 -0.0026* -1.77 -0.0868*** -4.34 
RPM -0.2425** -2.36 -0.0704*** -2.97 -0.7987*** -2.77 -0.2421** -2.35 -0.0704*** -2.96 -0.7871*** -2.73 
SMB -0.3031** -2.07 -0.1927*** -4.32 0.0822 0.30 -0.3075** -2.10 -0.1959*** -4.35 0.0828 0.32 
HML -0.3002* -1.70 -0.1117*** -2.59 -0.3669 -1.15 -0.3026* -1.70 -0.1112*** -2.59 -0.3817 -1.22 
PMN 0.8393*** 5.49 0.6226*** 23.43 1.1937*** 4.54 0.8392*** 5.47 0.6201*** 25.35 1.2011*** 4.97 
456745 0.5901** 1.93 0.2754* 1.74 0.6646 0.32 
4567458 0.5322* 1.65 0.292* 1.73 0.8582 0.42 
TB, Constant 1.3971*** 8.97 1.3971*** 8.97 1.3971*** 9.87 1.3971*** 9.87 
TB, Slope  0.5837** 2.41 -1.7248*** -3.55 0.5801*** 2.59 -1.7402*** -3.63 
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σ     0.0288*** 25.85 0.1317*** 10.36     0.0288*** 27.51 0.1316*** 10.45 
Table X shows that the coefficients for SENTIMENT and SENTIMENT3 are very similar. 
The coefficients for the sentiment measures are smaller in state 1, the low volatility state, and 
larger in state 2, the high volatility state. This makes sense since in a high volatility state stock 
returns are more highly impacted by investor sentiment than in a low volatility state, or 
expansion. Table X Panel A also shows that sentiment measures are insignificant in predicting 
the returns on the zero-based earning momentum portfolio that is long the highest SUE portfolio 
and short the lowest SUE portfolio, both in single-regime and two-regime regressions.     
In contrast, Table X Panel B shows that sentiment measures are significant in predicting 
the returns on the long-short price momentum portfolio that are long the winner’s portfolio and 
short the loser’s portfolio. In the nonlinear regime-switching regression, the coefficient of 
sentiment measure is only significant in the low volatility state, state 1, but not significant in the 
high volatility state, state 2. This result is similar to Antoniou, Doukas and Subrahmanyam (2011) 
finding that changes in investor sentiment only influence price momentum in up-states, not in the 
down-states. 
The results of earnings momentum are quite intriguing, since numerous papers argue that 
investor under or overreaction to news may cause earnings momentum (Barberis, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1998). However, the estimation above shows that after controlling for price momentum, 
investor sentiment has no predictive power in explaining earnings momentum. Also, in 
unreported results, even without including WML factor, sentiment still has no predictive power 
for earnings momentum. This may be because corporate earnings are more influenced by firm 
specific factors instead of aggregate sentiment. Hou, Peng and Xiong (2009) also point out that 
price momentum profits are higher in up-market, but that earnings momentum profits are higher 
among low volume stock and down-market. Particularly, they find that in the long-run, price 
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momentum profits reverse, but earnings momentum profits do not. This seems to indicate that 
the effect of investor sentiment on the profits of earnings momentum is somehow limited. 
8. Robustness Tests:  Alternative Instrument in Modeling State Transition Probabilities 
In the benchmark estimation, I follow Gray (1996) in using the one-month Treasury bill 
rate as the instrument in modeling the state transition probabilities. I conduct a robustness test by 
using an alternative instrument to replace the one-month Treasury bill rate in the transition 
probabilities specifications in the bivariate Markov-switching model. I follow Perez-Quiros and 
Timmermann (2000) in using the year-on-year log-difference in the US Composite Leading 
Indicator, ∆CLI, as an alternative instrument. The monthly index is available through the OECD 
database. 
Table XI.  Parameter Estimates for the Univariate Markov-Switching Extended Four -
Factor Model of Excess Returns to Momentum Portfolios, ∆CLI as an Alternative 
Instrument in Modeling State Transition Probabilities (January 1972 to December 2010) 
 
Panel A. Earnings Momentum 
                                                          
14
 ∆CLI is the year-on-year log-difference in the Composite Leading Indicator from the Conference Board. 
 
Low Sue  Decile  2 Decile 3 Decile 4  Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile  8 Decile 9 High SUE 
Intercept, State 1 -0.0133*** -0.0076*** -0.0070*** -0.0040*** -0.0013** 0.0031*** 0.0038*** 0.0065*** 0.0087*** 0.0112*** 
Intercept, State 2 -0.0287*** 0.9987*** -0.0065 -0.0067* -0.0032 0.0021 0.0027 0.0089*** 0.0090*** 0.0150*** 
MKT, State 1 1.0833*** 0.7660*** 1.0208*** 1.0227*** 1.0430*** 1.0250*** 1.0595*** 1.0468*** 1.0670*** 1.0439*** 
MKT, State 2 0.6281*** 0.2768*** 1.1467*** 0.9146*** 0.8391*** 0.8420*** 0.9106*** 0.8838*** 0.8952*** 0.8083*** 
SMB, State 1 0.8283*** -0.1724*** 0.8623*** 0.8574*** 0.9212*** 0.8514*** 0.8712*** 0.8344*** 0.8651*** 0.7821*** 
SMB, State 2 0.4962*** -0.0151*** 0.4364*** 0.6411*** 0.4555*** 0.4687*** 0.4400*** 0.4937*** 0.4286*** 0.4125*** 
HML, State 1 0.4703*** 0.9987*** 0.3342*** 0.2982*** 0.3577*** 0.3035*** 0.3322*** 0.2644*** 0.3015*** 0.1679*** 
HML, State 2 0.2660* 0.7660*** 0.5124*** 0.4776*** 0.4603*** 0.4792*** 0.4642*** 0.4289*** 0.4497*** 0.4239*** 
WML, State 1 -0.3066*** 0.2768*** -0.1750*** -0.1857*** -0.1573*** -0.1518*** -0.1004*** -0.0784*** -0.0894*** 0.0065 
WML, State 2 -0.3440*** -0.1724*** -0.2456*** -0.1563*** -0.1217*** -0.1535*** -0.0706*** -0.1814*** -0.0966*** -0.0983*** 
Transition Probability  
          
Constant 2.4563*** 2.5118*** 2.3130*** 2.0977*** 2.5073*** 2.5115*** 2.8980*** 2.4370*** 2.4548*** 2.2661*** 
∆CLI14, State 1 -13.2040 52.6077*** -45.6078** 11.7068 13.7660 13.9581 27.9940 -42.4365 41.4240 -0.8906 
∆CLI, State 2 -33.6169 57.7706*** -117.861*** 57.3034* -42.8509 -38.0679 1.4691 -65.9868** 54.0384* -26.3668 
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Panel B. Price Momentum 
Standard Deviation 
          
σ, State 1 0.0156*** 0.0116*** 0.0129*** 0.0109*** 0.0125*** 0.0124*** 0.0104*** 0.0105*** 0.0120*** 0.0117*** 
σ, State 2 0.0592*** 0.0465*** 0.0408*** 0.0384*** 0.0446*** 0.0475*** 0.0325*** 0.0341*** 0.0343*** 0.0340*** 
Log Likelihood value  1175.65 1250.57*** 1241.23 1250.72 1224.76 1243.29 1291.72 1257.30 1245.69 1256.17 
  T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat 
Intercept, State 1 -15.4197 -14.3552 -10.2648 -6.1774 -2.0507 4.2269 6.4602 9.8493 12.2940 16.6350 
Intercept, State 2 -3.9524 -3.3223 -1.4924 -1.8662 -0.7882 0.4689 1.0927 3.4886 3.1197 5.0245 
MKT, State 1 71.3344 80.3543 77.0976 66.0586 70.2823 61.1084 90.7264 78.1660 65.6694 71.7431 
MKT, State 2 5.0697 15.3813 15.4945 14.1619 12.1652 11.3218 24.5161 22.3744 18.9218 12.7526 
SMB, State 1 33.7003 42.6131 42.5653 33.0787 46.7214 35.1216 44.8681 37.6522 38.1762 32.9725 
SMB, State 2 3.0252 6.2159 4.2634 8.1991 4.5148 4.3845 6.8516 7.2750 5.6556 5.3099 
HML, State 1 16.0677 12.3921 15.7888 10.2678 14.7771 10.8276 17.9331 10.4647 12.4742 6.5581 
HML, State 2 1.7160 4.8863 5.5073 5.4458 4.1716 4.5062 9.5879 7.1130 6.9932 6.2257 
WML, State 1 -18.5987 -14.3572 -22.2386 -13.9011 -15.9125 -12.3610 -10.5251 -6.2563 -8.9177 0.5303 
WML, State 2 -6.3835 -12.9582 -9.9269 -4.7423 -4.0440 -4.8356 -3.9550 -8.2082 -3.7999 -3.5989 
Transition Probability  
          
Constant 11.6982 10.8898 11.4170 13.3855 11.6469 10.8204 6.7833 10.5335 10.6706 11.7685 
∆CLI, State 1 -0.5534 3.6510 -2.3687 0.4494 0.3805 0.5153 0.6640 -1.5917 1.4676 -0.0380 
∆CLI, State 2 -0.6472 2.7207 -3.3773 1.7618 -1.5512 -0.8947 0.0215 -2.5724 2.0605 -0.6093 
Standard Deviation 
          
σ, State 1 30.0921 27.0577 28.8755 21.3250 26.0744 28.3416 27.1737 24.5144 25.2481 23.6777 
σ, State 2 11.5796 18.9665 17.1674 19.6811 27.2734 13.1331 18.2006 18.4410 25.5227 18.4054 
  Loser's Decile  2 Decile 3 Decile 4  Decile 5 Decile 6 Decile 7 Decile  8 Decile 9 Winner's 
Intercept, State 1 0.0611*** 0.0156*** 0.0114*** 0.0048*** 0.0042*** 0.0036*** 0.0032*** 0.0025*** 0.0004 0.0010 
Intercept, State 2 0.0037** 0.0011 0.0021** 0.0057* 0.0050** 0.0037** 0.0022* 0.0002 -0.0032** 
-
0.0077*** 
MKT, State 1 1.6386*** 1.2389*** 1.1520*** 1.0177*** 0.9706*** 0.9749*** 0.9655*** 1.0061*** 1.0917*** 1.1461*** 
MKT, State 2 1.1453*** 1.0071*** 0.9821*** 0.4760*** 0.9608*** 0.9176*** 0.9870*** 0.7457*** 0.8961*** 0.9471*** 
SMB, State 1 0.8094*** 1.4536*** 1.0781*** 0.7103*** 0.6695*** 0.6014*** 0.5936*** 0.6601*** 0.8149*** 1.0818*** 
SMB, State 2 1.0711*** 0.5725*** 0.4539*** -0.1140*** 0.3708*** 0.3738*** 0.3931*** 0.3610*** 0.4809*** 0.6570*** 
HML, State 1 0.9766*** 0.3323*** 0.3415*** 0.4132*** 0.2234*** 0.2076*** 0.1814*** 0.2802*** 0.2398*** 0.2376*** 
HML, State 2 0.2637*** 0.5053*** 0.6415*** 0.2257*** 0.8583*** 0.8110*** 0.7956*** 0.5497*** 0.4779*** 0.2937*** 
PMN, State 1 
-
0.4318*** 
-
0.1628*** 
-
0.1028*** -0.1295*** -0.0614*** -0.0259** 0.0010 0.0346** 0.1277*** 0.1210*** 
PMN, State 2 
-
0.9980*** 
-
0.3594*** 
-
0.2891*** -0.1507** -0.1961*** -0.1543*** -0.0163 0.0426 0.1305*** 0.2559*** 
Transition 
Probability     
Constant 1.5683*** 1.6459*** 2.0775*** 2.2450*** 2.4987*** 2.4481*** 2.5134*** 2.7796*** 2.1537*** 2.2204*** 
∆CLI, State 1 8.7052 -1.2667 57.0240** 17.7933 
114.0730**
*
 95.4331** 43.1407 44.5277* -1.9167 -1.8884 
∆CLI, State 2 -8.6587 -57.7609 -1.0470 
198.9976**
*
 
188.0451**
*
 
158.1088**
*
 
-
71.1602** 
-
128.0838*** 
55.5298*
*
 23.3157 
Standard Deviation     
57 
 
 
Tables XI and XII repeat the same tests as in Table V and VIII by estimating the bivariate 
Markov-switching model for the 1st  and 10th  portfolio excess returns, but with ∆CLI as the 
instrument used in the modeling of the state transition probabilities, respectively. The two new 
tables show that the basic inferences from Table V and VIII are robust to the specification 
changes of the state transition probabilities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
σ, State 1 0.0247*** 0.0171*** 0.0149*** 0.0073*** 0.0091*** 0.0089*** 0.0089*** 0.0101*** 0.0111*** 0.0160*** 
σ, State 2 0.1132*** 0.0357*** 0.0197*** 0.0149*** 0.0149*** 0.0124*** 0.0131*** 0.0132*** 0.0144*** 0.0255*** 
Log Likelihood 
value  901.6486 1123.31 1220.33 1283.77 1446.49 1478.38 1489.44 1452.69 1373.50 1194.17 
  T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat T-stat 
Intercept, State 1 4.2736 3.3945 6.1974 7.2916 7.1844 6.4646 6.5486 3.8804 0.4231 0.8244 
Intercept, State 2 2.5217 0.9477 2.0457 1.8424 2.4758 2.3184 1.8043 0.1571 -2.4205 -2.9054 
MKT, State 1 7.5293 22.7220 46.7643 92.2812 54.2845 113.5685 110.4573 134.3389 74.9677 56.5476 
MKT, State 2 43.9229 44.3214 46.6916 15.6524 34.6970 43.5838 43.9387 27.5686 40.5217 21.6685 
SMB, State 1 3.8597 12.5917 23.8661 49.2373 16.7100 44.3520 28.1024 43.3381 37.6432 28.6696 
SMB, State 2 23.4968 18.3096 18.0045 -2.7281 10.3450 15.7640 19.6703 14.7272 20.6438 12.7703 
HML, State 1 4.1643 3.8774 8.6503 24.0279 4.1697 14.6737 11.1738 15.5001 6.6707 6.6244 
HML, State 2 5.3689 13.3134 21.2682 6.9561 25.8107 32.6095 33.9879 19.5703 17.4296 5.6310 
PMN, State 1 -17.2698 -6.7965 -4.8196 -12.3314 -6.2042 -2.2300 0.0969 2.4672 5.5502 4.0433 
PMN, State 2 -5.5812 -4.3924 -7.1979 -2.0577 -4.9222 -4.5423 -0.8176 1.4933 5.9087 6.2891 
Transition 
Probability     
Constant 12.9086 8.6111 11.2118 15.2325 5.9328 8.1148 9.5294 14.0831 8.8030 10.5564 
∆CLI, State 1 0.9040 -0.0556 1.9648 0.9838 3.6271 2.2935 1.5015 1.8147 -0.0624 -0.0825 
∆CLI, State 2 -0.4087 -1.3387 -0.0515 3.6416 3.9313 2.8161 -2.1971 -3.4975 2.1856 0.6990 
Standard Deviation    
σ, State 1 23.8380 23.8878 24.4686 73.7596 18.4921 28.3832 35.0891 44.6139 30.4467 26.7727 
σ, State 2 14.3565 12.0940 19.4942 6.0630 8.9125 16.2180 15.3069 11.9989 17.9999 14.6159 
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Table XII. The Bivariate Markov-Switching Model for the Earnings (PMN) and the Price 
Momentum Strategy (WML) ∆CLI as an Alternative Instrument in Modeling State 
Transition Probabilities (January 1972 to December 2010) 
Panel A. Earnings Momentum 
 
 Low SUE T-stat High SUE T-stat Tests for Identical Asymmetries 
     Intercept:- !- - ! =-$%&- -$%& 
Intercept, State 1 -0.0199*** -4.7905 0.0106*** 17.4277 Log-likelihood value 2433.7793 
Intercept, State 2 0.8291*** 14.4937 0.0164*** 5.7237 p-value   0.8115 
     MKT : ., !- ., ! =.,$%&- .,$%& 
MKT, State 1 0.6163*** 5.8840 1.0375*** 79.6384 Log-likelihood value  2376.1750 
MKT, State 2 0.4582*** 4.6438 0.8714*** 21.4409 p-value  0.0000 
     SMB: ., !- ., ! =.,$%&- .,$%& 
SMB, State 1 -0.3531*** -16.0554 0.7754*** 32.5295 Log-likelihood value 2431.7308 
SMB, State 2 -0.3531*** -17.0931 0.3972*** 6.0145 p-value   0.0415 
     HML: ./, !- ./, ! =./,$%&- ./,$%& 
HML, State 1 1.0563*** 69.0052 0.1599*** 7.2198 Log-likelihood value 2432.4409 
HML, State 2 0.7908*** 36.3765 0.4155*** 7.4814 p-value   0.0983 
     WML: .0, !- .0, ! =.0,$%&- .0,$%& 
WML, State 1 -0.2766*** -11.4605 0.0046 0.4087 Log-likelihood value 2434.3043 
WML, State 2 -0.3184*** -22.8442 -0.0899*** -4.8706 p-value   0.1512 
      
      
, State 1 0.0131*** 27.9187 0.0110*** 26.6060  
, State 2 0.0479*** 34.3844 0.0344*** 21.7279  
 
Parameters Common to Both Deciles 
Correlation parameters 
 
T-stat 
  
1, State 1 0. 5123*** 3.90   
1, State 2 0.6077*** 3.37   
Transition probability  
Parameters 
   TB: 1 2µ µ=  
Constant -2.4815*** 
-12.1144   
TB, State 1 50.7459** 2.2782  Log-likelihood value 2432.8324 
TB, State 2 -35.7376 
-1.3311  p-value   0.1625 
Unconstrained 
log-likelihood 
 
2433.8078 
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Panel B. Price Momentum 
 
 
 Loser's T-stat Winners T-stat Tests for Identical Asymmetries 
     
Intercept:- ()*- - ()*=-+,,)* 2  -+,,)*  
Intercept, State 1 0.0027** 2.1091 0.0005 0.5831 Log-likelihood value 2086.2771 
Intercept, State 2 0.0783*** 4.2687 -0.0141*** -2.4111 p-value   0.0000 
     
MKT : ., ()*- ., ()*  =.,+,,)*- .,+,,)*  
MKT, State 1 1.1687*** 50.9220 1.0982*** 67.6045 Log-likelihood value  2080.4924 
MKT, State 2 1.7851*** 6.2295 0.9669*** 11.8080 p-value   0.0000 
     
 
     
SMB: ., ()*- ., ()*  =.,+,,)*- .,+,,)*  
SMB, State 1 1.0953*** 25.3294 0.9285*** 34.9086 Log-likelihood value 2092.9705 
SMB, State 2 0.5947** 2.4111 0.8296*** 10.2175 p-value   0.3700 
     
 
     
HML: ./, ()*- ./, ()*  =./,+,,)*- ./,+,,)*  
HML, State 1 0.3432*** 7.7753 0.2687*** 11.6582 Log-likelihood value 2092.8748 
HML, State 2 0.7749*** 2.6440 0.3715*** 3.3682 p-value   0.3200 
     
 
     
 
     
PMN: .0, ()*- .0, ()*  =.,+,,)*- .,+,,)*  
PMN, State 1 -0.4275*** 
-2.5956 0.1782*** 11.5635 Log-likelihood value 2091.0050 
PMN, State 2 -1.0522*** -18.4780 0.2698
***
 2.5758 p-value   0.0200 
      
      
, State 1 0.0250*** 29.2668 0.0164*** 26.9080  
, State 2 0.1224*** 11.3286 0.0406*** 9.9983  
 
Parameters Common to Both Deciles 
Correlation parameters 
 
T-stat 
  
1, State 1 0.5258*** 4.9812 
  
1, State 2 0.4907*** 3.5436 
  
Transition probability 
Parameters 
   
TB: 1 2µ µ=  
Constant 1.8929*** 17.1850 
  
TB, State 1 5.4815 0.5613 
 
Log-likelihood value 2093.3689 
TB, State 2 5.8210 0.2584 
 
p-value   0.9800 
Unconstrained 
log-likelihood 
 
2093.3691 
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9. Conclusion 
Using a two-state Markov-switching framework with time-varying transition probabilities, 
this paper examines time variations of the relationship between earnings momentum and price 
momentum. This framework allows for the intercept, slope coefficient, and variance to vary with 
a single latent state variable. By incorporating macroeconomic information in the state transition 
probabilities, I am able to capture the time variation in the coefficients across low and high 
volatility states. I apply this framework to a extend four-factor model (Fama-French factors, and 
WML/PMN) to investigate the interaction between earnings and price momentum. WML is the 
return of an investment portfolio that consists of long positions in past winners and short 
positions in past losers; PMN is the return of an investment portfolio that is long in the highest 
earnings surprise decile and is short in the lowest earnings surprise decile. From this model I find 
that price momentum is significantly more influenced by earnings momentum in the high 
volatility state. From a financing perspective, the discount rate has a large impact on stock prices 
but not on companies’ earnings in the low volatility state. However in the high volatility state, 
when financing is more constrained, the discount rate makes a bigger difference on earnings. 
Therefore, the co-movement of price momentum and earnings momentum becomes stronger. 
From an investing perspective, PMN captures future aggregate investment opportunities and its 
predictive content becomes more important for investors in the high volatility state. Because of 
this investors pay more attention and place higher weights on earnings. 
Loser and lowest SUE firms are generally smaller in size with high book-to-market ratios, 
while winner and highest SUE firms are larger in size with low book-to-market. These 
differences in firm characteristics might make lowest SUE or loser firms more sensitive to 
changes in the state of the economy than highest SUE or winner firms. Therefore I examine 
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whether this is the case and find that the loser portfolio is more sensitive than the winner 
portfolio to changes in the earnings momentum across the two states. One explanation for this is 
that PMN captures future macroeconomic activities such as aggregate investment opportunities. 
Because loser firms are generally smaller firms with high book-to-market ratios they tend to have 
limited financing access, higher financing costs and are potentially associated with higher credit 
risk. These properties make loser firms more sensitive to PMN than winner firms. 
Finally, I adopt two sentiment measures constructed by Baker and Wurgler (2006) to 
further investigate the relationship between sentiment and the two momentums. I find that profits 
from earnings momentum are positive and do not vary much, regardless of whether investor 
sentiment is optimistic or pessimistic. This may be because corporate earnings are more 
influenced by firm specific factors instead of aggregate investor sentiment. In contrast, the profit 
for price momentum exists only when investor sentiment is optimistic. When pessimistic, profits 
for price momentum disappear. The results indicate that sentiment has predictive power for price 
momentum profit, but not for earnings momentum profit.  Moreover, this predictive power of 
sentiment for price momentum only seems to be pronounced for the low volatility state.  
In conclusion, this regime-switching framework allows me to capture the variation in the 
relationship between earnings momentum and price momentum. This framework is flexible 
enough to be applied to the study of a variety of topics within financial economics. By 
incorporating regime-switching one may examine the time-varying nature of financial markets, 
making this a beneficial tool for empirical studies. 
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Appendix: 
List of variables used in the paper: 
rH Excess return of a portfolio over period t 
 SH Latent state variable,  SH  J or L denote state i or state j  
X H A vector of conditioning variables used to explain the excess return rH 
.N  Regression coefficients of  X H 
- Intercept term 
 Error term ~	0,   
O ,1-O , P, 1-P State transition probabilities 
( )1 1| ,t t tP S i S j Y− −= =
 
Transition probability from state j to i, given information 1tY −  
Q A vector of information variables that are publicly known  at time 1t −
and affects the state transition probabilities between time 1t −  and t  
R A vector of parameters entering the likelihood function 
( | , ; )t t tf r S j X θ=  The density of the innovations, tε , conditional on being in state j, j=1, 2 
-S, .S N , S Intercept, slope coefficients, standard deviation in state j (given   L, j=1,2) 
1t−Ω  Information set contains,  , Q, and also the lagged value of 
these variables 
( )1| ;t trφ θ−Ω  The density obtained by summing the probability-weighted state 
densities, ( )f • , across two possible states. 
( )1| ;t tL r θ−Ω
 
Log-likelihood function obtained by summing ( )( )1log | ;t trφ θ−Ω from 1 
to T 
( )1| ,;t tP S j θ−= Ω  The conditional probability of state j at time t  given information at time
1t − , obtained recursively based on the total probability theorem. 
 Monthly excess return for the thi earnings or price momentum decile 
-  The intercept term from regression of decile,   1, 2 
.U,      k=1,2,3,4 Coefficients on MKT, SMB, HML, WML (for earnings momentum 
regressions) or PMN (for price momentum regressions). 
 Error term from regression of decile  
, Standard deviation from regression of decile,   1, 2 
O , 1 2 O , P , 1 2 P State transition probabilities of decile 
 State indicator for thi portfolio 
Φ
 
The cumulative density function of a standard normal variable 
0 , t
i i
Sµ µ  Intercept, slope coefficients for T-bill regression,   1, 2 of ith decile 
TB One-month Treasury bill rate 
MKT The excess return on the market (Value-weight return on all NYSE, 
AMEX, & NASDAQ stocks minus the one-month Treasury bill rate) 
 
thi
thi
thi
thi
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SMB The average return on the three small portfolios minus the average 
return on the three big portfolios. 
HML The average return on the two value portfolios minus the average return 
on the two growth portfolios. 
WML Returns on portfolio that shorting the past loser’s portfolio and going 
long the past winner’s portfolio. 
PMN Returns on portfolio that Returns on portfolio that shorting the lowest 
SUE portfolio and going long the highest SUE portfolio. 
( ), 'Earnings Low Hight t tr r r≡  ( )2 1×  vector consisting of the excess returns to the lowest SUE 
portfolio, Lowtr , and the highest SUE portfolio, 
High
tr  
 
Vector of intercept term of the lowest SUE portfolio, and the highest 
SUE portfolio. 
( ), , ,,t t tLow Highk S k S k Sβ β β≡
1, 2, 3, 4k =
 
Vector of coefficients on MKT, SMB, HML, WML of the lowest SUE 
portfolio, and the highest SUE portfolio. 
( )Price , 'Loser Winnert t tr r r≡  ( )2 1×  vector consisting of the excess returns to the loser’s portfolio, 
Loser
tr , and the excess returns to the winner’s portfolio, 
Winner
tr
 
( ),
t t t
Loser Winner
S S Sα α α≡  Vector of intercept term of the loser’s portfolio, and the winner’s portfolio.
 ( ), , ,,t t tLoser Winnerk S k S k Sβ β β≡  Vector of coefficients on MKT, SMB, HML, PMN of the loser’s portfolio, and the winner’s portfolio.
 
tε  ( )~ 0,
tt S
Nε Σ , { }1,2tS = are residuals 
tS
Σ
 A positive semi-definite ( )2 2× matrix that contains the variance and 
covariances of the residuals of the 1st decile and 10th decile portfolio 
excess returns in state tS  
, tii S
Σ
 
The diagonal elements of this variance-covariance matrix, take the 
similar form as in the univariate model. 
, tij SΣ  The off-diagonal elements, , assume a state-dependent correlation 
between two residuals , denoted 
tS
ρ , that is ( ) ( )1/2 1/2, , ,t t t tij S S ii S jj SρΣ = Σ Σ  
for i j≠ . 
tS
ρ
 
State-dependent correlation between two residuals 
SENTIMENT
3
 
Sentiment index in Baker and Wurgler (2006), based on first principal 
component of six (standardized) sentiment proxies: (1) Value-weighted 
dividend premium, (2) IPO volume, (3) First-day returns on IPOs, (4) Closed-
end fund discount, (5) NYSE turnover, (6) Natural log NYSE turnover, 
detrended using past five-year average 
SENTIMENT
3
 
Sentiment index in Baker and Wurgler (2006), based on first principal 
component of six (standardized) sentiment proxies, where each of the proxies 
has first been orthogonalized with respect to a set of macroeconomic 
conditions. 
 
( ),
t t t
Low High
S S Sα α α≡
, tij SΣ
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Chapter 2 
The Relative Pricing of Cross-Listed Securities: The Case of Chinese A- and H-Shares 
1. Introduction 
Despite being issued by the same company, prices for H-shares in Hong Kong are 
persistently lower than the corresponding A-share prices traded in Shanghai and Shenzhen. This 
is somewhat puzzling given that A- and H-shares represent a claim to the same future cash flow. 
In theory, according to the law of one price, securities with claims to the same cash flow should 
trade at the same price in different markets. Therefore, it is important to examine the factors that 
might affect the price disparity between A-and H-shares. This study differentiates from previous 
studies in that it focuses on the potential liquidity and transparency effects on the discount 
attached to H-shares. In particular, I examine multiple liquidity and transparency measures that 
have not yet been analyzed in earlier literature concerning A- and H-shares.  
Previous research establishes that a difference in liquidity across markets contributes to the 
price differential between financial assets with claims on identical cash flows trading in different 
markets.15 Because of this, it becomes necessary to examine this aspect. Particularly, in terms of 
liquidity effects, this paper examines the Amihud illiquidity measure (Amihud, 2002) and the 
turnover ratio for both A- and H-shares as well as the infrequency of trading associated with H-
shares.  The higher the illiquidity of H-shares than that of A-shares, the more H-shares is 
discounted relative to the underlying price of A-shares. In contrast, relatively active trading of A-
shares, as measured by the turnover ratio of A-shares divided by that of H-shares, are associated 
with a larger H-share discount. Additionally, an increase of the infrequency of trading of H-
                                                          
15
 Chen, Lee and Rui (2001) find that the A- and B-share price differences (in China) are caused by B-share market 
illiquidity. Chan, Hong and Subrahamanyam (2008) investigate the liquidity effect in asset pricing by studying the 
liquidity-premium relation of an ADR and its underlying share. 
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shares is accompanied with a larger H-share discount. Thus, the results suggest that liquidity 
plays a role in the relative pricing of A-and H-shares. 
Regarding transparency effects, this paper first examines the quality of auditors as a measure 
of accounting transparency by comparing firms that are audited by Big 4 auditors 16 versus those 
audited by local auditors. I find that firms audited by the Big 4 are generally associated with 
smaller H-share discounts, higher mutual fund holdings, a higher number of A- and H-share 
analysts, and higher liquidity. The difference between the local auditors and the Big 4 auditors 
groups is statistically significant, both in mean and median for most years covered in the sample. 
This finding provides evidence that transparency impacts the price differential between A- and 
H-shares. 
Further analyses of transparency provide more support for the role of transparency in the 
relative pricing of A- and H-shares. Analyst coverage, as measured by the number of analysts 
following a particular firm, is also commonly regarded as a mechanism that makes firms more 
transparent. 17 Therefore, I examine analyst coverage for both A-and H-shares and find that an 
increase in the analyst coverage for both A- and H-shares is associated with a smaller discount 
for H-shares. In addition, mutual funds may also provide more transparency to a firm through 
their monitoring of a firm’s activities.18 Empirical results suggest that an increase in mutual fund 
holdings of firm’s A-shares is associated with a smaller H-share discount. These results also 
suggest the importance of transparency on the A-and H-share price disparity.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is the literature review; 
Section 3 provides some background information concerning share structure in China, Section 4 
                                                          
16
 Price Waterhouse Coopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, and KPMG 
17
 Yu (2008) reports that firms with higher analyst coverage exhibit less accrual-based earnings management. 
18
 Choi and Seo (2008) find that firms with higher levels of institutional ownership exhibit higher accounting 
transparencies and that institutional monitoring curbs managers’ opportunistic behaviors associated with investing, 
financing, and operating activities as well as accounting reporting activities. 
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describes variables and summary statistics, Section 5 presents the methodology and empirical 
results, and Section 6 gives the conclusion.  
2. Literature Review  
 Many previous studies try to explain why financial assets with claims on the same cash 
flow streams are traded at different prices in different markets. Possible explanations for the 
price differential can generally be summarized into the following categories: differential demand 
theory, differential risk preference theory, information asymmetry theory, hedging for exchange 
rate theory, and the liquidity theory. Each of these is described below.  
The differential demand hypothesis states that the demand functions for domestic shares 
differ between foreign and domestic investors in terms of shares price elasticity. Foreign 
investors’ demand elasticity for local shares may be higher because they have wider access and 
better chances for diversification opportunities. Therefore, foreigner investors require a higher 
premium to invest in local shares. On the other hand, local firms understand this difference and, 
in order to maximize market value, discriminate between local and foreign investors. Sun and 
Tong (2000) apply this theory and discover that the B-share discount (B-shares were originally 
only for purchase by foreigners on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges) increases with the 
number of listings of H-shares and in Hong Kong. They suggest this happens because H-shares 
are close substitutes for China B-shares. Fernald and Rogers (2002) argue that an A-share 
premium exists because the domestic investors in China are willing to pay more, since they have 
limited alternative investments available. Indeed, there is little opportunity for overseas 
diversification for Chinese mainland investors due to the capital controls imposed by the state. 
Secondly, the real interest rate on Renminbi (RMB) deposits is close to zero (or negative). 
Thirdly, Chinese’s treasuries often offer unattractive rates. In addition, the tradable A-shares that 
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are available for individual investors are quite limited since there is a substantial amount of 
shares still owned by the State.  The limited supply coupled with a relatively high demand causes 
A-shares to trade at a premium to both H-and B-shares. 
The differential risk preference theory states that barriers to international investment 
restrict the access of foreigners to the local capital market and limit the fraction of a local firm’s 
equity that can be owned. The two different price rules in the foreign securities market (that arise 
from this theory) reflects the premium paid by domestic investors, under no constraints, versus 
the discount demanded by foreign investors under constraints, as suggested by Eun and 
Janakiramanan (1986) in their general equilibrium asset pricing model. Ma (1996) argues that 
price differences between A- and B-shares can be attributed to investors' attitude towards risk. 
He further states that the beta of the stocks partially explains the discount attached to Chinese B-
shares and that Chinese mainland investors’ risk taking preferences are associated with this result. 
Using a CAPM model, Sue (1999) investigates the relationship between restrictions on 
ownership and the stock prices for A- and B-shares. His finding suggests that the B-share price 
discount is related to expectations on the return premium for B-shares. He further states that 
foreign investors tend to be more risk averse in investing in the Chinese stock market, due to the 
fact that the market is segmented. Therefore, this requires that investors receive more 
compensation for bearing this risk.  
Another study by Sun and Tong (2000) looks at the relative volatility of B-share and A-
share returns. They argue that given that a pair of A- and B-stocks share identical information of 
the firm, any A-share volatility in excess of the B-share volatility is due to speculative 
trading .Their study suggests that excessive speculation is associated with an A-share price being 
traded at a premium, relative to the B-share price. Chen, Lee and Rui (2001) employ a return 
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variance ratio between A- and B-shares to investigate changes in risk preferences. They find no 
statistically significant connection between B-share discounts and levels of risk. Their findings 
are consistent with Bailey, Chung and Kang (1999). Wang and Jiang (2004) argue that H-shares 
exhibit significant exposure to Hong Kong market factors and behave more like Hong Kong 
stocks than mainland Chinese stocks. However, H-shares retain significant exposure to their 
domestic market and therefore provide foreign investors with diversification opportunities. They 
also suggest that the time-varying H-share price discount, relative to A-shares, is highly 
correlated with the domestic and foreign market factors as well as relative market illiquidity.  
The hedging for exchange rate hypothesis argues that investors want to protect 
themselves from unexpected movements in the exchange rates. Arquette, Brown and Burdekin 
(2008) examine the differences between the share prices of Chinese securities traded on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange versus the prices in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the New 
York Stock Exchange. They find that the discounts in relation to home share prices are 
significantly influenced by changes in both exchange rate expectations and investor sentiment 
during the 1998 to 2006 period. They argue that expected exchange rate changes alone account 
for approximately 40% of the total variation. Their results also suggest that the cross-sectional 
variation in discounts is due to market-specific and company-specific sentiment effects. Cai, 
McGuinness and Zhang (2011) develop a non-linear Markov error-correction approach to 
examine the general co-integration relationship between H- and A-prices during the period 1999 
to 2009. They focus on three dimensions of the relationship: (i) the long-run expectation of the 
H- (to A-price) discount; (ii) the level of short-run co-movement in prices; and (iii) the 
magnitude of error corrections. They also find similar evidence as Arquette, Brown and 
Burdekin (2008) that the H-discounts are related to the revaluation of the RMB; in other words, 
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the exchange rate movement between the RMB and Hong Kong Dollar. Lastly, they suggest that 
the higher the H-discounts the higher the relative difference in the markets’ information 
asymmetry and opinion divergence levels. 
The information asymmetry theory states that foreign investors possess less information 
than local investors in the home market and therefore the discount represents a compensation for 
the asymmetric information. Chakravarty, Sakar and Wu (1998) argue that one reason for the 
large price discount of B-shares is because foreign investors have less information on Chinese 
stocks than domestic investors. They develop a model incorporating both informational 
asymmetry and market segmentation and derive a relative pricing equation for A-shares and B-
shares. They show that their model-based proxies for informational asymmetry explain a 
significant portion of the cross-sectional variation of the B-share discounts. Their asymmetry 
includes for language barriers, different accounting standards, and the lack of reliable 
information regarding the aggregate economy as well as individual companies. They also find 
that the size of the B-share price discount is negatively related to the news coverage in the 
mainland home market. Karolyi and Li (2003) find that there is a negative relationship between 
information asymmetry and firm size, and that there is a statistically significant relationship 
between firm size and B-share discount variations. 
The liquidity hypothesis suggests that illiquidity lowers security prices and is associated 
with price differentials amongst otherwise identical or essentially comparable securities. Amihud 
and Mendelson (1986) using a sample of U.S. stocks finds a positive relationship between the 
bid-ask spread and the average risk adjusted return. In addition, illiquid shares suffer higher 
trading costs and therefore are forced to reduce their price in order to provide higher expected 
returns. Chung and Wei (2005) examine the relationship between bid-ask spreads and holding 
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periods across Chinese A- and B- shares and find that there is a positive relationship between 
holding periods and bid-ask spreads. They conclude that although liquidity plays a role in 
explaining the discount attached to B-shares the evidence is not conclusive. In contrast Chan, 
Hong and Subrahamanyam (2008) investigate the liquidity effect in asset pricing by studying the 
liquidity-premium relation of an ADR and its underlying share. They find that an increase in the 
ADR premium is associated with an increase in the liquidity of the ADR market and is also 
associated, to a lesser degree, with a decrease in home-share liquidity.  
Although there is a large body of literature on this topic already, several potential factors 
have not been examined in regards to the H-share discount. One such issue is transparency. 
There are numerous studies documenting a correlation between greater corporate transparency 
and greater analyst coverage. Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) find that return synchronicity 
increases with analyst coverage. They interpret return synchronicity as a result of greater analyst 
coverage since specializing by industry encourages more industry-wide and market-wide 
information to be incorporated into stock prices. Using data from emerging markets Chan and 
Hameed (2006) report that greater analyst coverage increases return synchronicity and therefore 
increases the transparency of the corporation. Chang, Dasgupta and Hilary (2006) provide 
evidence that analyst coverage affects security issuance. They argue that firms covered by fewer 
analysts are less likely to issue equity as opposed to issuing debt. However, even though these 
firms tend to issue equity less frequently, when they do decide to issue equity they tend to do so 
in larger amounts. Moreover, these firms depend more on favorable market conditions for their 
equity issuance decisions. In addition, debt ratios of less covered firms are more affected by the 
“external finance-weighted” average market-to-book ratio. Their findings are consistent with the 
market timing behavior associated with information asymmetry, as well as the behavior implied 
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by dynamic adverse selection models of equity issuance. Moreover, McNichols and O’Brien 
(1996) suggest that analysts tend to start covering companies when they believe the companies’ 
near future prospects are optimistic. Analysts may drop coverage of a firm because the firm is no 
longer a good prospect for generating future investment banking or brokerage income. 
Alternatively, analysts may drop coverage because they become pessimistic about the firm or 
future share performance. Investors generally must infer the reason for dropped coverage. If 
investors typically emphasize the latter explanation when they initially interpret the coverage 
drop decision, they may over-react by selling shares and driving stock prices below fundamental 
values. The most plausible interpretation of this evidence is that investors respond to extreme 
losses in analyst coverage by selling shares in the coverage loss year and thus driving down stock 
prices. These studies suggest that analyst coverage plays an important role in transparency. 
 Aside from the role that analyst coverage plays in the role of corporate governance and 
transparency, institutional shareholders can also contribute to better governance and more 
transparency. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) find that monitoring by large external shareholders like 
institutions reduces the agency costs of equities by effectively controlling managers’ decisions 
that are in conflicts with shareholders’ interests. Choi and Seo (2008) find that firms with higher 
level of institutional ownership exhibit higher accounting transparencies and  institutional 
monitoring curbs managers’ opportunistic behaviors associated with investing, financing, and 
operating activities as well as accounting reporting activities. These papers suggest that 
institutional shareholders have an important role in transparency. This study examine 
institutional shareholders’, particularly, mutual funds’19 role in the price differential between 
Chinese A-share and Hong Kong H-share. 
                                                          
19
 Due to the availability of data I was able to examine mutual funds for A-shares; unfortunately, data for mutual 
funds of H-shares is not available.  
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3.  Background Information Concerning the Share Structure in China 
 China began to open its economy in 1978. After the successes of farm liberalization in 
the 1980’s China began to shift its focus to building stronger financial markets. To that end they 
opened the Shanghai Stock Exchange on December of 1990. It was followed in 1991 (a year 
later) by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.20 Most of the original companies listed on the two 
exchanges were state-owned enterprises. The first shares traded on the exchanges were A-shares. 
A-shares are denominated in Renminbi (RMB) and are issued to local investors. In 1992 the two 
exchanges also began trading B-shares.  B-shares are denominated in U.S. dollars and allowed 
foreigners, for the first time, to own and trade shares on the two mainland exchanges.   
 During this initial start-up period, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange had already 
established itself as a major figure in the Asian financial markets. China knew of Hong Kong’s 
ability to raise large amount of capital and soon approached the Hong Kong Exchange with an 
offer. In 1993 China brokered a deal between the Hong Kong Exchange and the two mainland 
exchanges called the Memorandum of Regulatory Co-operation. This allowed Chinese 
businesses to be listed directly on the Hong Kong Exchange. Since Hong Kong begins with the 
letter “H” the new shares were known as H-shares.   
H-shares are stocks traded on the Hong Kong stock market and are denominated in Hong 
Kong dollars. In order to sell H-shares companies must meet certain requirements: (1) the 
company must be incorporated in mainland China; (2) the company must have a market 
capitalization of HK $200 million; (3) the company must have earned, 3 years prior to 
application, a profit of HK $5 billion; this means a profit of HK $2 billion the year before the 
                                                          
20
 Shenzhen was designated by the state as a special economic zone in 1980. The stock exchange extended its 
growing financial flexibility. 
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application and a total profit of HK $3 billion the two years prior to that; and (4) during the 3 
year period prior to application management must have remained unchanged.  
A-shares generally trade at a premium to H-shares, and this might be partially due to the 
fact that the Chinese government restricts mainland Chinese from investing abroad and 
foreigners from investing in the H-share market in mainland China. In mainland China, there are 
three ways for individual investors to invest in H-shares:  (1) individual investors can travel to 
Hong Kong to set up an account in Hong Kong to buy H-shares; (2) individual investors can buy 
H-shares through Hong Kong brokerage companies that have offices in China; (3) in selected 
cities, individual investors can purchase H-shares using a special service called “H-share Express” 
provided by the Bank of China. 
In contrast, institutional investors on the mainland, such as mutual funds and social 
security funds, can invest in H-shares. State social security funds are large players in the Hong 
Kong market. However, Hong Kong and international investors can only invest in H-shares. 
According to the trading regulations in mainland China, Hong Kong and international investors 
are restricted to investing in A-Shares. 
Historically Chinese domestic A-shares are divided into tradable and non-tradable shares, 
even though both types of shares have the same cash flow and voting rights. This unique split-
share structure can result in divergent interests and incentive conflicts between tradable and non-
tradable shareholders. It has long been recognized as a source of corporate governance problems 
in China. To help solve these fundamental governance problems, the Chinese government 
initiated a split-share structure reform program in April 2005. The aim of the reform was to 
convert non-tradable shares into tradable shares. The non-tradable shareholders gained from the 
reform as their shares become tradable (this increased liquidity and enabled controlling 
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shareholders to sell at market prices). In contrast, tradable shareholders suffered in the short term 
since there was an extra supply of tradable shares in the market, and this lead to a steep decline 
in stock prices.  
 The roles of state shareholders and mutual funds in this reform are particularly interesting. 
The state is the largest non-tradable shareholder, while mutual funds are the largest type of 
institutional investor for tradable shares in China‘s stock market. Thus, non-tradable 
shareholders need to offer compensation to tradable shareholders (including mutual funds) in 
order for the latter to agree to the reform. In theory, the interests of mutual funds should align 
with the interests of individual investors for tradable shares. Individual investors can therefore 
free-ride on the efforts of mutual funds in the belief that the funds will be looked after. However, 
in recent research (Mehran and Stulz (2007)), it has been shown that the incentives facing 
financial institutions are complex and conflicts of interest and political pressures often arise. 
Regarding mutual fund growth in China, since 2000, the growth of the industry has been 
phenomenal. The voting rules set out by the CSRC21 Measures (2000) make mutual funds a 
powerful and influential party in the bargaining process because mutual funds frequently appear 
in the top-ten shareholders of many listed companies. The attitudes of the mutual fund 
shareholders were therefore crucial to the passing of the proposed reform plan. As such, it is 
interesting to examine the impact that mutual fund shareholders have on a firm’s transparency 
and corporate governance, as well as the relative pricing of A-and H-shares. 
 
 
                                                          
21
 China Securities Regulatory Commission  
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4. Variables and Summary Statistics 
 This study particularly focuses on how liquidity and transparency impact the relative 
pricing of A-and H-shares. In terms of liquidity, I examine three different measures: Amihud 
illiquidity measure, turnover ratio measure, and infrequent trading of H-share. In terms of 
transparency, I examine accounting transparency (or auditor quality), analyst following, and 
percentage of a firm’s share hold by mutual funds. The first part of this section describes the 
sample data used in this study and how variables of interest are constructed. Then, the second 
part of this section presents the summary statistics for variables of interest and analyzes the 
correlations of these variables.   
4.1. Data and Variables 
The initial sample is constructed using all cross-listed A- and H-shares in both the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange for the period of 2003 to 2011. For a firm to be 
included in the sample, it must have daily price data, daily trading volume, shares outstanding, 
and analyst following data available for both the A-and H-share market. Moreover, firms are also 
required to have monthly mutual fund holdings data for A-shares. Additionally, for each firm in 
the sample I collect financial data such as tradable A- and H-share size, which is defined as the 
market value of A- and H-shares. Since H-shares are denoted in Hong Kong dollars, I convert 
their amounts to Renminbi. A detailed list of all the variables and the sources can be found in the 
Appendix. The final sample covers 68 firms and spans from January 1st, 2003 to December 31st, 
2011. Table I reports the sample firms and their respective industries and listing dates for the A- 
and H-shares markets.
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Table I Sample Company Information 
This table provides the basic information for the dual-listed A- and H-shares included in the sample. Column 1 
provide the name of the company, column 2 provides the respective industry, column 3 provides the listing date on 
the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange, and column 4 provides the listing date on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange.  
Company Name Industry A List Date H List Date 
ZTECorporation Communications and Related Equipment Manufacturing 11/18/97 12/9/2004 
Zoomlion Heavy Industry Science And Technology Co., Ltd. Special Equipment Manufacturing 10/12/2000 12/23/2010 
Weichai Power Co., Ltd. Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 4/30/2007 3/11/2004 
Shandong Chenming Paper Holdings Ltd. Paper and Allied Products 11/20/2000 6/18/2008 
Northeast Electric Development Co., Ltd. Electrical Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing 12/13/1995 7/6/1995 
Jingwei Textile Machinery Co., Ltd. Special Equipment Manufacturing 12/10/1996 2/2/1996 
Shandong Xinhua Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. Medicine Manufacturing 8/6/1997 12/31/1996 
Angang Steel Company Limited Ferrous Metal Smelting and Extruding 12/25/1997 7/24/1997 
Hisense Kelon Electrical Holdings Company Limited Electrical Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing 7/13/1999 7/23/1996 
Xinjiang Goldwind Science&Technology Co.,Ltd Electrical Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing 12/26/2007 10/8/2010 
Shandong Molong Petroleum Machinery Co. Ltd. Special Equipment Manufacturing 10/21/2010 2/7/2007 
BYD Co., Ltd Other Manufacturing 6/30/2011 7/31/2002 
Huaneng Power International Co., Ltd Electric Power, Steam and Hot Water Generation and Supply 12/6/2001 1/21/1998 
Anhui Expressway Co., Ltd Support Service for Transportation 1/7/2003 11/13/1996 
China Minsheng Banking Co., Ltd. Banking 12/19/2000 11/26/2009 
China Shipping Development Co., Ltd Water Transportation 5/23/2002 11/11/1994 
Huadian Power International Co., Ltd. Electric Power, Steam and Hot Water Generation and Supply 2/3/2005 6/30/1999 
China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation Oil and Gas Extraction 8/8/2001 10/19/2000 
China Southern Airlines Co., Ltd Air Transportation 7/25/2003 7/31/1997 
China Merchants Bank Co., Ltd Banking 4/9/2002 9/22/2006 
China Eastern Airlines Co., Ltd. Air Transportation 11/5/1997 2/5/1997 
Yanzhou Coal Mining Co., Ltd. Coal Mining and Quarrying 7/1/1998 4/1/1998 
Guangzhou Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. Medicine Manufacturing 2/6/2001 10/30/1997 
Jiangxi Copper Co., Ltd. Non-Ferrous Metal Smelting, Rolling, Drawing, and Extruding 1/11/2002 6/12/1997 
Jiangsu Expressway Co., Ltd Support Service for Transportation 1/16/2001 6/27/1997 
Shenzhen Expressway Co., Ltd Support Service for Transportation 12/25/2001 3/12/1997 
Anhui Conch Cement Co.,Ltd Non-metallic Mineral Products 2/7/2002 10/21/1997 
Tsingtao Brewery Co., Ltd. Beverages 8/27/1993 7/15/1993 
Guangzhou Shipyard International Co., Ltd. Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 10/28/1993 8/6/1993 
Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical Co., Ltd. Petroleum Processing & Coking 11/8/1993 7/26/1993 
Nanjing Panda Electronics Co., Ltd. Communications and Related Equipment Manufacturing 11/18/1996 5/2/1996 
Shenji Group Kunming Machine Tool Co.,Ltd Special Equipment Manufacturing 1/3/1994 12/7/1993 
Maanshan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. Ferrous Metal Smelting and Extruding 1/6/1994 11/3/1993 
Beiren Printing Machinery Holdings Ltd. Special Equipment Manufacturing 5/6/1994 8/6/1993 
Sinopec Yizheng Chemical Fibre Co., Ltd. Chemical Fibre Manufacturing 4/11/1995 3/29/1994 
Tianjin Capital Environmental Protectiongroup Co., Ltd. Public Facilities Services 6/30/1995 5/17/1994 
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Dongfang Electric Corporation Limited Electrical Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing 10/10/1995 6/6/1994 
Luoyang Glass Co., Ltd. Non-metallic Mineral Products 10/31/1995 7/8/1994 
Chongqing Iron & Steel Company Limited Ferrous Metal Smelting and Extruding 2/28/2007 10/17/1997 
China Shenhua Energy Company Limited Coal Mining and Quarrying 10/9/2007 6/15/2005 
Sichuan Expressway Company Limited Support Service for Transportation 7/27/2009 10/7/1997 
Air China Limited Air Transportation 8/18/2006 12/15/2004 
China Railway Construction Corporation Limited Civil Engineering Construction 3/10/2008 3/13/2008 
Agricultural Bank Of China Limited Banking 7/15/2010 7/16/2010 
Ping An Insurance (Group) Company Of China, Ltd. Insurance 3/1/2007 6/24/2004 
Bank Of Communications Co., Ltd. Banking 5/15/2007 6/23/2005 
Guangshen Railway Company Limited Railroad Transportation 12/22/2006 5/14/1996 
China Railway Group Limited. Civil Engineering Construction 12/3/2007 12/7/2007 
Industrial And Commercial Bank Of China Limited Banking 10/27/2006 10/27/2006 
Beijing North Star Company Limited Estate Development and Operation 10/16/2006 5/14/1997 
Aluminum Corporation Of China Limited Nonferrous Metal  Mining 4/30/2007 12/12/2001 
China Pacific Insurance (Group) Co., Ltd. Insurance 12/25/2007 12/23/2009 
Shanghai Pharmaceuticals Holding Co.,Ltd. Medicine Manufacturing 3/24/1994 5/20/2011 
Metallurgical Corporation Of China Ltd. Civil Engineering Construction 9/21/2009 9/24/2009 
China Life Insurance Company Limited Insurance 1/9/2007 12/18/2003 
Shanghai Electric Group Company Limited Electrical Machinery and Equipment Manufacturing 12/5/2008 4/28/2005 
China South Locomotive & Rolling Stock Co., Ltd. Transportation Equipment Manufacturing 8/18/2008 8/21/2008 
China Oilfield Services Limited Oil and Gas Extraction 9/28/2007 11/20/2002 
Petrochina Company Limited Oil and Gas Extraction 11/5/2007 4/7/2000 
China Shipping Container Lines Company Limited Water Transportation 12/12/2007 6/16/2004 
Dalian Port (Pda) Co., Ltd. Port 12/6/2010 4/28/2006 
China Coal Energy Company Limited Coal Mining and Quarrying 2/1/2008 12/19/2006 
Zijin Mining Group Co., Ltd. Nonferrous Metal  Mining 4/25/2008 12/23/2003 
China Cosco Holdings Company Limited Water Transportation 6/26/2007 6/30/2005 
China Construction Bank Corporation Banking 9/25/2007 10/27/2005 
Bank Of China Limited Banking 7/5/2006 6/1/2006 
Datang International Power Generation Co., Ltd. Electric Power, Steam and Hot Water Generation and Supply 12/20/2006 3/21/1997 
China Citic Bank Corporation Limited Banking 4/27/2007 4/27/2007 
 
The change in exchange rate of Hong Kong Dollars to one Renminbi (HKD/RMB)  is 
calculated as monthly variations in the change of exchange rates.22 Figure I plots the change of 
exchange rate (in percentage) between the Hong Kong Dollar and the Renminbi over the 2003 to 
2011 period.  Figure I suggests that exchange rate may be one important reason for changes in 
                                                          
22
 I also calculated the change of implied exchange rate using the implied exchange rate. It is similar to the change of 
exchange rate. 
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the H-share discount since exchange rate policy seems to be going through considerable changes 
over that period. Indeed, Arquette, Brown and Burdekin (2008) find that the differences between 
the share prices of Chinese securities traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange versus the prices in 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange are significantly influenced 
by changes in exchange rate expectations during the 1998 to 2006 period. 
 
Figure I. Change in the Renminbi Exchange Rate: January 2003 - December 2011 
The change in exchange rate of Hong Kong Dollars to Renminbi (HKD/RMB)  is calculated as monthly variations in 
the change of exchange rates. The following times series plot this change in percentage over the period from January 
2003 to December 2011. 
 
 
I also plot the price differential of A- and H-share during the 2003 to 2011 period.  First, 
the discounts or premiums are computed as follow: 
Discount_H
i,t
=
Pi,t
H ×VRMB HKDW X
Pi,t
A
-1 
where Discounti, t  is the discount (premium) for H-shares i if it is negative (positive). Pi,tH  is the 
H-share price from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, HKD RMBW   is the exchange rate for Hong 
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Kong dollars to one Renminbi, and Pi,tA   is the underlying A-share price from the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. After computing the daily discount for each H-share, I compute the 
average for each month to get its monthly discount. Figure II plots the average monthly H-share 
 
Figure II. Average H-share Discount: January 2003 - December 2011 
The discounts or premiums are computed as follow:  
YJ'Z[\:]__,  `,
$ a Vb7c _dYW X
`,e
2 1 
where YJ'Z[\:],  is discount (premium) for H-shares i, if it is negative (positive). `,$  is the H-share price from 
Hong Kong stock exchange, _dY b7cW   is the exchange rate for Hong Kong dollars to Renminbi, and `,e   is the 
underlying A-share price from the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange. After computing the daily discount for 
each H-share, I compute the average for each month to get its monthly discount. 
 
 
discount over the sample period. It is apparent from the plot that the H-share discount is 
shrinking over time. In the beginning of 2003, the average H-share discount is almost 80%, 
contrasted with the mid-2010s when the average H-share premium is slightly more than 5%. This 
is consistent with the fact that the Chinese government has relaxed constraints and allowed more 
Chinese citizens to invest in H-shares. This also suggests that the appreciation of the Renminbi 
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may have an effect that lowers the H-share discount. The role of changes in the exchange rate 
between the Hong Kong Dollar and the Renminbi will be incorporated in the analysis. 
Next, I calculate the three liquidity measures: the Amihud illiquidity measure for both A- 
and H-shares, the turnover ratios for both A- and H- shares, and the infrequency of trading 
measure of H-shares. The Amihud (2002) measure of illiquidity is computed from the A- and H- 
market daily price and volume data. For H-shares, I begin by calculating the measure daily, when 
there is trading. Then I average these measures across all trading days of each month to obtain 
the monthly measure: 
 Illiqudity
i,t
=
1
Dt
∑ gRi, dg
Voli,d
Dt
d=1  
 
where Dt is the number of trading days in month t, Ri, d is the daily return of share i on day d 
(within month t), and  Voli,d is the  trading volume of  share  i on day  d,  defined as number of 
shares traded times the H-share price on day d. The measure is computed for A-and H- markets 
in the same way. The daily money trading volume for the H-shares market is converted into 
Renminbi at the corresponding spot exchange rate on day d in order to ensure the liquidity 
measure is calculated on the same basis. 
Amihud illiquidity measures the price impact aspect of liquidity and quantifies the 
price/return response to a given size of trade. Liquidity, also has another aspect – trading. To 
address this aspect, I use the turnover ratio as an alternative liquidity measure and perform a 
similar analysis. The turnover ratio measures trading activity of the stocks and is adjusted by the 
number of shares outstanding in each market available for trading. The monthly turnover ratio is 
defined as the average of daily turnover ratios in each month. The turnover ratio for H-shares is 
calculated as follow: 
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Turnover Ratioi,t=
1
Dt
h Voli,d
Outstanding
i,d
Dt
d=1
 
where Voli,d ,is the number of i shares traded and  , Outstandingi,d is the total i  shares 
outstanding on day d in the market. The measure is computed for A-and H- markets in the same 
way, as well. 
Furthermore, in some extreme situations, H-shares are so illiquid that there is virtually no 
trading at all during a regular trading day in the Hong Kong market. In a way, this type of trading 
infrequency captures another aspect of illiquidity. Therefore, I construct another variable, the 
monthly trading “infrequency,” defined as the number of days that the H-share is not traded at all; 
specifically, it is computed as zero trading activity days divided by the total number of trading 
days in the month. This trading infrequency is typically an issue only for the H-shares, but not 
for their A-shares counterparts since the underlying shares in the home markets are generally 
more actively traded in the local markets. Hence, it is only necessary to compute this variable for 
H-shares. 
As mentioned earlier, regarding transparency, I examine accounting transparency (or 
auditor quality), analyst following, and percentage of a firm’s share hold by mutual funds. The 
analyst coverage is collected for both A- and H-shares, defined as the number of analysts 
providing one-year earnings forecasts at any time over a one-month period.  Mutual fund holding 
is defined as the number of shares of a firm held by mutual funds divided by the total number of 
shares at the end of the period.  
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Additionally, I calculate the market performance measure, which reflects relative market-
wide performance across two markets, measured as the relative performance of the two cross 
market indices for the Chinese A-shares market. This relative market performance measure is  
Figure III. Movement of Market Indices 
Panel A plots the return on SSE A-share Index. The base day for the SSE A-share Index is December 19, 1990. The 
base period is the total market capitalization of all A-shares of that day at a base value of 100. The index was 
launched on February 21, 1992.  Panel B plots the return on Hang Seng index as the market proxy for the Hong 
Kong market. 
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later used as a control variable.23 To this end, I use the SSE A-share Index and Hang Seng Index 
for Chinese mainland and Hong Kong stock markets, respectively. The base day for the SSE A-
share Index is December 19, 1990. The base period is the total market capitalization of all A-
shares on that day at a base value of 100. The data of this index was publicly available on 
February 21, 1992.  For the Hong Kong market, I choose the Hang Seng Index as the market 
proxy. Figure III Panels A and B plot the returns of the two indexes over the sample period. As 
shown in the figure, for most of the sample period the two indices have similar patterns of 
general movement, but they do experience ups and downs differently as well as differences in 
magnitude. I later incorporate this relative market performance measure in the analysis for the 
price differential between A- and H-shares.   
4.2. Summary Statistics and Correlations between Liquidity, Transparency and Size   
Table II provides summary statistics for the 68 firms in the sample. The sample period is from 
January 2003 to December 2011. The average (median) total asset is 1,102,470.00 (76,912.96) 
millions of Renminbi. The average (median) total liabilities is 991,832.00 (41,644.26) millions 
of Renminbi. The average (median) market capitalization is 39,567.80 (14,316.90) millions of 
Renminbi. The mean of tradable A-share is 15,681.03 millions of shares almost twice of the 
mean of tradable H-shares (8,745.80 millions of shares).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23
 Previous studies tended to use the SSE Composite Index. Constituents for the SSE Composite Index include all 
listed stocks, both A- and B-shares, on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. However, this index cannot accurately reflect 
the performance of the A-share market. 
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Table II Summary Statistics for the Sample Company 
Table II contains descriptive statistics of the 68 sample firms dual-listed in the A- and H-share market during the 
years 2003-2011. Total assets are obtained from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Cashflow s are obtained from 
operations cash flow generated from operating activities and are measured as a ratio relative to the total assets of the 
firm. Operating revenue is Sales minus Cost of Goods Sold (and other expenses), before depreciation and 
amortization. Debt ratio is measured as the ratio of the short-term and long-term debt to the total assets of the firm. 
Items are in millions of RMBs. Tradable A-share size is number of outstanding A-shares (in millions), while 
tradable H-share size is number of H-shares (in millions).   
Variable Maximum Minimum Mean Median Std Deviation 
Total Asset 15476900.00 557.05 1102470.00 76912.96 3064500.00 
Long Term Debt 180675.00 0.00 27504.46 9042.46 42053.88 
Cash And Cash Equivalents 2762156.00 56.68 181576.38 7918.48 571080.97 
Total Liabilities 14519000.00 295.05 991832.00 41644.26 2879280.00 
Total Shareholders' Equity 1082570.00 78.71 110634.00 28087.92 227508.00 
Total Liabilities and Shareholder’s Equity 15476900.00 557.05 1102470.00 76912.96 3064500.00 
Market Capitalization 1015780.00 139.47 39567.80 14316.90 124812.00 
Total Profit 272311.00 -6805.55 23079.94 3035.10 54257.25 
Total Operating Revenue 271000.00 -7807.39 22730.63 2873.73 54100.76 
Net Profit 208445.00 -8838.83 17834.58 2446.03 41922.51 
Basic Earnings per Share 3.36 -1.02 0.58 0.43 0.71 
Net Cash Flow From Operating Activities 348123.00 -13480.35 33978.48 1872.31 77217.37 
Total  Number of Shares Outstanding 349083.00 398.92 29356.67 6771.08 72917.20 
State Shares 268485.00 0.00 4421.00 0.00 32303.18 
Tradable A Shares 262289.00 72.62 15681.03 3627.39 43233.64 
Tradable H Shares 214837.00 100.00 8745.80 1431.03 29314.80 
 
Table III Panel A provides summary statistic characteristics of the liquidity measure, the 
transparency measure, and the firm size in A- and H-shares respectively. The mean and median 
Amihud measures for H-shares are almost 10 times larger than those of the A-shares. This 
implies that H- shares are generally more illiquid than their underlying A-shares. This pattern is 
also confirmed by the measure of trading activity, the turnover ratio. The mean and median of 
the turnover ratios are much higher for the A-shares market than those of the H-shares market, 
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implying that the trading is more active in the A-shares market. In addition the average number 
of analysts following a firm in the A-shares market is 3, and the corresponding number in the H-
shares market is 1. In other words, the average analyst coverage for A-shares is 3 times that of H- 
shares. Further, the size of A-shares is generally larger than that of H-shares as well. The average 
mutual fund holding is 2.49% of outstanding A-shares for the sample firm. Unfortunately, the 
corresponding information for the H-share market is not available. Table III Panel B provides 
results of the nonparametric Mann-Whitney Rank test to examine the difference of Amihud 
measure, turnover ratio, number of analyst, and size between A-and H-shares. For these four 
measures, the difference between A-and H-shares are statistically significant. 
 
Table III Characteristics of A and H Shares 
This table provides the basic statistics for the Amihud measure, turnover ratio, infrequency of trading, mutual fund 
holdings, analyst coverage, and size characteristics of A- and H-shares. The sample includes 68 pairs of H-shares 
and corresponding A-shares in the home market from 2003 to 2011. Individual H-shares and A-shares’ Amihud 
liquidity measures are defined as the ratio of absolute daily return and dollar volume. Daily measures are then 
averaged to provide a monthly series. Amihud measures are scaled by 100,000. Turnover is defined as the number of 
shares traded divided by the total number of shares outstanding. H-shares trading infrequency is obtained by 
dividing the number of days that H-share are not traded by the number of trading days in a given month. Analyst 
coverage is defined as the maximum number of analysts following a firm in a given month. A-or H-share size are 
defined as the market value of A-share or H-share (in millions of RMB). A mutual fund holding is the percentage of 
firms shares hold by mutual funds. Panel A provides the time series averages of the monthly cross-sectional mean, 
median, standard deviation, maximum, and minimum values. Panel B provides results of the nonparametric Mann-
Whitney Rank test (or Wilcoxon Rank Sum) for Amihud measure, turnover ratio, number of analyst, and size 
between A-and H-shares .Panel C provides the time series averages of the monthly correlations among the measures 
(***, ** and * denote significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%).        
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Panel A: Summary Statistics 
  Mean Median Std. Dev Max Min 
A-share Amihud Measure 0.0010 0.0002 0.0027 0.0712 0.0000 
A-share turnover 0.0214 0.0138 0.0300 1.0400 0.0001 
A-share number of analysts  2.9600 1.0000 5.4300 56.0000 0.0000 
A-share mutual fund holding (%) 2.4900 0.9690 4.0300 33.4000 0.0000 
A-share size (in RMB) 44600 6890 152000 1940000 117 
H-share Amihud Measure 0.1030 0.0005 1.7100 60.9000 0.0000 
H-share turnover 0.0093 0.0071 0.0094 0.1770 0.0000 
H-share number of analysts 1.1400 1.0000 1.4100 11.0000 0.0000 
H-share trading infrequency 0.0208 0.0000 0.0583 0.9520 0.0000 
H-share size (in RMB) 39000 5730 114000 1710000 59.8 
 
 
 
Panel B: Testing the Difference between A-and H-shares 
 
A-and H-shares Difference Amihud Measure  Turnover Ratio Number of analyst Size  
Mean -21.71*** 32.43*** -7.54*** 5.02*** 
Median -15.99*** 27.39*** 0.06 3.24*** 
 
   
Panel C: Correlations 
Correlations (A share) A-share turnover 
A share number of 
analysts A-share size 
A-share mutual fund 
holding (%) 
A-share Amihud Measure -0.0940*** -0.1679*** -0.1025*** -0.1897*** 
A-share turnover 
 
-0.0340** -0.1473*** -0.0891*** 
A-share number of analysts 
  
0.2078*** 0.1989*** 
A-share size (in RMB) 
   
0.0219 
Correlations (H share) H-share turnover 
H-share number of 
analysts H-share size 
H-share trading 
infrequency 
H-share Amihud Measure -0.0559*** -0.0101 -0.0204 0.3448***   
H-share turnover 
 
0.0750*** -0.1022*** -0.0816*** 
H-share number of analysts 
  
0.1505*** -0.1097*** 
H-share size (in RMB) 
   
-0.1006*** 
 
Table III Panel C provides the correlation coefficients among the liquidity measures, the 
transparency measure, and the size of the H-shares and underlying home shares. For A- shares, 
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the Amihud measure is negatively correlated with the turnover ratio, analyst coverage, mutual 
fund holdings, and the size of A-shares; the analyst coverage is positively correlated with mutual 
fund holdings as well as the size of A-shares. These results are consistent with the notion that 
liquidity is positively related to analyst coverage and mutual fund holding. However, the 
turnover ratio in the A-shares market is negatively correlated with analyst coverage, mutual fund 
holdings, and the size of the A-shares. This result is counter-intuitive. A possible reason is that 
some of the trading may come from excessive speculation or insider information; if so, analyst 
and mutual funds might avoid these shares. To the extent this explanation is true it suggests that 
turnover is a noisy indicator of liquidity. For H-shares the results are similar, but with one 
exception. Namely, the correlation between the number of analysts and turnover ratio is negative, 
which is consistent with the results of empirical studies that liquidity and transparency tend to be 
positively related. This is not true for the A-share market perhaps because, as previously argued, 
there is excessive speculation in the A-share market. Moreover, the negative correlation between 
H-share analyst coverage and H-share trading infrequency also indicates that less active trading 
activity is associated with little analyst coverage.  
5. Methodology and Empirical Results: 
 There is considerable support in the literature in regards to the Big 4 auditors providing 
higher audit quality and therefore more transparency. Fan and Wong (2005) show that the Big 4 
auditors provide a corporate governance role in emerging Asian markets. Gul, Kim and Qiu 
(2010) show greater stock price informativeness in firms audited by the Big 4 auditors in China. 
The alternative analysis is to include Big 4 as a dummy in the regression analysis; however, 
including it in a fixed effect regression might be problematic since the auditor information is 
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only available as annual data.24 Therefore, I categorize the firms into those audited by local 
auditors and those audited by Big 4 auditors in order to proxy for less transparent and transparent 
firms. I find that firms audited by the Big 4 are generally associated with smaller H-share 
discounts, higher mutual fund holdings, a higher number of A- and H-share analysts, and higher 
liquidity. Table IV reports the year by year and full sample period mean and median statistics of 
these two groups. I perform a non-parametric Mann–Whitney U test to test the difference in 
mean and median between local auditors and Big 4 auditors groups on a year by year basis. The 
yearly basis analysis is aimed to capture the group difference as much as possible. Since the H-
shares discount also exhibits time-varying changes, as shown in Figure II, year by year analysis 
will mitigate the potential time-varying effect and offer a clear picture of the difference between 
the local auditors and Big 4 auditors groups.    
Table IV shows that average H-share discounts are lower for Big 4 auditors through the 
entire sample, with the difference between the two groups both statistically significant in mean 
and median. In addition, the Big 4 auditor group is also associated with higher average mutual 
fund holdings, with the difference between the two groups statistically significant for years 2003, 
2004, 2005, 2008, 2010, & 2011. The Big 4 auditor group also is associated with higher average 
A-share analyst coverage, with the difference between the two groups statistically significant for 
years 2003, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, & 2011. Finally, the Big 4 is associated with higher 
average H-share analyst coverage, with the difference between the two groups statistically 
significant for years 2003-2011.These findings provide further evidence that transparency does 
indeed impact the price differentials between A- and H-shares. 
  
                                                          
24
 Fixed effect regression models involve subtracting group means from the regressors. This means that one can only 
include time-varying regressors in the model. Since Big 4 is a yearly dummy, it is not desirable to include it in the 
fixed effects model. 
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Table IV. Firms Audited by Big4 VS. Non-Big 4  
Breaking the sample into two groups by auditors and by year: Big4=1if firms use Big 4 auditors and Big4=0 if the firms use local auditors. H-discount: V
`,$ a Vb7c _dYW X `,eW 2 1X , ` ,$   or `,e    is the H-or A-share price for firm i in month t. Individual H-shares and A-shares’ Amihud liquidity measures are 
defined as the ratio of absolute daily return and dollar volume. Daily measures are then averaged to provide a monthly series. Turnover is defined as the number 
of shares traded divided by the total number of shares outstanding. Trading infrequency is obtained by dividing the number of days that H-share are not traded by 
the number of trading days in a given month. A or H analyst number are number of analysts following a firm in A-or H-share market, and A mutual fund holding 
is the percentage of firms shares hold by mutual funds. A-or H-share size is defined as the market value of A- or H-share. The following table reports the year by 
year mean and median statistics for these two groups. The results of the nonparametric Mann-Whitney Rank test (or Wilcoxon Rank Sum) are specified in the 
panels. (***, ** and * denote significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%) 
 
    Hdiscount Aamihud Aturnover Holding Asize Hamihud Hturnover Infrequency Hsize Aanalyst Hanalyst 
Year=2003 
Big4=0 Mean -0.72760 3.63E-09 0.01404 0.02010 892658336 1.39E-07 0.00932 0.06052 1014653287 0.14815 0.06481 
Big4=1 Mean -0.56856 2.20E-09 0.01516 1.13637 2173589576 1.73E-08 0.01203 0.02960 4144140812 0.27619 0.33654 
Difference -7.35*** 5.51*** 0.5789 -7.80*** -7.43*** 5.82*** -1.94* 2.72*** -6.27*** -1.90* -3.55*** 
Big4=0 Median -0.75399 2.98E-09 0.01006 0.00000 646792282 7.26E-09 0.00824 0.04348 406212893 0.00000 0.00000 
Big4=1 Median -0.60382 1.14E-09 0.00979 0.22176 1459021429 1.92E-09 0.00873 0.00000 1474803671 0.00000 0.00000 
Difference -7.09*** 4.26*** 0.24 -6.41*** -6.15*** 4.02*** -0.71 2.06** -4.26*** -1.84* -3.52*** 
             
Year=2004 
Big4=0 Mean -0.65768 5.82E-09 0.01402 1.25732 1017569795 1.80E-07 0.00683 0.05571 1484055366 0.29897 0.43299 
Big4=1 Mean -0.44530 2.31E-09 0.01457 1.85828 2676003409 1.43E-08 0.01029 0.04284 6311075273 0.26754 0.76754 
Difference -9.05*** 6.22*** -0.38 -2.62*** -7.75*** 7.01*** -4.10*** 1.06 -7.06*** 0.30 -2.29** 
Big4=0 Median -0.69986 3.20E-09 0.01092 0.22438 590584615 1.51E-08 0.00501 0.04545 374000000 0.00000 0.00000 
Big4=1 Median -0.43084 1.04E-09 0.01093 0.79267 1635324394 1.19E-09 0.00757 0.04545 2834733156 0.00000 0.00000 
Difference -8.56*** 5.48*** -0.08 -1.54 -6.86*** 5.72*** -2.51** 0.60 -5.62*** 0.27 -1.82* 
             
Year=2005 
Big4=0 Mean -0.50313 6.62E-09 0.01789 0.97404 767325676 1.94E-07 0.00621 0.07473 1677841808 0.38824 0.48235 
Big4=1 Mean -0.24541 3.10E-09 0.01540 2.27862 2321431481 2.41E-08 0.00677 0.04849 6338587191 0.83740 0.86122 
Difference -8.61*** 7.15*** 1.42 -4.08*** -7.27*** 6.51*** -1.41 1.84* -7.04*** -1.58 -2.92*** 
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Big4=0 Median -0.54310 5.39E-09 0.01275 0.54984 432198520 1.10E-08 0.00507 0.04762 329560000 0.00000 0.00000 
Big4=1 Median -0.22168 1.07E-09 0.01198 1.10243 1561835000 1.25E-09 0.00577 0.04762 3192907901 0.00000 0.00000 
Difference -7.38*** 6.69*** 0.41 -2.85*** -7.19*** 5.43*** -1.60 1.15 -6.88*** -1.14 -2.50* 
             
Year=2006 
Big4=0 Mean -0.47604 2.39E-09 0.03206 1.29914 892853058 3.80E-08 0.00742 0.03470 1572836221 0.82418 0.39560 
Big4=1 Mean -0.17004 7.51E-10 0.03337 1.98394 4691602059 1.46E-08 0.01039 0.03352 1.8867E+10 1.22481 1.33865 
Difference -9.08*** 8.57*** 1.71* -1.20 -9.62*** 9.63*** -2.66*** 0.48 -9.63*** -2.63*** -7.37*** 
Big4=0 Median -0.57982 1.93E-09 0.02970 0.57795 472133333 1.66E-08 0.00519 0.00000 376736742 0.00000 0.00000 
Big4=1 Median -0.13471 3.82E-10 0.02567 0.48024 2234657143 6.93E-10 0.00780 0.00000 4325920359 0.00000 1.00000 
  Difference  -6.66***  6.73***  2.35**  0.64 -7.39***   8.19***  -2.77***  0.73  -8.13***  -2.92***  -7.87*** 
             
year=2007             
big4=0 Mean -0.48328 5.89E-10 0.04980 3.50367 6519158249 6.62E-09 0.01434 0.04575 7487773181 1.43119 0.45794 
big4=1 Mean -0.38234 2.86E-10 0.04267 2.89575 2.3692E+10 5.63E-10 0.01269 0.02773 7.8114E+10 1.89974 1.65229 
 Difference -5.37*** 9.30*** 2.39** -0.53 -9.24*** 10.88*** 0.19 2.68*** -10.28*** -1.79* -8.59*** 
big4=0 Median -0.50310 3.65E-10 0.04473 1.88556 2288156367 2.60E-09 0.00914 0.04545 1218834058 0.00000 0.00000 
big4=1 Median -0.37287 7.63E-11 0.03594 1.09923 1.1389E+10 1.63E-10 0.01005 0.00000 1.2974E+10 0.00000 1.00000 
 Difference -4.67*** 7.27*** 1.63 0.54 -5.75*** 7.93*** -0.76 2.82*** -7.71*** -1.17 -8.76*** 
 
            
year=2008             
big4=0 Mean -0.53351 1.25E-09 0.02330 3.24822 7831529314 1.08E-07 0.01014 0.01578 9168012639 3.50000 1.22436 
big4=1 Mean -0.41150 4.49E-10 0.01902 3.12638 3.063E+10 1.32E-07 0.01060 0.01336 5.6793E+10 4.97474 1.59488 
 Difference -5.33*** 6.98*** 6.61*** 1.96** -9.21*** 7.96*** -1.10 1.74* -8.83*** -3.26*** -3.86*** 
big4=0 Median -0.57303 4.47E-10 0.02033 1.87487 3340988381 1.95E-09 0.00825 0.00000 2393774760 1.00000 1.00000 
big4=1 Median -0.42100 1.76E-10 0.01261 1.27992 1.3151E+10 3.04E-10 0.00901 0.00000 1.4538E+10 2.00000 1.00000 
 Difference -4.40*** 4.63*** 6.11*** 2.42** -6.62*** 5.00*** -1.27 1.65* -5.51*** -2.50** -3.12*** 
             
year=2009             
big4=0 Mean -0.54520 4.56E-10 0.03812 2.75474 8630080303 5.63E-08 0.01585 0.01382 5810210034 2.34300 1.10244 
big4=1 Mean -0.37897 1.16E-10 0.02439 3.00480 5.5269E+10 5.90E-07 0.00990 0.00747 5.8111E+10 4.19008 1.51975 
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 Difference -7.22*** 10.37*** 7.11*** -1.48 -11.21*** 10.18*** 6.71*** 1.29 -12.17*** -6.38*** -5.12*** 
big4=0 Median -0.58096 1.77E-10 0.02907 1.15075 3973218612 1.73E-09 0.01163 0.00000 1722016961 0.00000 0.00000 
big4=1 Median -0.40036 5.47E-11 0.01863 1.12335 1.7032E+10 1.97E-10 0.00808 0.00000 1.5484E+10 2.00000 1.00000 
 Difference -6.53*** 8.07*** 4.26*** 0.27 -7.52*** 7.74*** 5.91*** 1.31 -7.86*** -6.22*** -5.67*** 
 
            
year=2010             
big4=0 Mean -0.44433 3.08E-10 0.02101 2.58307 1.2572E+10 7.61E-09 0.00888 0.00143 7518456897 2.62551 0.72083 
big4=1 Mean -0.23672 1.25E-10 0.01399 2.95193 1.2066E+11 2.26E-08 0.00666 0.00403 7.0293E+10 5.68327 1.43687 
 Difference -8.46*** 11.00*** 10.24*** -0.21 -12.56*** 11.49*** 4.98*** -0.35 -13.11*** -6.02*** -7.26*** 
big4=0 Median -0.47811 1.78E-10 0.01593 1.46900 6703820455 1.56E-09 0.00707 0.00000 2386747000 0.00000 0.00000 
big4=1 Median -0.25797 5.27E-11 0.00729 1.19928 2.1848E+10 1.35E-10 0.00531 0.00000 2.1483E+10 2.00000 1.00000 
 Difference -6.14*** 9.01*** 9.16*** 1.67* -8.96*** 8.85*** 4.63*** -0.33 -9.74*** -4.65*** -7.38*** 
 
            
year=2011             
big4=0 Mean -0.47994 4.81E-10 0.01306 1.51994 1.8957E+10 4.54E-08 0.00729 0.01194 7797835987 2.71681 0.62222 
big4=1 Mean -0.27652 1.93E-10 0.00907 2.84861 1.4295E+11 2.45E-08 0.00576 0.00659 7.9608E+10 4.58574 1.34354 
 Difference -8.80*** 9.20*** 5.60*** -4.91*** -10.51*** 9.04*** 2.45** 1.67* -11.16*** -4.61*** -7.66*** 
big4=0 Median -0.52860 2.17E-10 0.00672 0.79911 6899028021 1.40E-09 0.00594 0.00000 3203007300 1.00000 0.00000 
big4=1 Median -0.28309 7.12E-11 0.00457 1.21028 4.2076E+10 2.30E-10 0.00475 0.00000 1.5518E+10 2.00000 1.00000 
 Difference -7.01*** 7.84*** 4.24*** -2.48** -6.55*** 7.22*** 2.21** 1.55 -9.36*** -4.00*** -7.80*** 
             
Full Sample             
big4=0 Mean -0.53897 2.39E-09 0.02481 1.90669 6453352748 8.61E-08 0.00959 0.03493 4836852824 1.58623 0.61150 
big4=1 Mean -0.34615 1.06E-09 0.02085 2.45385 42784847392 9.33E-08 0.00945 0.02374 42064422586 2.65995 1.20570 
 Difference -9.00*** 2.99*** 2.43*** -2.51*** -2.29** -0.10 0.13 2.88*** -3.78*** -3.10*** -5.60*** 
big4=0 Median -0.58229 1.65E-09 0.02002 0.94794 2816324510 6.58E-09 0.00728 0.02022 1378987746 0.22222 0.11111 
big4=1 Median -0.33240 4.09E-10 0.01242 0.89210 12239131203 5.99E-10 0.00659 0.01034 9722160525 0.88889 0.55556 
 Difference -7.00*** 2.53*** 3.43*** 0.02 -2.62*** 3.04*** -0.25 1.51 -4.17*** -2.31** -3.16*** 
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Next, a panel approach is used to examine the extent to which variations of the discount 
attached to H-shares across time and firms are related to exchange rate, market return, liquidity 
effect, and transparency effect. More specifically, the independent variables include: the change 
in exchange rate of Hong Kong Dollars to one Renminbi to (HKD/RMB), the ratio of A- and H-
shares’ market return, the size ratio of A- and H-shares, the relative Amihud illiquidity measure 
of A-and H- share, the relative turnover ratio measure of A-and H- share, H share trading 
infrequency, the number of analysts for A-shares, the number of analysts for H-shares, and 
mutual fund holdings of A-shares.  
 
The full model of the regression is specified as follow: 
DiscountH,it=β0+β1∆Exchange Rate(
HKD
RMBW )t+β2 A HW Market Return Ratiot+ 
β
3
A
HW Share Sizeit+β4 A HW Amihud Ratioit+β5 A HW Turnover Ratioit+β6H Trading Infrequencyit 
+β
7
 No.A.Analyst
it
+β
8
 No.H.Analyst
it
+β
9
Mutual Fund Holdings
it
+εit                                                (1) 
 
where ∆Exchange Rate( HKD RMBW )tis the change in the exchange rate of Hong Kong Dollar to 
one Renminbi (1 RMB to X HKD), A HW Market Return Ratiot is the return on the Shanghai 
Composite A-share Index divided by the return on Hong Kong Hang Seng Index for month t, 
A
HW Share Sizeitis the size of the A-shares for firm i divided by the size of the H-shares for 
month t ,  A HW Amihud Ratioit is A-share Amihud illiquidity measure divided by that of H-share, 
A
HW Turnover Ratioit is A-share turnover ratio divided by that of H-share adjusted by number of 
outstanding shares in each market, 
 
 No.A.Analyst
it
 and  No.H.Analyst
it
  are numbers of analysts 
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following firm i in month t for A-and H-share markets respectively, and Mutual Fund Holdings
it
 
is the percentage of firm i’s A-shares held by mutual funds in month t. 
            Table V presents the results of employing this model to explain the H-share discount with 
and without allowance for company-specific fixed effects.25 The negative coefficients indicate 
that the variables in question have the effect of making the H-share discount bigger, i.e., more 
negative. The panel analysis first looks at aggregate effects such as change in the exchange rate, 
relative market performance, and then focuses on firm-level relative liquidity and transparency 
effects. The regression results presented in Table V consist of 68 firms for the period of January 
2003 to December 2011. The number of total observation is 4,695.
                                                          
25
 The choice for using a fixed effects model is based on the results of the Hausman test. The Hausman specification 
test compares the fixed versus random effects under the null hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated 
with the other regressors in the model. Based on my test results the null hypothesis is rejected; therefore, a random 
effects model produces biased estimators. So, a fixed effects model is preferred.  
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Table V. Panel Regression of H-share Discount 
The dependent variable is H-share discount: V `,$ a Vb7c _dYW X `,eW 2 1X , `,$   or `,e    is the H-or A-share price for firm i in month t. ∆ Exchange Rate is 
the change in the exchange rate of HK Dollars against 1 RMB. A/H market return is the return on the Shanghai Composite A-share Index divided by that of Hong 
Kong Hang Seng Index, A/H Share Size is the A-share market value divided by that of H-share, A/H Amihud  is A-share illiquidity divided by H-share illiquidity, 
A/H Turnover is the A-share turnover ratio divide by that of H-share, H trading infrequency is the fraction of zero trading days in month t for H-share, 
No.A.Aanlysts and No.H.Aanlysts are numbers of analysts following a firm in A-or H-share market, and mutual fund holdings (A) is the percentage of firms 
shares held by mutual funds. All data is monthly data. Models (1)-(11) are pooled regressions, and (12)-(20) are regressions controlling for company fixed effect. 
Models (11) and (22) are full models that also include the lagged value of independent variables (***, ** and * denote significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%). 
 
 
Pooled Regression Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) Model (10) Model (11) 
Constant -0.2940*** -0.2430*** -0.2430*** -0.2512*** -0.2497*** -0.2212*** -0.3130*** -0.3668*** -0.4001*** -0.4000*** -0.4341*** 
∆ Exchange Rate 0.0912*** 0.0945*** 0.0952*** 0.0957*** 0.0946*** 0.0900*** 0.0947*** 0.0855*** 0.0688*** 0.0689*** 0.0417*** 
A/H Market Return  
 
0.0030*** 0.0029*** 0.0030*** 0.0030*** 0.0026*** 0.0049*** 0.0044*** 0.0037*** 0.0037*** 0.0032*** 
A/H Share Size 
  
-0.0284*** -0.0271*** -0.0267*** -0.0250*** -0.0242*** -0.0211*** -0.0252*** -0.0251*** -0.0248*** 
A/H Amihud Ratio 
   
0.0059*** 0.0058*** 0.0055*** 0.0045*** 0.0040*** 0.0055*** 0.0055** 0.0032** 
A/H Turnover Ratio 
    
-0.0284*** -0.0041 -0.0098* -0.0104* -0.0094* -0.0002* -0.0020 
H Trading Infrequency 
     
-1.5052*** -1.2199*** -1.1272*** -1.0280*** -1.0266*** -0.7676*** 
No.A.Aanlysts 
      
0.0269*** 0.0255*** 0.0220*** 0.0220*** 0.0188*** 
No.H.Aanlysts 
      
  0.0469*** 0.0405*** 0.0405*** 0.0116*** 
Mutual Fund Holdings (A) 
        
0.0248*** 0.0248*** 0.0093*** 
R-square 0.3431 
 
0.3630 0.3647 0.3678 0.4013 0.4983 0.5183 0.5615 0.5615 0.6218 
Company Fixed Effect Model (12) Model (13) Model (14) Model (15) Model (16) Model (17) Model (18) Model (19) Model (20) Model (21) Model (22) 
Constant -0.1960*** -0.2017*** -0.2224*** -0.2227*** -0.2224*** -0.2141*** -0.2436*** -0.2576*** -0.2739*** -0.2720*** -0.3118*** 
∆ Exchange Rate 0.0438*** 0.0468*** 0.0470*** 0.0470*** 0.0470*** 0.0468*** 0.0516*** 0.0525*** 0.0492*** 0.0492*** 0.0440*** 
A/H Market Return  
 
0.0026 0.0026*** 0.0026*** 0.0026*** 0.0025*** 0.0032*** 0.0031*** 0.0030*** 0.0030*** 0.0028*** 
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A/H Share Size 
  
-0.016 1*** -0.0159 *** -0.0159 *** -0.0160 *** -0.0160 *** -0.0167*** -0.0167*** -0.0076*** -0.0257*** 
A/H Amihud Ratio 
   
0.0026*** 0.0026*** 0.0026*** 0.0026*** 0.0029*** 0.0029*** 0.0008*** 0.0025*** 
A/H Turnover Ratio 
    
-0.0011 -0.0033 -0.0028 -0.0031 -0.0029 -0.0003 -0.0047 
H Trading Infrequency 
     
-0.4120*** -0.3875*** -0.3817*** -0.3658*** -0.3633*** -0.3158*** 
No.A.Aanlysts 
      
0.0075*** 0.0076*** 0.0076*** 0.0076*** 0.0080*** 
No.H.Aanlysts 
       
0.0133*** 0.0129*** 0.0129 0.0033 
Mutual Fund Holdings (A) 
        
0.0062*** 0.0062 0.0001 
R-square 0.7012 0.7041 0.7062 0.7062 0.7062 0.7095 0.7187 0.7235 0.7248 0.8176 0.7523 
Observations 4695 4695 4695 4695 4695 4695 4695 4653 4653 4526 4526 
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 Model (1) indicates that the change of the exchange rate does in fact play an important 
role in determining the discount, explaining over 30% of the total variation on its own. The 
impact of change in exchange rate remains both statistically and economically significant as 
adding additional explanatory variables. An increase in the change in the exchange rate of Hong 
Kong Dollar to Renminbi (1 RMB to X HKD) means that the RMB is appreciating. The 
coefficient of ∆Exchange Rate( )HKD RMB is positive and significant indicating that the 
appreciating value of the RMB against the HKD is associated with a lower H-share discount. 
This means that the value of H-shares will benefit from a RMB appreciation. The reason is that 
the revenue of most of the H-share companies is denominated in RMB and, when converted into 
the HKD, this would result in higher revenue and profit. Further, this is also consistent with 
increased demand for Renminbi denominated Chinese stocks at times when investors expect 
Renminbi values to go up.   
 Model (2) allows for sentiment effects in addition to changes in exchange rates. The 
relative A/H market performance measure is positive and significantly related to the H-share 
discount. This implies that better market performance in the Chinese mainland stock market than 
that of the Hong Kong stock market is associated with a smaller H-share discount. This indicates 
A- and H-dual listed companies become more preferred than companies listed solely on the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange when the Hong Kong stock market goes down. In other words, dual 
listed company represents a source of diversification and therefore the demand for their stock is 
higher when the Chinese mainland stock market has relatively better market performance. Model 
(3) adds relative A/H share size as an explanatory variable. The negative coefficient indicates the 
smaller the H-share size, relative to the underlying A-share size, the higher the H-share discount. 
This is consistent with smaller companies that generally have higher trading costs, less cross 
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border information and more barriers to arbitrage – resulting in a higher H-share discount. This 
may also be a result of Hong Kong investors viewing the smaller issue of H-shares as being more 
risky and less liquid; therefore, requesting greater discount as compensation.  
 Models (4)-(6) add liquidity factors and examine their impacts on the H-share discount. 
Model (4) looks at the relative Amihud illiquidity ratio, which measures the price impact of 
liquidity. The positive coefficient suggests that the higher the relative illiquidity of H-share, as 
measured by the illiquidity of A-share divided by the illiquidity of H-share, the more the price of 
the H-share is discounted relative to the underlying A-share price. This result is consistent with 
the economic notion that an increase in the illiquidity requires more discount as compensation. 
This result remains robust as more explanatory variables are added in the model. Model (5) 
further examines the trading aspect of liquidity by adding a relative turnover ratio. Empirical 
results suggest that relatively active trading of A-share, as measured by turnover ratio of A-share 
divided by that of H-share, are associated with a larger H-share discount. This makes sense 
because investors require a higher discount for less actively traded H-shares for being less liquid. 
As mentioned earlier in some situations H-shares are so illiquid that there is virtually no trading 
at all. Model (6) examine this aspect of illiquidity by including H-share trading infrequency, 
computed as zero trading activity days divided by the total number of trading days in the month. 
The negative coefficients of H-share trading infrequency are significant at the1% level, which is 
consistent with the economic intuition that the more infrequently the company’ stock trades in 
the Hong Kong market, the more discount investors will require for its H-share. In sum, the 
results suggest that liquidity plays a role in the relative pricing of A-and H-shares. 
Models (7)-(8) focuses on the transparency effect on the H-share discount. The 
transparency measures are positively associated with a lower H-share discount. More specifically, 
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increases in the A- and H-share analyst coverage are associated with a smaller H- share discount. 
This indicates that as the number of analyst following a firm increases, the more transparent the 
firm becomes; thus, the smaller the price differentials across the two markets. Mutual fund 
holdings of A-shares also prove to be positively associated with a lower H-share discount. This is 
consistent with the notion that mutual funds provide governance and transparency, resulting in a 
decreasing price differential between A- and H-shares. 
  Model (9) is the full model, as specified in Equation (1). Model (10) controls for 
aggregate liquidity in two markets.26 Model (11) adds the lagged one-period value of 
independent variables to the full model , which should be subject to less potential endogeneity 
issues. The coefficients and their significance level obtained from these models are essentially 
the same with Model (9). Meanwhile, Models (12)-(22) show the estimates that result after 
controlling for company fixed effects; these findings are generally similar to those of the pooled 
regression. Thus, the estimation results from this study are robust and provide support for the 
notion that liquidity and transparency affect the relative pricing of A- and H-shares. 
6. Conclusion 
 This paper investigates the impact of liquidity and transparency on the relative pricing of 
A- and H-shares using a sample of 68 cross-listed A- and H-share Chinese firms from 2003 to 
2011. In terms of liquidity effects, I focus on three different aspects: Amihud illiquidity measure 
(Amihud, 2002), turnover ratio, as well as the infrequency of trading associated with H–shares.  
The higher the relative illiquidity of A-share, the more the price of the H-share is discounted 
relative to the underlying A-share price. In contrast, relatively active trading of A-shares is 
                                                          
26The turnover ratio is calculated as individual firm turnover ratio as a percentage of aggregate A- or H-share market 
turnover ratio 	A HW Turnover Ratioit/	A HW Turnover Ratiot. 
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associated with a larger H-share discount. Additionally, an increase of the infrequency of trading 
of H-share is accompanied with a larger H-share discount. 
 In regards to transparency effects, this paper first examines the quality of auditors as a 
measure of accounting transparency by comparing firms audited by Big 4 auditors versus firms 
audited by local auditors. Firms audited by the Big 4 are generally associated with smaller H-
share discounts, higher mutual fund holdings, a higher number of A- and H-share analysts, and 
higher liquidity. Moreover, analyst following is a mechanism that makes firms more transparent. 
Therefore, I examine analyst coverage for both A-and H-shares and find that an increase in the 
analyst coverage for both A- and H-shares is associated with a smaller discount for H-shares. In 
addition, mutual funds as institutional shareholders may also provide more transparency to a firm 
through their monitoring of firm’s activities. Empirical results suggest that an increase in mutual 
fund holdings of A-shares as measured by the percentage of a firm’s A-share hold by mutual 
funds is associated with a smaller H-share discount.  
 Overall, the results of this study provide support for the notion that liquidity and 
transparency affect the relative pricing of A- and H-shares.  
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Appendix. Data Collecting Resource: 
Daily stock price and trading volume  
Yahoo Finance: Historical Price, Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange. 
Analyst coverage data: 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/   http://quote.eastmoney.com/  http://stock.hexun.com/   
http://finance.people.com.cn/stock/  http://stock.stockstar.com/  http://www.caiguu.com/  
http://www.southmoney.com/  http://stock.fivip.com/  http://stock.sohu.com/  http://hao.360.cn/gupiaojijin.html 
I/B/E/S summary history data for analyst coverage before December 31st, 2009 
Return on the market indices: 
Yahoo Finance, Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and Shanghai Stock Exchange  
Exchange rate between Hong Kong Dollars to Renminbi: 
Yahoo Finance, Federal Reserve Economic Data – (St. Louis Fed) 
Mutual fund holding data: 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/   http://funds.money.hexun.com/fundsdata/ http://www.chinafund.cn/ 
http://fund.sohu.com/jjsj/     http://data.eastmoney.com/center/fund.html 
http://money.business.sohu.com/jijinshuju.shtml            http://data.cnfund.cn/ 
http://quote.hexun.com/fund/default.html          http://fund.jrj.com.cn/funddata/ 
Other data on the size of A-and H-shares and summary statistic for the sample firms: 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/   http://datainfo.stock.hexun.com/   http://www.wstock.net/wstock/shsz.htm          
Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
Data on auditing firms are collected through each firm’s auditing reports. 
The other financial data for the sample firms are collected through the company’s annual or 
quarterly accounting report
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